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INTRODUCTION
This case involves a condemnation action by the Utah Department of
Transportation ("UDOT") to acquire property owned by Admiral Beverage Corporation
("Admiral") as part of UDOT's project to reconstruct Interstate 15 ("1-15") in Salt Lake
City. The matter is on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, and the issues presented have
been fully briefed and heard by the Court. Subsequently, the Court requested
supplemental briefing and rehearing on the issue of whether the decision in Ivers v. Utah
Dep 't of Tramp., 2007 UT 19, 154 P.3d 802 ("Ivers") should be overruled on
constitutional grounds.
The Ivers decision held that severance damages in a condemnation action were
recoverable for impacts caused to a property for loss of view, but not for loss of visibility.
The decision's ruling on loss of visibility contravenes the constitutional protections of
just compensation afforded to landowners who must endure the involuntary taking of
their property by the government. The Ivers decision should be overruled.
The Ivers decision is constitutionally infirm in three regards: First, it ignores longstanding Utah eminent domain laws and fails to recognize a constitutional "taking" where
governmental actions constitute a substantial interference with property or cause a
material decrease in the property's value or the landowner's right to use and enjoy his
property. Second, it fails to provide landowners with the constitutionally required award
of just compensation for damages stemming from such interference, diminution in value,
and impairment of the use and enjoyment of the property by not putting the landowner in
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as good a position monetarily as he would have been in but-for the taking. Third, the
Ivers decision denies a landowner the ability to obtain the full measure of just
compensation by precluding the landowner from presenting evidence of all factors that
bear on the market value of the land after the taking of his property, the severance of his
land, and the damages caused to his property.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that Admiral5s property was taken "in
connection" with the UDOT's 1-15 Project and was an integral and essential part of the
Project. (R. at 493, 673, 678, 684, and Supreme Court Oral Argument, Hr'g. Tr. at p. 10,
11. 2-10. p. 16,11. 16-18. (Nov. 5, 2009)) ("It [the relocation of 500West] meets the
integrated project requirement."; "For purposes of this motion in limine, we agreed that it
was an essential part of the project.") (Addendum Tab D).1 As part of the Project, UDOT
elevated 1-15 by approximately 28 feet and consequently, the Project substantially
impaired the market value of the remaining portion of Admiral's property. (R. at 494).
In particular, the Project has significantly obstructed the visibility of and view from
Admiral's property, resulting in a depreciated market value to the remainder, a substantial

1

During oral argument before the Court, counsel for UDOT w7as asked whether the
relocation of 500 West "was part of the integrated project for which this property was
taken. Hr'g. Tr., p. 10,11. 2-3 (Addendum Tab D). In response, counsel stated "[i]t is,
yes." Id. at p. 10,11. 6-7. Then, the Court queried whether "to the extent, though, that
we're applying the Ivers standard that says it's part of the integrated project, it meets that
requirement? Id. at p. 10,11. 6-8. Counsel without qualification stated, "[i]t meets the
integrated project requirement." Id. at p. 10,11. 9-10. Counsel further stated that "[f]or
the purposes of this motion in limine, we agreed that it wras an essential part of the
project." Id. at 16,11. 16-18.
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impairment to Admiral's use and enjoyment of the property, which amounts to a "taking"
for which just compensation is owed under Utah's eminent domain law. Finally, because
the district court excluded any and all evidence of loss of visibility and loss of view
damages from its consideration of market value for severance damages, Admiral has been
denied the just compensation to which it is entitled to under the Utah Constitution.
The Ivers decision regarding loss of visibility runs afoul of the constitutional
mandate that just compensation be paid when private property is "taken or damaged" for
public use and should be overruled.2
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is on appeal from the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals issued on
November 28, 2008. Dep't of Tramp, v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 2008 UT App 426,
198 P.3d 1003. Admiral timely filed its Petition for Writ of Certiorari on December 29,
2008, which this Court granted on April 14, 2009. The matter is now before the Court on
rehearing pursuant to the Court's June 23, 2010 Order for Supplemental Briefing and
Rehearing. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter under the provisions of Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3) and Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

2

Admiral does not challenge the Ivers decision on the issue of loss of view, nor does it
contend that this portion of the Ivers decision violates Utah's constitution. However,
Admiral maintains its position that the Court of Appeals misinterpreted and misapplied
the Ivers decision on the loss of view issue. If the decision is properly read and the
clearly-stated standard for loss of view damages is appropriately applied to the facts of
this case—particularly with UDOT's admission that the relocation of 500 West was
essential for and integral to the 1-15 Project for purposes of the Ivers standard—loss of
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The Court framed the issue for supplemental briefing and rehearing as "whether
Ivers v. Utah Department of Transportation, 154 P.3d 802 (UT 2007) [(;;Ivers")] should
be overruled on constitutional grounds." Order for Supplemental Briefing and Rehearing
(Addendum Tab A). Of the two rulings in Ivers—that severance damages are not
recoverable in condemnation actions for loss of visibility, but they are available for loss
of view—Admiral only contests the portion of the Ivers decision relating to the Court's
denial of severance damages based upon loss of visibility.3 Accordingly, the issues on
Ivers' loss of visibility ruling are as follows:

(cont 'd)
view damages should be awarded to Admiral, with the single question remaining of the
amount of the award.
3

As noted in the footnote above, Admiral limits its challenge to the loss of visibility rule
announced in Ivers premised upon the understanding that this Court will render the
proper interpretation and application of the Ivers loss of view rule, which was
subsequently reaffirmed in Utah Dep't ofTransp. v. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, 218 P.3d 583
{"Ivers IF) (holding that "[w]hen land is condemned as part of a single project—even if
the view-impairing structure itself is built on property other than that which was
condemned—if the use of the condemned property is essential to the completion of the
project as a whole, the property owner is entitled to severance damages.").
Notably, the Utah Court of Appeals decision in the present case failed to apply the proper
standard for damages for loss of view in accordance with Ivers. Dep 't ofTransp. v.
Admiral Beverage Corp., 2008 UT App. 426,ffif3-5, P.3d 1003, 1004. Specifically, the
Court of Appeals' decision improperly applied the "abutment rule," when that rule w7as
neither applied, nor referenced in either Ivers or Ivers II. Nevertheless, the Court of
Appeals decision should be considered as effectively nullified - if not tacitly overruled in light of this Court's subsequent reaffirmation of the proper standard for the loss of
view rule in Ivers II. Ivers II, 2009 UT 56, If 14 (quoting Ivers, 2007 UT 19, % 21).
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1.

Whether the r uling in 1 vers denying se\ erance damages to landowners for

impairments and impacts arising from a loss of visibility of the properly violates the
constitutional mandate under the Utah Constitution requiring that "private property shall
not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." UTAH CONST, art.
I, § 22 (emphasis added).
2.

Whether the hers decision denying severance damages for loss of visibility

violates the constitutional requirement that just compensation be paid when the loss of
visibility results in a substantial interference with private property that destroys or
materially lessens its v ah le, or by w hich the owner's right to its I lse and enjoyment is
substantially abridged or destroyed.
3.

Whether the hers decision violates the constitutional requirement that the

lando wxiei' be paid the full 1 measure of just compensation w hich includes the depreciation
of the fair market value of the remainder property.
4.

Whether the hers decision violates the constitutional requirement that the

landowner be paid the full measure of just compensation when the Court improperly
precluded the landowner from presenting evidence of a ] 1 factors bearing on the property's
market value, including loss of visibility and the diminution of the market value of the
property.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The interpretation and application of case law is a question of law, which this
Court reviews for correctness. Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339. 346 (Utah 1996)

5-

("[W]e consider the trial court's interpretation of binding case law as presenting a
question of law and review the trial court's interpretation of that law for correctness/').
Moreover, this Court reviews constitutional challenges for correctness. State v. Johnson,
2009 UT App. 382, % 18, 224 P.3d 720 ("Appellate courts review constitutional
challenges for correctness.") (quoting State v. Sheperd, 1999 UT App 205, % 8, 989 P.2d
503 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted in original).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
1.

Utah Constitution, art. I, § 22.

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511(2); § 78B-6-512.

3.

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 45

4.

Ivers v. Utah Dep 't of Tramp., 2007 UT 19, 154 P.3d 802.

5.

Utah Dep't ofTransp. v. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, 218 P.3d 583 fivers IF)
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND CASE

I.

Factual Background Of The Case.
Admiral incorporates by reference its prior Statement of the Case into this brief,

and therefore only provides a brief summary of recent factual developments which have
occurred since the completion of the parties" briefing and oral argument.
In the original condemnation action, UDOT sought to acquire a portion of
Admiral's property as part of the reconstruction of 1-15 in Salt Lake City (the "Projecf).
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(R. at 11-20).4 UDO I : s I- ] 5 reconstruction Project involved not only construction work
on the Interstate high;v\ a\ ., but also requi red the w idening and relocating of 500 '\;lv est,
which served as a frontage road to 1-15 and is owned by Salt Lake City. (R. at 493-94).
Admiral owns two lots located directly west of 1-15 and bordering on 500 West.
(R. at 494), A portion of Admiral5s property was required for the 1-15 Project, (R at TITS) \ dmiral's property 'was physically used for the relocation and reconstruction of 500
West. There is no dispute that the taking of Admiral's property was necessary and
essential for the 1-15 Project. (R, at 673, 678, 684; see Admiral Reply Br. at 9 (Utah Ct.
App., Sept. 1 7, 2008)).
During oral argument and on ' - *\, -*J s : >:•-*- <.

•

'>

--*• •* v;. .• *i-e

widening of 500 West was essential and "integral" to UDOT's I-15 Project - an
admission that triggers the standards set forth in Ivers, 2007 Ul
Argument, Hrg

l

'

\

° Supreme Court Oral

....

-,::*

:

^ **. • t.e

exchange between this Court and counsel for UDOT:

21
22
23
24
25

MR. BURNETT: May it please The Court, first
a correction. Fifth West is, was, continues to be a
Salt Lake City-owned street. Yes, the Department of
Transportation, as part of the 1-15 remodeling, did
move a purchased property so as to remake Fifth West
10

1 :,)rV;,. ^ . -. ity.
4

See Admiral's Opening Brief for full discussion of the ownership history of the ^ r ^ e n y
at issue in this case. (Admiral's Opening Br. 2-3.).
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2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

THE COURT: It was part of the integrated
project for which this property was taken?
MR. BURNETT: It is, yes. But the road
itself is owned by Salt Lake.
THE COURT: But to the extent, though, that
f
we re applying the Ivers standard that says it's part
of the integrated project, it meets that requirement?
MR. BURNETT: It meets the integrated

10 project requirement
Id. at p. 9,11. 21-25, p. 10,11. 1-10 (emphasis added). In addition, the following
discussion between the Court and counsel for UDOT was had, whereby counsel admitted
that the widening of 500 West was "an essential part of the project:"

14
15
16
17

16
Because if you had not widened Fifth West,
could you have raised the freeway?
MR. BURNETT: No. For the purposes of this
motion in limine, we agreed that it was an essential

18 part of the project.
Id. at 16,11. 16-18 (emphasis added).
The 1-15 Project involved elevating the reconstructed highway, which increased
the height of the roadway and its abutting wall to a height of approximately 28 feet above
Admiral's property and about 6 inches outside the prior southeast corner of its property.
(R. at 181, 494-95). As part of its claim for just compensation, Admiral sought several
types of severance damages caused to its property, including damages for loss of
visibility and loss of view. (R. at 494). Admiral's claims for damages were supported by
Admiral's expert appraiser, who had appraised the property and assessed the impacts of
the taking on the fair market value of the property. (Id.) Based upon his analysis and
-8-

conclusions, UDOT's taking caused substantial damage to Admiral's property, including
a significant depreciation in the market \ ah le of the remaining property. (Id.)
II.

Procedural Background Of The Case,
Admiral's outline of the procedural background of this case in its Statement of the

Case is Incorporated herein b)< reference

V brief summar> of the ea>c ana mv. aeiaiis o:

recent: procedural developments since the completion of the pa rties' briefing are provided
herein.
Procedurally, this case is on appeal from the district court's grant of UDOT's
motions in limine to excli ide evidence of Admiral's severance damages, specifically its
damages for loss of view and loss of visibility. (Minute Entry, Consolidated Case No.
970905361CD and 970905368CD (Dec. 27, 2007) (R.866) (Addendum Tab C)
(affirming Memorandum Decision and Order (Oct. 31, 2005) (Addendum I ab B) (R at
492.500))).
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling on November 28, 2008.
Dep't ofTransp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 2008 UTApp. 426..fflj3-5. The Utah
Supreme Court granted certiorari on April 1 7., 2009. and af ter being fully briefed on the
issues presented, the Court heard oral argument on November 55 2009. Following oral
argument, on June 23, 2010, the Court issued an Order for Supplemental Briefing and
Rehearing on the issue of "whether hers v. Utah Department of Transportation, 154 P 3d
802 (UT 2007) should be overruled on con stiti itional grounds."!" Order for Supplemental
Briefing and Rehearing (Addendum Tab A).

.9.

Since the Court granted certiorari in this matter, the Ivers case has twice returned
to the Utah Supreme Court on appeal. In April 2009, the Court took up the case on
appeal for a second time, and in August 2009, it issued its decision in "Tvers IIP Utah
Dep 't of Tramp, v. hers. 2009 UT 56 fivers

IP).

The Court in Ivers //reaffirmed its prior ruling on loss of view and concluded that
the district court both exceeded the scope of the remand order issued in Ivers and
misinterpreted the statute by allowing the amendment of pleadings following the entry of
the Final Order of Condemnation and remand. Id. at ^ 20, 27. In its analysis of the
scope of remand issue, the Court re-affirmed its prior ruling in Ivers that "severance
damages are awardable for the loss of view—even if the view-impairing structure is not
built on the condemned land—if the 'condemned property is essential to the completion
of the project as a whole/" Id. at \ 14 (quoting Ivers, 2007 UT 19, ^j 21). It further
concluded that when UDOT admitted that the partial taking of the Arby's property was
essential to the completion of the construction project, all that was left for the district
court to do was to award Arby's appropriate severance damages. Id.
On remand the case proceeded to trial on April 13-15, 2010, on the issue of
Arby's claim for severance damages resulting from the obstruction built by UDOT.
(Addendum Tab F. Attach. A & C.) The jury declined to award Arby's severance
damages based upon loss of view—despite the fact that Arby's suffered such losses as a
result of UDOT's actions. (Id.) Arby's has once again appealed the results from the trial
court proceedings. (Addendum Tab F, Attach. B.)
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III.

Factual and Procedural Background Olivers v. Utah Dep't of Tramp.
Because the issue presently before the Coi u: t in\ Dives the constit utionalit} of the

decision in Ivers, 2007 U T 19, a detailed discussion of the Court's decision, analysis and
reasoning is warranted.
r

I hzlvers

ease iiiv olved a condemnation ac tion by I J D O I ' as pai t of a highvv ay

project to construct a frontage road adjacent to U.S. Highway 89 in Farmington, I Jtah.
Ivers, 2007 U T 19, r r L 2. The frontage road construction was part of a larger project to
improve Highway 89. .. ;:i its condemnation action, 1 DO I sought to acquire a portion
of property belonging \c- !V doners (collectively referred to as " A rby's"). Id at ( | 2.
Similar to the present condemnation action, the property UDOT acquired in Ivers was
used for the creation of the frontage road, and no portion of the raised highway, its
footings, or its foundation w as constructed on Arb> ' 's c ondemned property. Id. at M\ f 3
A spart of its claim for just compen sation A rb> 's son iglit severance damages
resulting from the loss of visibility of its restaurant from the highway and the loss of view
from the property. Id. at *[[ 5. Axby's argued that the loss of visibility and view materially
diminished the market value of its remaining property. Id.
In response, UDOT moved to exclude evidence of both the loss of visibility and
view. Id. The district court granted UDOT's motion, and Arby's appealed. Id. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the district cour rs decision Id. Arby"'s subsequently sought,
and was granted, a writ of certiorari.
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In Ivers, the Utah Supreme Court addressed two issues: First, "whether a
landowner has a protectable property interest in the visibility of his land/' and second,
whether severance damages are awardable for the loss of view where "land was
condemned as part of a single project to build a structure that would impair the view from
the remaining property, but in which that structure was not built on the severed land." Id.
atffij11, 17; see Ivers II, 2009 UT 56, \ 5. On the first question, the Court concluded that
landowners did not have a protected interest in the visibility of their property7 and
affirmed the district court's grant of UDOT's motion in limine to exclude evidence of
loss of visibility. Ivers, 2007 UT 19,ffif12, 15; Ivers II, 2009 UT 56, \ 5.
On the second question regarding loss of view, the Court announced for the first
time that under Utah's eminent domain laws,
[w]hen land is condemned as part of a single project—even if
the view-impairing structure itself is built on property
other than that which was condemned—if the use of the
condemned property is essential to the completion of the
property as a whole, the property owner is entitled to
severance damages.
Ivers, 2007 UT 19, f 21 (emphasis added). The Court's ruling expanded the prior
law that limited severance damage awards to situations where the view-impairing
structure is built directly on the condemned land and causes damage to the remainder
property. Id. at % 16 (citing Utah State Rd Comm 'n v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926, 928-29 (Utah
1974); Utah Dep't of Trans, v. D'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220, 1222 (Utah 1987) and Utah
Dep 't ofTransp. v. Harvey Real Estate, 2002 UT 107 % 10, 57 P.3d 1088)).
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Under Ivers' new test for severance damages, when a view-impairing structure is
constructed on property other than the condemned property, the land owner is entitled to
severance damages for loss of view "if the i lse of the condemned property is essential to
the completion of the project as a whole." Ivers, 2007 UT 19, ^ 21 (emphasis added).
The Court explained that the property is "essential" to the project if its use "is such a
critical part of the project, tha t without the taking, the pt oject could not ha\ e been
completed." Id.
Applying this standard, the Court concluded that Arby's would be entitled to
severance damages if the condemned property was "essential" to the project. Id. at Tj 24.
However, the (\ »nrl was nnahlc lo detemiiha mi tha nauu'il before it whether the had 'n a>
"essential to the project" and the Court remanded the case for a factual determination on
that question. The Court specifically instructed the district court that if the condemned
property \ub "essential" hi lite project, llien Ark *s was entitled to appropriate damages.
Id atffif23, 24; see Ivers II, 2009 UT 56,ffi[1, 6.
On remand, UDOT admitted that Arby's condemned property was essential to the
project. Ivers, 2007 11 "1 I "^ ^i <>. Despite that admission, the district court failed to
determine or awrard \ rbyas damages, as ordered by the Supreme Cour t h / Instead, the
district court permitted UDOT to argue for the first time on remand that (1) Arby's did
not have a compensable right of view that would entitle it to severance damages because
a prior deed executed by A rby's predecessors had relinquished to IJDO I ' all appurtenant
rights, including the right of view; and (2) UDOT was allowed to amend its tale sr. • V-- r
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was no longer taking Arby's right of view as part of its condemnation action. Id. atffl{6,
7. The district court rejected UDOT's first argument, but agreed with its second one. Id.
at \ 7. The district court then ruled that it no longer had jurisdiction over the issue
because UDOT no longer claimed to take Arby's right of view and did not award Arby's
damages for loss of view. Id. Arby's once again appealed the district court's decision.
Id.
The Utah Supreme Court took up the case on appeal for a second time, and in
August 2009, it issued its decision in "Ivers II" Utah Dep 7 ofTransp. v. Ivers, 2009 UT
56 ('Tvers IF). In the second appeal, the Court considered the issues of:
"(1) whether the district court violated our mandate in Ivers I
to determine whether Arby's condemned land was essential to
the project and if so, award appropriate damages; (2) whether
the district court misinterpreted Utah Code section 78B-6-512
(2) to allow UDOT to amend its complaint at any time in
order to exclude a property right from the original scope of its
taking; and (3) whether UDOT's strategy of shifting theories
warrants a change in the date of valuation."
Id. at % 10. The Utah Supreme Court held that the district court exceeded the scope of the
remand order in Ivers and that it misinterpreted the statute allowing for the amendment of
pleadings following the entry of the Final Order of Condemnation and remand. Ivers II,
2009 UT 56, THf 20, 27. The Court further concluded that UDOT had failed to preserve
the valuation issue, and therefore the Court did not reach the issue on appeal. Id. at \ 30.
The Court reversed the district court's order and once again remanded the case. Id. at f
31.
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In its anahsiv the ('ourt n>emphasi/ed its prioi ruling from Ivers that "severance
damages are awardable for the loss of view—even if the vi<:\^ -impairing structure h. imi
built on the condemned land—if the 'condemned property is essential to the completion
of the project as a whv>:c.
concluded"'

''|,:

. . .•:.* ;4 • quoting Ivers, 2007 TTT 1Q. * 21). It further
mm.*- • * ;• i\v p i ::.' .> - ^ m Vib) \s property was

essential to the completion of the construction project, all that was left for the district
court to do was to award Arby's the appropriate severance damages. Id.
On the second remand back to the district court.., the case proceeded to trial on
April 13-15, 2010, with respect to Arby's claim, for se\ i/nince damages resulting from the
obstruction built by UDOT, (Addendum Tab F? Attach. A). The jury declined to award
Arby's severance damages based upon loss of view—despite the fact Arby's suffered
such losses as;nrsiiIf nfULK ) Ts actions i 'n i Aih\

I ia> once again appealed the

resultsfromthe trial court proceedings. (Id. Tab F, Attach. B).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Ivers decision and its holding that severance damages for loss of visibility are
not compensable—despite the impacts caused by such loss on the remainder property and
the resulting depreciation in the landowner's property—deprive landowners, such as
Admiral, of their constitutional guarantees and their right to receive just compensation.3

3

Article I, § 22 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[p]rivate property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."
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First, the denial of severance damages for loss of visibility in Ivers fails to
acknowledge that a constitutional 'taking" has occurred for such losses and. therefore
fails to fully compensate Admiral, and other similarly situated landowners, for the
"substantial interference with private property which destroys or materially lessens its
value," or for the substantial impairment or destruction of their right to its use and
enjoyment. Colman v. Utah State LandBd., 795 P.2d 622, 625-26 (Utah 1990) (citations
omitted).
Second, Ivers' denial of loss of visibility severance damages fails to award
landowners, like Admiral, the full measure of "just compensation" as required by Utah's
Constitution. Utah State Road Comm 'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 828 (Utah 1971) ("For
compensation to be fair and just, it must reflect the fair value of the land to the
landowner. Just compensation means that the owners must be put in as good a position
money wise as they would have occupied had their property not been taken."); City of
Hildale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56,1 19, 28 P.3d 697 (same).
Third, the conclusion reached in Ivers—that a landowner cannot present evidence
of all damages that result in a depreciation of the market value of his land—contravenes
the constitutional requirement that "just compensation" be paid. See City of Hildale v.
Cooke, 2001 UT 56, \ 18, 28 P.3d 697. See also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511 (the
finder of fact must "hear any legal evidence offered by any of the parties to the
proceedings, and determine and assess" the market value of the property taken or
damaged) (emphasis added); § 78B-6-512. Specifically, by denying the finder of fact the
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opportunity to consider evidence of loss of visibility, Ivers has effectively denied a
landowner the full measure of just compensation as required by the Utah Constitution.
Accordingly, the Ivers decision to preclude severance damages for loss of
visibility violates the constitutional protections of just compensation afforded to
landowners who must endure the involuntary taking of their property by the government
and should be overruled.6
ARGUMENT
The denial of severance damages for loss of visibility in condemnation actions
involving partial takings of private property violates article L section 22 of the Utah
Constitution because it denies landowners their constitutional guarantee of just
compensation. The plain language of Utah's Constitution, the historical background of
the constitutional provision, the clear and stated intent of the framers of Utah's

6

Admiral does not contend that the Ivers decision should be overruled on the issue of
loss of view. If properly read and properly applied, the Ivers (and Ivers II) decision on
loss of view affords appropriate constitutional protections to the landowner and serves to
provide compensation for the taking and the damage that has been caused. Utah Dep't of
Transp. v. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, ^ 14 ("Ivers IF) (quoting Ivers, 2007 UT 19, If 21) (reaffirming its conclusion that "severance damages are awardable for the loss of view—
even if the view-impairing structure is not built on the condemned land—if the
'condemned property is essential to the completion of the project as a whole/").
The Court further concluded that upon UDOT's admission that the partial taking of the
Arby's property was essential to the completion of the construction project—as it has
done in the present case—then, all that was left for the trial court to do was to award
Arby's the appropriate severance damages. Id. Similarly, this case should be remanded
to the district court for a determination of the amount of the appropriate award of
severance damages due to loss of view.
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Constitution, and the long-standing case law established in Utah and other jurisdictions
necessitate the reversal of Ivers.
I.

Utah's Constitutional Provision On Eminent Domain Requires The Payment
Of Just Compensation When Private Property Is "Taken or Damaged" For
Public Use.
The source of Utah's eminent domain laws arises from article I, section 22 of the

Utah Constitution. In interpreting the provisions of Utah's Constitution and the
protections afforded by it the Court's analysis is to begin with a review of the
constitutional text. American Bush v City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, ^ 10, 140
P.3d 1235 (citing Grand County v. Emery County, 2002 UT 57, f 29, 52 P.3d 1148
(explaining that "our starting point in interpreting a constitutional provision is the textual
language itself).
Utah's eminent domain provision states *'[p]rivate property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation." UTAH CONST. Art. L § 22. See also
City ofHildale v Cooke, 2001 UT 56, % 18. The plain language of Utah's Constitution is
significant. The Utah eminent domain provision is distinct from other jurisdictions in
that Utah not only provides for the payment of'"just compensation" where private
property has been "taken." but it also affords payment of damages when the property has
been '"damaged." Since the early days of the state's history, Utah's eminent domain
provision has been interpreted as being distinct from, and providing greater protections
than, those constitutions which only provide just compensation for the 'taking" of private
property.
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As recognized in the 1907 case of Kimball v. Salt Lake City, Utah's constitutional
provision "was expressly adopted to afford a relief not then existing to all whose property
might thereafter be damaged." 90 P. 395, 396 (Utah 1907) (finding it "manifest" that the
landowners were "entitled to recover" damages suffered from the government's alteration
of the street grade); see also Coalter v. Salt Lake City, 120 P. 851, 853 (Utah 1912)
("Consequential damages to property which are caused by making public improvements
are recoverable under the Constitution of this state"). The policy behind the provision is
to allow recovery for all consequential damages arising out of public improvements,
thereby ensuring that the "burdens for such damages are distributed among all the
taxpayers" where previously they disproportionately "fell upon those only who sustained
the injury." Kimball, 90 P. at 396.
Utah's constitutional provision and its inclusion of the term "damage" as a basis
for awards of just compensation is significant, and in this case supports the conclusion
that Ivers' denial of severance damages for loss of visibility is improper, violates Utah's
Constitution, and should be overruled.
A.

Constitutional Provisions Providing for Just Compensation for the
"Taking" or "Damage" Caused to Private Property Provide Greater
Protections for Landowners.

In addition to the plain language of Utah's eminent domain provision, the history
of Utah's constitutional language, as well as the provisions of other jurisdictions with
similar "take or damage" language in their constitutions, is critical to a full understanding
of the protections intended for landowners whose private property is taken for public
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purposes. Prior to 1870, the constitutional provisions of every state in the nation
provided that private property could not be taken for public use without payment of just
compensation. City of Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 161, 164 (1888); see Brown v. City of
Seattle, 31 P. 313, 314 (Wash. 1892); Idaho-Western Ry. Co. v. Columbia Conference of
Evangelical Lutheran Augustana Synod, 119 P. 60, 65 (Idaho 1911). At the time, the
respective state constitutional takings provisions mimicked the language of the United
States Constitution, which provides in relevant part that "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST, amend V.
As interpreted by courts across the nation, the "almost universally accepted" rule
was that "acts done in the proper exercise of governmental power, and not directly
encroaching upon private property, though their consequences may impair its use, are
universally held not to be a taking within the meaning of the constitutional provisions."7
City of Chicago, 125 U.S. at 164 (quoting Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 641
(1878) (ruling abrogated on other grounds relating to regulator}7 takings in McQueen v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 496 S.E.2d 643, 647-48 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998), reh'g
denied (March 19, 1988), cert, granted (Mar. 18, 1999)). Instead, the damages were
considered "damnum absque injuria" [a harm without legal injur}7] and therefore not
7

While not specifically stated in the City of Chicago case, the exceptions to the
"universal rule" appear to have been Ohio and Kentucky, wrhich courts "had given an
unusually wide definition to what constituted a taking." See Brown v. City of Seattle, 31
P. 313, 314 (Wash. 1892) (noting Ohio as an exception to the general rule against
compensation awards for consequential damages); Idaho-Western Ry., 119 P. at
65 (Idaho 1911) (noting Ohio and Kentucky as exceptions).
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compensable. Id. Accordingly, 'there could be 'no recovery by an adjacent property
holder, on streets the fee whereof is in the city, for the merely consequential damages
resulting from the character of the improvements made in the streets, provided such
improvement has the sanction of the legislature." Id. at 164-65 (quoting several Illinois
court decisions).
As a result of the general rule, several jurisdictions believed that a "a great and
manifest injury was constantly done by the states, counties, and cities to the private
citizen without any legal means of reimbursement." Brown, 31 P. at 314; see IdahoWestern Ry. Co., 119 P. at 65 (stating that the limitations of the general rule "frequently
resulted in hardship"). In order to remedy the inherent injustice and uncompensated
injury, in 1870 Illinois amended its constitution to expand its takings clause and provide
for "just compensation" not only in situations where property was taken, but also where
property was "damaged." City of Chicago, 125 U.S. at 165. Thus, the Illinois
constitutional takings clause read that "private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation." Id.; ILL. CONST, art XIII, § 11.
The United States Supreme Court in City of Chicago interpreted Illinois' new
provision and found that the use of the word "damaged" in the amended constitutional
provision was not meaningless. Id. at 168-69. Rather, the Court concluded that it was
significant that the term "damaged" was inserted into the clause providing for
compensation to owners of private property appropriated to public use. Id. As a result,
the Court concluded that under the expanded language of the constitution, the rule of law
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in Illinois was that "a recovery may be had in all cases where private property has
sustained a substantial damage by the making and using an improvement that is public in
its character; that it does not require that the damage shall be caused by a trespass, or an
actual physical invasion of the owner's real estate, but if the construction and operation
of the railroad or other improvement is the cause of damage, though consequential, the
party may recover." City of Chicago, 125 U.S. at 168 (approving and reaffirming the
holding of Rigney v. City of Chicago, 102 111. 64, 74 (111. 1881)).
After Illinois revised its constitution, numerous other jurisdictions followed suit—
West Virginia in 1872, Arkansas and Pennsylvania in 1874, Alabama, Missouri, and
Nebraska in 1875, Colorado and Texas in 1876, Georgia in 1877, California and
Louisiana in 1879, and Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Washington in 1899.
See Brown, 31 P. at 314 (Wash. 1892) and Idaho-Western Ry. Co., 119 P. at 65
(discussing history of the "take and damage55 jurisdictions). All of the jurisdictions
enacted the "taken or damaged55 language with the intention of affording greater
constitutional protections to landowners for impacts and damages caused to their property
as a result of the involuntary taking of their land for public purposes.
As stated in 1892, by the Supreme Court of Washington, as part of its historical
summary of the evolution of eminent domain laws across the nation,
"Damaged55 does not mean the same thing as "taken,55 in
ordinary7 phraseology. The makers of the Illinois constitution
used the word in that instrument for some purpose. Other
states changed their constitutions for substantially the same
purpose. They took the new phrase subject to the general rule
of construction, that the adoption of constitutional or statutory
-22-

language by one state from another adopts to some extent, at
least, the construction put upon the borrowed language by the
courts of the state from which it came. After almost 20 years
of discussion and decision in Illinois and other states, we put
the words "taken or damaged" into our constitution, and they
must have their effect."
Brown, 31 P. at 315 (emphasis added). The Washington Court went on to quote from the
United States Supreme Court decision in Chicago v. Taylor, stating that
"The use of the word 'damaged' in the clause providing for
compensation to owners of private property, appropriated to
public use, could have been with no other intention than that
expressed by the state court. Such a change in the organic
law of the state was not meaningless. But it would be
meaningless if it should be adjudged that the constitution of
1870 gave no additional or greater security to private property
sought to be appropriated to public use than was guarantied
[sic] by the former constitution."
Brown, 31 at 315 (quoting Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. at 168-69).
Through the amendment or adoption of their respective constitutions, states
throughout the nation provided greater security and protection to landowners and enacted
a constitutional guarantee that they would receive "just compensation" when their
property was "taken or damaged" as a result of the government's exercise of eminent
domain.
B.

Following the Trend of Other Jurisdictions Utah Enacted Its Own
Constitutional Provision Requiring Just Compensation When Property
is "Taken or Damaged."

Like numerous other jurisdictions, Utah followed the growing trend to afford the
general public greater protections and a more meaningful remedy for governmental
takings. In 1895, the framers of the Utah Constitution adopted language stating that
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"private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation." UTAH CONST, art. I, § 22 (emphasis added).8 Vintage Utah Supreme
Court decisions detail how Utah took a similar view of the injustice and unfairness that
resulted from the then existing eminent domain laws and sought to avoid such a result
from occurring in this state.
For example, in 1904, the Utah Court in Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co.,
acknowledged that "the law, as to what constitutes a taking, has been undergoing radical
changes in the last few years." 77 P. 849, 852 (Utah 1904) (citing 1 Lewis on Eminent
Domain (2d Ed.) § 57). In its discussion, the Court noted that:
the great weight of the more recent judicial authority, which
we believe to be supported by the better reason, and which is
more in accord with our ideas of equity and natural justice,
holds that any substantial interference with private
property which destroys or materially lessens its value, or
by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in
any substantial degree abridged or destroyed, is, in fact
To date, there are 24 jurisdictions with constitutional provisions that require the
payment of just compensation when private property has been taken or damaged for
public purposes: ALASKA CONST, art. I, § 18; ARIZ. CONST, art. II, § 17; ARK. CONST,
art. II, § 22; CAL. CONST, art. I, § 19; COLO. CONST, art. II, § 15; GA. CONST, art. I, § 3,
If I; HAW. CONST, art. I, § 20; I I I . CONST, art. I, § 15; LA. CONST, art. I, § 4, Tf B; MINN.
CONST, art. I, § 13; Miss. CONST, art. Ill, § 17; Mo. CONST, art. I, § 26; MONT. CONST.

art. II, § 29; NEB. CONST, art. I, § 21; NM CONST, art. II, § 20, ND CONST, art. I, § 16;
OKLA. CONST, art. IL § 24; SD CONST, art. VI, § 13; TEX. CONST, art. I, § 17; UTAH
CONST, art. I, § 22; VA. CONST, art. I, § 11; WASH. CONST, art. I, § 16; W.VA. CONST.

art. Ill, § 9; WYO. CONST, art. I, § 33. Of note, is that the constitutions of Alabama,
Kentucky and Pennsylvania provide for the payment of just compensation when private
property is taken or ''applied to"* public use and have been interpreted in similar fashion
to the general "taken or damage'* constitutional provisions. See ALA. CONST, art. I, § 23;
KY. CONST. § 13, PA. CONST^H. I, § 10.
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and in law, a taking, in the constitutional sense, to the
extent of the damages suffered, even though the title and
possession of the owner remain undisturbed.
Id. (emphasis added) (citing to cases from Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, New York,
Michigan, and Nebraska). The Court went on to state that "[t]he tendency under our
system is too often to sacrifice the individual to the community and it seems very
difficult, in reason, to show why the state should not pay for property of which it destroys
or impairs the value, as well as for what it physically takes." Id. (quoting ELIOTT ON
ROADS & STREETS

§ 202 (2d ed.) and citing MILLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 30-32 (2d

ed.)). Thus, Utah, like other jurisdictions incorporated the term "or damaged" into its
constitution "to set at rest this much-vexed question, and at the same time give additional
security to private property" located within their respective jurisdictions. Id. at 853.
Accordingly, Utah's Constitution "was expressly adopted to afford a relief not then
existing to all whose property might thereafter be damaged." Kimball v. Salt Lake City,
90 P. 395, 396 (Utah 1907) (finding it "manifest" that the landowners were "entitled to
recover" damages suffered from the government's alteration of the street grade); see also
Coalter v. Salt Lake City, 120 P. 851, 853 (Utah 1912) ("Consequential damages to
property which are caused by making public improvements are recoverable under the
Constitution of this state").
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C.

The Framers of Utah's Constitution Specifically Incorporated the
Term "Take or Damaged" and Specifically Contemplated Awards of
Just Compensation for Damages Caused by Elevated Highways.

In addition to reviewing the plain language of Utah's constitution, the Utah
Supreme Court has recognized "that constitutional 'language ... is to be read not as barren
words found in a dictionary but as symbols of historic experience illumined by the
presuppositions of those who employed them.'" American Bush v. City of South Salt
Lake, 2006 UT 40, \ 10 (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 523 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)). Thus, the Court has determined that it is to "inform [its]
textual interpretation with historical evidence of the framers' intent." Id. (citing State v.
Betensei% 378 P.2d 669, 669-70 (Utah 1963) ("[I]t is proper to look not only to the
[constitution] itself, but to the background out of which it arose and its practical
application in order to determine the [framers5] intent.")); see also Univ. of Utah v. Bd. of
Exam 'rs, 295 P.2d 348, 361-62 (Utah 1956) ("[I]f the words are ambiguous or their
meaning not clear, then it is proper to look outside the instrument itself to ascertain what
the framers meant by the language used.").
The debates and discussions of the framers of Utah's Constitution provide
considerable insight and guidance on the legal significance of the inclusion of the term
"or damaged" into the constitution, lending important historical context to how the
framers' intended that term is to be interpreted for purposes of determining when just
compensation must be awarded. Notably, the discussions at the constitutional convention
focused on the very issue currently pending before this Court—namely, the extent to
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which compensation is to be awarded to a landowner, like Admiral, whose property is
taken or damaged by the construction of an elevated highway near, but not on the
landowner's property. As detailed below, the constitutional framers insisted on the
inclusion of the term "or damaged" for the specific purpose of ensuring that landowners
receive the full measure of compensation for what has been taken from them, including
the loss of value of the property caused by the construction of the public improvement.
See Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention for
the Utah Constitution, at 328 (Day 22, Mar. 25, 1895) (Statement of Mr. Pierce)
(Addendum Tab E).
At Utah's constitutional convention held in 1895, the framers of the Constitution
analyzed and debated each provision of the state's new governing document. When the
framers came to the debates over Utah's eminent domain provision, the initial draft
provision was identical to its current version, stating that "[p]rivate property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." Proceedings and Debates
of the Constitutional Convention, at 326 (Day 22, Mar. 25, 1895) (Addendum Tab E).
The debate on the eminent domain language centered on the issue of whether the "or
damaged" language should be remove from the provision.9 Id.

9

The framers' debates also included the issue of the timing for the payment of just
compensation and whether the sum should be paid before or after the taking/damage
occurred. See Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention at 326-27
(Addendum Tab E).
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In response, Mr. Varian explained at length the importance of retaining the "or
damaged" language in the constitution. He stated that:
[I]t seems to me that to strike out "or damaged" is a very
material matter. I have taken pains to look at it a little to-day
[sic] in the late works on eminent domain, and I find it is put
in other constitutions or statutes to meet the entire case. In
some states some courts have held that damages to property
of a consequential kind was not necessarily within the
meaning of the article of the constitution. For instance, I
believe in Pennsylvania—I may have confounded the state—
the question arose where an elevated road was erected upon a
street and while it did not touch the property of the abutting
owner, did not destroy a brick, did not take a foot of his
ground. It did affect his use and occupation of his premises
very disastrously. It affected the convenience of the
inhabitants of a house, and in this particular case, following
later, it was held that there was no remedy. There was not the
taking of the property.
Id. at 326-27 (Statement of Mr. Varian). Mr. Varian continued his discussion and
provided another example of a decision in New York where the court reached the
opposite conclusion as the Pennsylvania case. Id. at 327. In the New York case,
according to Mr. Varian, the court held that a similar injury caused by the construction of
an elevated road near a landowner's property was compensable under that state's eminent
domain laws. Id.
Insistent that Utah's laws afford an adequate and just remedy and compensation
for injuries caused to property as a result of public improvements—specifically by an
elevated highway located near, but not upon, the landowner's property—Mr. Varian
sought "to make it perfectly clear this word has been put in laws and constitutions, and
the text-writers say that it is an equivalent for any kind of injury of that kind." Id. The
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type of "injury" referenced by Mr. Varian and other constitutional framers, as described
in further discussion of the damages issue, was not only "the deprivation of light and air"
but also all of the other "necessary inconveniences" brought about by the elevated
highway, including "noise and soot and cinders, and disturbing the peace and rest of the
family." Id. (emphasis added). As stated by Mr. Thurman in his statement regarding the
breadth that the "or damaged" term should encompass, "[djamage is not always—and in
fact is not often contemplated or expected. It comes unlooked for as the consequence of
an act which the party performs." Id. (Statement of Mr. Thurman). It is this type of
broad measure of damage that was specifically contemplated by the constitutional
framers and intended by them to be included in the amount of just compensation to be
awarded landowners whose property is "taken or damaged."
Throughout the course of the debates, the framers weighed counter arguments to
allowing damages caused by the "necessary inconveniences" of a public improvement
project as part of the award of just compensation. These arguments focused on the
potentially harmful fiscal ramifications a provision with a greater measure of damages
would have on governmental entities—including the fear that it would potentially
bankrupt them. Id. at 328 (Statement of Mr. Eichnor).
Yet despite these concerns, the constitutional framers, underscored the unfairness
that would result if a public improvement should destroy a landowner's property or take
away half the value of the property "without making some compensation for that
property[.]" Id. As stated by Mr. Pierce,
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I say I am in favor of being liberal in [sic] eminent domain
act, but whenever we grant this liberty to corporations in any
way—public or private corporations, we should make them
pay for whatever they take, and I believe the words 'or
damaged' should remain in the Constitution.
Id. (emphasis added). This view was echoed by Mr. Richard who said,
Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to the motion to strike out the
words "or damaged." I believe, as has been said already in
this discussion, that when the public uses a man's property
or makes an improvement that virtually destroys the use
of that property, that they should pay for it as much as if
the property itself were taken.
Id. (emphasis added). The framers' insistence that landowners be fairly compensated for
damages caused to their property prevailed and the motion to amend the Constitution and
strike the term "or damaged" was withdrawn. Id. at 329.
As evidenced by the debates at the constitutional convention, the framers of
Utah's Constitution clearly contemplated that inclusion of the term "or damaged" would
provide greater protections to landowners and avoid unjust results. Moreover, inclusion
of the term was specifically debated in the context of situations like the present one,
where damages and injury result from the construction of an elevated highway.
Therefore, consistent with the stated intention of the constitutional framers, Admiral is
entitled to damages sustained from UDOT's 1-15 Project. At the very least, Admiral is
entitled to present evidence of its injury and damages as reflected in the decrease in value
of its property.
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II.

Consistent With The Plain Language Of Utah's Constitution, Its Historical
Background, And The Framer's Stated Intent, Utah's Courts Have
Interpreted The State's "Taken Or Damaged" Constitutional Provision As
Providing Greater Protections For Landowners.
As outlined above, based upon the plain language of Utah's Constitution, the

historical background of the constitutional provision, the clear and stated intent of the
framers of Utah's Constitution, and the long-standing case law established in Utah and
other jurisdictions, Utah's "taken or damaged" constitution was specifically drafted for
the purpose of providing greater constitutional protections for landowners whose property
is impacted as a result of governmental actions. Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corp., 2010
UT 37, *{ 13, 656 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 ("because the Utah Constitution bounds the ability
of the government not only to "take[ ]," but also to "damage[ ]," private property, we
have characterized this state constitutional provision as being broader than its federal
counterpart.") (omissions in original) (citing Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095,
1097 (Utah 1995) ("This provision is broader in its language than the similar provision in
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.")). Utah's constitutional
language also provides for a broader definition of what types of governmental actions
serve to trigger the "just compensation" clause of its eminent domain provision and
guarantees to landowners a more expansive measure of just compensation when their
property is "taken or damaged" for public purposes. Sti'awberry Elec. Serv. Dist. v.
Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1996) (explaining that article I, section 22's
"expansive language" has been interpreted to encompass "every species of property
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which the public needs may require, ... [including] legal and equitable rights of every
description.") (citations omitted).
The Court in hers failed to uphold the foundational principles of Utah's eminent
domain laws when it failed to recognize that property can be "taken or damaged" when
the loss of visibility "substantially interferes with property," "destroys or materially
lessens a property's value" or impairs or destroys "the owner's right to its use and
enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed." Bingham v. Roosevelt
City Corp., 2010 UT 3 7 , \ 13; Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western Ry., 11 P. 849, 852 (Utah
1904). The Ivers decision likewise contravened the constitutional requirement of just
compensation when it denied to landowners the ability to obtain the full measure of
compensation guaranteed them, which includes damages caused by loss of visibility.
A.

Property has been "Taken or Damaged" When There is Any
Substantial Interference with Private Property that Destroys or
Materially Lessens its Value or When the Landowner's Use and
Enjoyment of the Property has been Impaired or Destroyed.

It has long been the law in Utah that a "taking" occurs—meaning that property has
been sufficiently "taken or damaged" so as to trigger Utah's constitutional guarantee of
just compensation—when there is "any substantial interference with private property
which destroys or materially lessens its value, or by which the owner's right to its use and
enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed." Stockdale v. Rio Grande
Western Ry., 11 P. 849, 852 (Utah 1904) (emphasis added); see State ex rel State Road
Comm 'n v. District Court, Fourth Judicial Dist., 78 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1937); Hampton
v. State Road Comm % 445 P.2d 708, 711-12 (Utah 1968); Colman v. Utah State Land
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Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 625-26 (Utah 1990). The establishment of the takings principle in
Utah is significant. The rule of law was first recognized in 1904 by the Stockdale case,
Stockdale, 77 P. at 852 (1904), and remains the established law in Utah. Bingham v.
Roosevelt City Corp., 2010 UT 37,113.
In the Stockdale case, the Court noted that "radical changes" had been going on at
the time with respect to eminent domain laws in the country and concluded that "the great
weight of the more recent judicial authority, which we believe to be supported by the
better reason, and which is more in accord with our ideas of equity and natural justice,"
required that a taking be found when there is "any substantial interference with private
property which destroys or materially lessens its value, or by which the owner's
right to its use and enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed."
Id. (emphasis added). In that instance, the Court stated in no uncertain terms that it
would constitute "in fact and in law, a taking, in the constitutional sense." Id. And upon
such a constitutional "taking," the landowner would be entitled to just compensation "to
the extent of the damages suffered," even in the situation where the title and possession
of the owner remain undisturbed. Id.
Under this standard, where there is "any substantial interference" with the
landowners property and that interference "destroys or materially lessens its value," a
"taking" has occurred and the landowner is entitled to "just compensation." Id.
(emphasis added). Additionally, a compensable taking is found where the landowner's
right to the "use and enjoyment" of his property has "in any substantial degree" been
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impaired or destroyed, then, again, there has been a taking and just compensation must be
paid. Id.
Other Utah Courts have phrased the standard slightly differently, but have
intended the same thing. Under those cases, if a landowner establishes that his property
has been substantially impaired or damaged as a "direct and necessary consequence of
the construction or operation of a public use," then the landowner is entitled to just
compensation. Farmers New World Life Ins, Co, v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 124445 (Utah 1990) (holding that "[t]he diminution of value and cost of repairs to the mall
which [landowner] alleged constitute damages within the guarantee of article I, section
22."); Utah State Road Comm'n v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1974) ("just
compensation is due if the market value of property has diminished"). See also Pigs Gun
Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, ^ 29 & n.l 1, 42 P.3d 379 (remanding case for
factual determination of whether "the damage was indeed for a public use and then
whether the damage necessarily resulted from that use.").
Additionally, Utah's courts have interpreted the term "damaged"' to mean a
"definite physical injury cognizable to the senses with a perceptible effect on the present
market value." Bd. ofEduc. of Logan City School Dist. v. Croft, 373 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah
1962). Other courts have stated that to be compensable, the damage caused to private
property must be '•permanent, continuous and recurring" and must be "the direct and
unavoidable consequence of the construction or use of the improvement." Farmers New
World Life Ins., 803 P.2d at 1244-45.
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The Utah courts' statement of what extent and degree of government action is
necessary to trigger the "taken or damaged" provision of Utah's Constitution, is
consistent with text of the Constitution as well as its background and history. As
discussed above, the inclusion of the term "or damaged" into Utah's Constitution was a
deliberate and intentional effort to broaden the circumstances under which a compensable
"taking" occurs and to ensure an award of just compensation to a landowner when the
government's actions "affect his use and occupation" of his property. Proceedings and
Debates of the Constitutional Convention, at 326-27 (Statement of Mr. Varian)
(Addendum Tab E) (Mr. Varian's complaint of a Pennsylvania court's refusal to fmd a
taking had occurred as a result of damages caused by the construction of an elevated
highway and argument that Utah's eminent domain provisions should avoid a similar
result).
As applied to the facts of the instant case, each of these standards is readily
satisfied. The substantial impacts and impairments caused to Admiral's property, and the
diminution of market value of its property, constitute a "taking" under Utah's
Constitution for which it is entitled to compensation. It is undisputed that Admiral's
property was taken "in connection" with the 1-15 Project and that the portions of the
Project the relocation of 500 West, for which Admiral's property was taken was an
integral and essential part of the Project. (R. at 493, 673, 678, 684; Supreme Court Oral
Argument, Hr'g Tr. at p. 10,11. 2-10, p. 16,11. 16-18. (Nov. 5, 2009)) ("It [the relocation
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of 500West] meets the integrated project requirement."; "For purposes of this motion in
limine, we agreed that it was an essential part of the project.") (Addendum Tab D).
Moreover, the Project substantially impaired the market value of the remaining
portion of Admiral's property. In particular, as part of the Project, UDOT elevated 1-15
by approximately 28 feet, (R. at 494), and where Admiral used to have a piece of
property that w7as clearly visible, its property7 is now left "in a hole 28 feet deep." (See
Supreme Court Oral Argument, Hr'g Tr. at p. 12,11. 20-23 (Nov. 5, 2009)) (Addendum
Tab D). Consequently, the Project has significantly obstructed the visibility of and view
from Admiral5s property, resulting in a depreciated market value to the remainder, a
substantial impairment to Admiral's use and enjoyment of the property, which under
Utah's eminent domain law amounts to a "taking" for which compensation is owed.
The Ivers decision, as well as the Court of Appeals' decision in this case, erred in
their conclusion that loss of visibility is not compensable. Accordingly the Ivers decision
should be overruled, and the Court of Appeals decision should be reversed.
B.

Once a Constitutional "Taking" Occurs, Just Compensation Requires
the Landowner Be Placed in as Good a Position as It Would Have Been
in Monetarily Had Its Property Not Been Taken.

When a landowner, like Admiral, has its property "taken or damaged," under
Utah's constitution, it is entitled to "just compensation. UTAH CONST, art. 1, § 22. The
term "just compensation" has been interpreted by Utah courts to mean "that the owners
must be put in as good a position money wise as they would have occupied had their
property not been taken." State v. Noble, 305 P.2d 495. 497 (Utah 1957). As explained
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by the Utah Supreme Court in Utah State Road Comm 'n v. Friberg, "[t]he constitutional
requirement of just compensation derives 'as much content from the basic equitable
principles of fairness as it does from technical concepts of property law/ when the State
takes private property for the public welfare." Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 828 (Utah 1984)
(quoting United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973)). In order for compensation to
be fair and just as required by Utah's Constitution, "it must reflect the fair value of the
land to the landowner[,]" and must make the landowner whole in a monetary sense and
place him back in the position he would have occupied were his property not taken and
the government's project not constructed. Id. (citing Noble, 305 P.2d at 497).
To carry out the state's constitutional charge, the full measure of just
compensation must be determined and awarded. Just compensation consists of two
components, "(1) the value of the property sought to be condemned ...; [and] (2) if the
property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the damages
which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by reason of its severance
from the portion sought to be condemned and the construction of the improvement in the
manner proposed by the plaintiff[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511. Severance damages
are those damages caused by the taking of a part of the property where the taking itself or
construction of some improvement on the portion causes injury to the remaining parcel.
UtahDep't of Transp. v. D'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220, 1222 (Utah 1987).
The widely-accepted method for measuring severance damages—and thereby
determining just compensation—is the "diminution of the fair market value of the
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property immediately following the infliction of the damage." Thorsen v. Johnson, 745
P.2d 1243, 1246 (1987). Utah case law is replete wiih similar variations of this wellestablished rule:
•

City ofHildale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56, f 20 ('The cardinal and wellrecognized rule as to the measure of damages to property not actually taken
but affected by condemnation is the difference in market value of the
property before and after the taking.") (quoting Salt Lake County
Cottonwood Sanitary District v. Toone, 357 P.2d486? 488 (Utah I960));

•

State ex rel Rd. Comm 'n v. Peterson, 366 P.2d 76, 79 (Utah 1961) (holding
that 'the correct measure" of severance damages is "the difference between
its fair cash market value before and after the taking");

•

State v. Noble, 305 P.2d 495, 498 (Utah 1956) ("The accepted formula for
determining fair market value is .. . what would a purchaser willing to buy
but not required to do so, pay and what would a seller willing to sell but not
required to do so, ask.");

•

Utah Dep 't ofTransp. v. D'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220, 1222 (Utah 1987)
(severance damages are those damages that are caused by the taking of a
part of the property where the taking itself or construction of some
improvement on the portion causes injury to the remaining parcel).

Thus, to properly determine the fair market value of the affected property—and
correspondingly the amount of just compensation owed—requires "that all factors
bearing upon such value that any prudent purchaser would take into account at [the time
of the taking] should be given consideration, including any potential development in the
area reasonably to be expected." Weber Water Basin Consei-vancy Dist. v. Ward, 347
P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1959; Morris v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 102 P. 629, 631 (Utah
1909) (holding that "everything which arises out of the proper construction and proper
operation of the [public improvement] which directly affects the salable value of the
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abutting property may ordinarily be considered as elements in assessing damages []")
(emphasis added); see Carpet Barn v. State of Utah, 786 P.2d 770, 773-74 (Utah Ct. App.
1990) (applying before-and-after valuation method as the proper method of determining
damages).
The policy behind a broad interpretation of just compensation awards under a
"taken or damaged" constitutional provision like Utah's is to allow recovery for all
consequential damages arising out of public improvements, thereby ensuring that the
"burdens for such damages are distributed among all the taxpayers" where previously
they disproportionately "fell upon those only who sustained the injury." Kimball v. Salt
Lake City, 90 P. 395, 396 (Utah 1907). As recognized in Kimball in 1907, Utah's
constitutional provision "was expressly adopted to afford a relief not then existing to all
whose property might thereafter be damaged." Id. (finding it "manifest" that the
landowners were "entitled to recover" damages suffered from the government's alteration
of the street grade). Thus, under Utah's constitution, "the party7 whose property is
injuriously affected by any change of grade may recover damages against the
[governmental entity] for the diminution of the market value of his property to the extent
that such diminution exceeds the direct benefits derived from the improvements causing
the damage." Id.
Other jurisdictions are in accord. For example, the Arizona Supreme Court,
interpreting Arizona's narrower "take" provision, nevertheless, has found loss of
visibility to be a valid consideration in assessing depreciation of market value. City of
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Phoenix v. Wilson, 21 P.3d 388; 394-95 (Ariz. 2001) (explaining that w*[t]he owner must
be compensated for the entire damage, which, of course, includes the value of what was
taken and the lessening in value of what remains.").
Moreover, the California Supreme Court, interpreting California's similar 'taken
or damaged" provision has held that a landowner possesses "an easement of reasonable
view of their property" from a highway. People v. Ricciardi, 144 P.2d 799, 804 (Cal.
1943). More recently, in Regency Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, the
court held that a landowner has a "compensable visibility interest" and "the 'right to be
seen' bears upon the value of the residual parcel" including "diminution of visibility"
which must be "taken into account in determining damages in a condemnation or inverse
condemnation proceeding." Regency Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,
139 P.3d 119, 126 & n. 6 (Cal. 2006) (citing cases) (noting that state statute applicable to
severance damages "recognizes no such distinction" that "the improvement that blocks
visibility" must be "located on property taken from the landowner" to be compensable).
Likewise, Utah's condemnation statute requires recovery of severance damages
and contains no restrictive language that the improvement obstructing visibility must be
built on the taken property. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511(2) ("if the property sought
to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel the damages which will accrue
to the portion not sought to be condemned by reason of its severance from the portion
sought to be condemned and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed
by the plaintiff"). In fact the Utah Supreme Court has broadly construed Utah Code
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Ann. § 78B-6-511(2) (formerly Utah Code Ann. 78-34-10) to mean: "Damage to the
noncondemned portion of land "caused" by the severance ... when the view-impairing
structure is built on land other than the condemned land, but the condemned land is used
as a part of a single project and that use is essential to completion of the project.*' Ivers,
2007 UT 19, Tf 26 (emphasis in original).
In the present action, Admiral paid fair market value when it purchased its
property, taking into consideration all factors which contributed to the property's value,
including the value added to the property by its view and visibility. By contrast, in this
condemnation action and under the loss of visibility rule announced by Ivers (and how it
has been interpreted by the Court of Appeals in this case), Admiral is precluded from
recovering the amount of the property's market value that is attributable to its particular
view and visibility and is thus, left without the full measure of just compensation as
required by Utah's Constitution. See Noble, 305 P.2d at 497. Stated otherwise, despite
the fact that a willing and knowledgeable buyer will pay less for Admiral's property
because of UDOTs taking and construction of the elevated highway, it cannot recover
the diminished valued caused by UDOT because of the ruling in Ivers.
In sum, Admiral has been precluded from having full consideration taken of all of
the factors that affect the market value of its property and unable to have applied to its
case the "cardinal and well-recognized'* before-and-after valuation rule as established by
Utah's eminent domain laws. Cooke, 2001 UT 56, \ 20; Toone. 357 P.2d at 488.
Admiral has been denied its constitutional right to receive just compensation as a result of
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the Ivers decision—and the Court of Appeals' application of that decision to affirm the
district court in this case. The Ivers decision should be overruled in order to remedy the
unjust result caused to Admiral.
C.

In Order to x4fford Admiral the Full Measure of Just Compensation
Under Utah Law. It Must Be Permitted to Present Evidence
Concerning All Factors that Affect the Fair Market Value of its
Property.

In order to afford Admiral the full measure of just compensation as required under
Utah's constitution, it must be permitted to present evidence of all factors that bear on the
diminution in value caused by UDOT in this case. In its grant of UDOT's motion in
limine, the district court, relying on Ivers, excluded Admiral's evidence of its severance
damages caused by loss of view and loss of visibility. Both the district court and the
Ivers's decision failed to adhere to the statutory requirements of Utah's eminent domain
statutes and Utah cases interpreting Utah's Constitution. See State Road Comm 'n v.
Rohan, 487 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1971).
Under Utah's eminent domain statutes, the court or jury is required to "ascertain
and assess [] the value of the property sought to be condemned." Utah Code Ann. § 78B6-511 (2010). See also Cooke, 2001 UT 56, ^ 20. Additionally, if the condemnation
action only involves a partial taking of property, then the finder of fact is similarly
required to consider 4 the damages [that] will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the
construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the [condemning authority]."
Id. Utah's eminent domain statutes further require that as to the scope of evidence to
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consider in market value, the finder of fact must "hear any legal evidence offered by any
of the parties to the proceedings, and determine and assess" the market value of the
property taken or damaged. Utah Code § 78B-6-511 (emphasis added).
The statutory requirements are consistent with the broad view taken by Utah
courts as to what is to be considered in determining the fair market value of the
property—and correspondingly, just compensation. Morris v. Oregon Short Line R. Co.,
102 P. 629, 631 (Utah 1909). See also 4-13 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 13.21[3]
(explaining that compensation for loss of visibility "should be reflected in the diminished
fair market value of the property left in a partial taking.").
More recently, the Court in State Road Comm 'n v. Rohan, reaffirmed the
requirement that all market-value related evidence be considered in the assessment of just
compensation. 487 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1971). The Court held that "there should not be
any attempt to isolate and appraise as a separate item of damage any loss of value due to
noise or any other such intangible factor;" however, "in order to correctly evaluate the
severance damages, i.e., the damage to the remaining property, it is obvious that it should
be viewed in the composite as it will be after the taking and after the improvement has
been constructed." Id. at 859. Thus, the Court concluded that the expert appraiser's
testimony was appropriate because he contemplated "the attendant increase in traffic and
noise" as among several factors he considered in making his appraisal and "there was no
attempt to segregate and place a separate money value thereon." Id.
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Applying the proper standard for determining just compensation in Utah, loss of
visibility—like loss of view, loss of access, loss of parking, increase in traffic, increase in
noise—are factors a court must consider, as prescribed in Utah's Constitution, in
determining the impact a taking and resulting public improvement has on the fair market
value of the remainder property and awarding just compensation. Twenty-Second Corp.
of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 103 P. 243,
249 (Utah 1909) (holding that elements that impact the property "which may affect the
market value of the property not taken are ordinarily permitted to be shown, not as
independent elements of damage, but as elements to be considered in connection with all
other things which may depreciate the market value of the property interfered with but
not taken).
In other words, if construction of the government's project substantially impairs
the visibility of the remainder, the landowner is entitled as a matter of law to present any
and all evidence that the loss of visibility contributed to the substantial devaluation of the
remainder. Rohan, 487 P.2d at 858 ("[i]n making the appraisal, it is not only permissible
but necessary to consider all of the facts and circumstances that a prudent and willing
buyer and seller, with knowledge of the facts, would take into account in arriving at its
market value/y(emphasis added)). Cf Three D Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 1321,
1326 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (holding that in an inverse condemnation action. ;*[w]here
governmental action, not amounting to a physical taking, substantially impairs a right
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appurtenant to an owner's property, or otherwise causes peculiar injury, and thereby
results in substantial devaluation, the owner is entitled to compensation.").
In the instant action, Admiral had a protectable property interest in the property
that was actually taken from it by UDOT to widen 500 West as part of the overall 1-15
Project. As a result of UDOT's highway reconstruction project, which resulted in the
elevating of 1-15 by nearly 28 feet, Admiral's property was directly and substantially
impaired by the significant decrease in fair market value of the remaining portion of
Admiral's property caused by the loss of view from and visibility of the property. Utah's
Constitution mandates that Admiral must be compensated for all facts and circumstances
that a reasonable buyer would consider in assessing market value—including loss of
visibility and loss of view. As part of the required process for determining the full
measure of just compensation for Admiral, the finder of fact was required to examine and
consider all components having a bearing on the property's fair market value in assessing
and awarding damages, which means that consideration be given to any and all damages
affecting the remainder that were caused by and necessary to the 1-15 Project. To the
extent hers holds otherwise, it must be overruled.
Accordingly, the district court and Utah Court of Appeals erred in excluding
evidence of loss of visibility and loss of view as components of diminished fair market
value of the remainder. Because the district court excluded any and all evidence of loss
of visibility and loss of view damages from its consideration of severance damages,
Admiral has been denied the just compensation it is entitled to by the Utah Constitution.
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D.

In the Alternative, If Severance Damages for Loss of Visibility are Not
Compensable, Admiral May Still Present Evidence of Impacts the Loss
of Visibility Has on the Market Value of Its Property.

Admiral does not in anyway concede its position that loss of visibility is
compensable in a condemnation action. However. Admiral recognizes that Utah courts
have permitted the admissibility of evidence of severance damages, even if the element is
not compensable as a separate item of damage. Morris, 102 P. at 631 (where public
improvement was constructed several feet from landowner's property and the value of the
land depreciated in value as a result, Court recognized that "[m]any things are usually
taken into consideration in such actions which would not give rise to an independent
action, and in such an action all the damages are assessed as constituting a single cause of
action, and the measure of such damages is the amount that the property has depreciated
in market value." (referencing 1 Lewis, Eminent Domain §§ 112 to 125); Twenty-Second
Corp., 103 P. at 249. See also Rohan, 487 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1971) (holding that "there
should not be any attempt to isolate and appraise as a separate item of damage any loss of
value due to noise or any other such intangible factor" but rather "all facts and
circumstances" impacting on the property's overall market value must necessarily be
considered).
Therefore, if the Court were to determine that loss of visibility is not a separate
element of severance damages - in accordance with existing Utah law -Admiral should
be permitted to present evidence of all factors that show the depreciated fair market value
of Admiral's property.
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CONCLUSION
The Ivers decision that denies severance damage for loss of visibility violates
Utah's constitutional guarantee to provide just compensation to landowners when private
property is "taken or damaged" for public purposes. The decision should be overruled
and this case remanded to the trial court on the issue of loss of visibility, as well as a
determination of the amount of severance damages to be awarded Admiral for loss of
view.
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Park City West & Associates;
Valley Bank & Trust Company;
and Valley Mortgage Company,
Defendants and Petitioner.

ORDER FOR SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING
AMD REHEARING
The court hereby requests further briefing and orders
rehearing in this case, which will be scheduled as soon as
possible after the vacancy currently existing on the court is
filled,
Specifically, the court requests the parties to brief the
question of whether Ivers v. Utah Department of Transportation,
154 P.3d 802 (UT 2007) should be overruled on constitutional
grounds•
The briefing shall comply with the court's general rules.
Petitioner's brief shall be filed by August 16, Respondent's
brief by September 16f and the Reply brief by October lf 2010.
The partiesf original briefs will also be considered on
rehearing- The matter will thereafter be calendared for oral
argument•
FOR THE COURT:

Dated

''^Kl^MlP

Christine M. Durham
Chief Justice

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on June 23, 2010, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or
placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered to:
REED L MARTINEAU
DAVID JASON HAWKINS
SNOW CHRISTEMSBN & MARTINEAU
10 EXCHANGE PL 11TH FL
PO BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY UT B414S-5000
BRENT A BURNETT
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 5TH FL
PO BOX 140858
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0858
Dated this June 23, 2010.

Case No. 20081054
District Court No. 970905361
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH
DEPARTMENT
TRANSPORTATION,

OF

Plaintiff,
vs.
ADMIRAL
BEVERAGE
CORPORATION (Assignee of Mark
Investment Trust); PARK CITY WEST
& ASSOCIATES; VALLEY BANK &
TRUST COMPANY nka BANK ONE,
UTAH; and VALLEY MORTGAGE
COMPANY nka UTAH INVESTMENT
COMPANY,

MEMORANDUM DECISION and
ORDER (Cross-Motions in Limine)
CONSOLIDATED:
Case No. 970905361 CD
CaseNo.970905368CD

Defendants.
Judge Stephen L. Roth
UTAH
DEPARTMENT
TRANSPORTATION,

OF

Plaintiff,
vs.
ADMIRAL
CORPORATION,

BEVERAGE

Defendant.

Plaintiff Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") filed a Motion in Limine to which
defendant Admiral Beverage Corporation ("Admiral") responded with a cross-motion, Motion in
Limine of Defendant Admiral Beverage Corporation to Admit Evidence of All Factors That Affeci
Fair Market Value ("Admiral's Motion in Limine"), While both motions are nominally focused on

the parties* competing views of the admissibility of basically the same evidence, they recognize that
the real issue is the scope of severance damages that may be swarded to defendants under Utah
condemnation law. The parties submitted memoranda supporting their own motions and opposing
their opponents, as well as reply memoranda. The court heard argument on the motions on June 28,
2005 where UDOT was represented by Randy S. Hunter, Assistant Attorney General, and Admiral
was represented by Rex E. Madsen (who argued) and Reed L. Martineau, Snow Christensen &
Martineau. The court gave leave to Admiral to submit a new survey in response to one submitted
by UDOT just before the hearing. That survey was provided to the court on August 31,2005, and
the matter was submitted for decision. Having considered the memoranda, affidavits and other
evidence submitted, along with the arguments of counsel, the court GRANTS UDOT's Motion in
Limine and DENIES Admiral's Motion in Limine, for the reasons set forth below.
DECISION
A.

Factual Background.
The relevant facts do not appear to be disputed in any material way. Admiral owns two

adjacent lots directly to the west of the I-15freeway,bordering 500 West, which serves as a frontage
road in that area, running north and south between the Admiral lots and the west side of the freeway.
In connection with the I-15 reconstruction project, the west side of the freeway in that area was
moved closer to the Admiral lots, requiring that the 500 West frontage road also be moved further
to the west and onto the east side of Admiral's property, resulting in the condemnation of what are
nowi

dentifred by UDOT as parcels 109 and 110, which are the subject of these consolidated cases.
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Before reconstruction, the existing freeway lanes had an elevation about two feet higher than
the surface of Admiral's property. The reconstructed freeway is elevated considerably higher, with
a portion of the freeway wall reaching a height of about 28 feet at a point about six inches outside
and to the west of the southeast corner of parcel 109, the former southeast comer of the Admiral
property, and about 62 feet from the nearest point of Admiral's property remaining after the
condemnation.1 While 500 West was reconstructed on the taken parcels, no part of the rebuilt
freeway itself is located on that property.
Based on an appraisal, UDOT deposited into court a total of $163,100 as payment of just
condemnation for the taking of parcels 109 and 110. Admiral appears to have only minimal
disagreement that the deposited amount is a fair value for the property taken, as valued on a squarefootage basis. The central issue is whether there are additional compensable severance damages to
the remainder of Admiral's property. Based on the reports of its own expert appraisal witnesses,
Admiral claims that the market value of the remaining property has been reduced by "(a) loss of air,
light, view, visibility and aesthetics, and (b) increased fumes and dust from traffic traveling on the
reconstructed 1-15 freeway...." Admiral's Memorandum in Support of its Motion in Limine to
Admit Evidence of All Factors That Affect Fair Market Value and in Opposition to Plaintiffs

' Admiral originally argued that a portion of the freeway wall at issue was actually built
.,,. t h e s o u t h e a s l corner of parcel 109, based on UDOT engineering drawings that appeared to
^ L T a S d u A m . About two weeks before the hearing, however, UDOT submrtted.
Z r t ^Affidavit of Keith Hafen, a more detailed survey that showed the wall, at its nearest
Sfobesixinchesoutsideofthecondemned parcel 109. Subsequent to the heanng, Admiral had
f r i s k y done, which confirmed that the wall was outside of parcel 109 although four to five
X
at ta closest point rather than six, a difference that is not material to the issues before the
court.
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Motion in Limine ("Admiral's Memorandum in Support") at 2, UDOT contends that these rights
are not compensable as severance damages under applicable law.
B.

Analysis.
The factors identified by Admiral's appraisers as damaging the remaining property seem to

fall into three categories: the loss of visibility and prominence of the remainder due to the size and
location of the new freeway structures; loss of air and light to, and view from, the remaining
property; and the increase in noise, dust, fames and so onfromincreased traffic flow nearer to the
remainder than the prior freeway. The claim for loss of visibility is the only subject addressed in
UDOT's Motion in Limine, but all of these factors are addressed in Admiral's Motion in Limine,
which is imposed in ioio by UDOT. The loss of visibility issue is addressed separately as a matter
of first impression in Utah,
1.

Loss of Visibility.

There seems to be no dispute that reconstruction of the portion ofl-l 5 passing by the Admiral
property, which moved the freeway closer and significantly raised its grade, restricts the visibility
of the remainder parcels from passing vehicles in comparison with the prior freeway configuration.
The issue of whether reduced visibility is a compensable severance damage has not been directly
addressed by Utah appellate courts. Nevertheless, the court believes that analogous Utah case law
provides guidance in this area,
A long line of Utah cases has established the principle that the appurtenant rights of an owner
of abutting property do not include an interest in the traffic flow from a public road or highway
passing by his property that justifies severance damages if reduced or taken away. In Hampton v.
State Road Commission, 445 P.2d 708 (Utah 1968), the court noted that '"the right of ingress or
-4-

egress to or from one's property [does not] include anyrightin and to existing public traffic on the
highway, or any right to have such traffic pass by one's abutting property." Id at 711. The court
explained:
The reason is that all traffic on public highways is controlled by the police power of
the State, and what the police power may give an abutting property owner in the way
of traffic on the highway it may take away, and by any such diversion of traffic the
State and any of its agencies are not liable for any decrease of property values by
reason of such diversion of traffic, because such damages are "damnum absque
injuria? or damage without legal injury.
Id at 347, See also, Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Hislop, 362 P2d 580, 581 (Utah
1961) ("The owner of land abutting on a street or highway has no property or other vested right in
the flow of traffic on that street or highway and is not entitled to compensation when that flow of
traffic is diminished as a result of eminent domain proceedings"); Utah State Road Commission v.
Miyay 526 P.2d 926,928 (Utah 1974) ("A property owner has norightto afreeand unrestricted flow
of traffic past his premises, and any impairment or interference with this flow does not entitle the
owner to compensation."); Utah Department a/Transportation v. Harvey Real Estate, 2002 UT ] 07,
<|14 (citing Miya and quoting Hampton for the principle stated above).
Here, a significant portion of Admiral's claimed severance is based on the reduction in
visibility from the reconstructed freeway when compared to its original configuration. The visibility
that was lost, under these circumstances, was necessarily a function of the passage of traffic. In other
words, the original visibility of the site resulted from the construction of the freeway by the State,
which exposed the Admiral property to the view of passing motorists who used the freeway as a
route of travel. Under existing law, if the State had moved the freeway route horizontally, to a
different location far enough from the Admiral property that it traffic no longer passed by it, the
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deprivation of the passing traffic itself would not be a compensable injury. It is difficult to see how
moving the freeway vertically, so that traffic continues to pass by the property but without being able
to see it, results in an injury that is any different as a practical matter or that is legally distinctive in
any meaningful way. The court therefore does not believe that diminishment of visibility from a
road or highway is any more compensable as severance damages than a more general diversion of
traffic flow would be.
Moreover, even if a right to visibility were found to be appurtenant to landowners abutting
a highway or road, the rights of abutting owners with respect to a freeway are significantly more
limited 1-15 is a "[IJimited-access facility," which is defined by statute as "a highway especially
designated for through traffic, and over, from, or to which neither owners nor occupants of abutting
lands nor any other persons have any right or easement, or have only a limitedrightor easement of
access, light, air, or view." U.C.A. § 72-1-102 (11). This definition suggests, among other things,
an intent to restrict the appurtenantrightsof lands abutting freeways so as to limit the scope of
severance damages attributable to such rights.
Admiral relies in part on People v. Rkardi, 144 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1944), and subsequent
decisions following it, for the proposition that a landowner is entitled to severance damages for the
loss of the view of bis property from a highway. The California Court of Appeals, however,
subsequently held that Ricardi 's "right to a view" does not apply to freeways. The court upheld the
lower court's conclusion that an owner "has no legal right to a view of his property from the
freeway:"
A freeway is unlike a highway. An abutter/landowner has a right to a view from a
public road or highway. However, while the purpose of a highway ts to provide
landowners with abutter's rights, the purpose of a freeway is to eliminate those nghts.

People ex rel Department of Transportation v. Mb**, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 52, 55 (Cal.App. 1994)
(citation to Ricardi omitted). The court noted that the purpose of roads or highways is to allow
access from abutting private property and to allow travelers along the road or highway "to view a
business, drive into it, patronize it, and reenter the highway" but that "[shich purposes are
antagonistic to the purpose of a freeway," which is designed to "'prevent just that sort of thing.'"
Id. {citations omitted). The court went on to discuss a California statute similar in import to Utah's:
For that reason, Streets and Highway Code section 23.5 provides that owners of
abuttinglandstoafreeway have limited or noright of access to or from their abutting
S d s Obviously a freeway restricts rights of access and related nghts such as the
right to a view.

Id
Therefore, even if the court were inclined to find arightto a view of one's abutting property
from a road or highway under Utah law, the court concludes that a landowner "has no legal right to
a view of his property from the freeway."
2.

rwHgr Damages.

Admiral also claims it is entitled to severance damages for "loss of air, light, view, visibility
and aesthetics," a bundle ofrightsthat may include, but goes beyond, therightto a view from the
freeway, as well as for "increased fumes and dust from traffic traveling on the reconstructed 1-15
freeway." The court concludes that Utah law does not allow recovery for such damages under the
circumstances of these consolidated cases.
The claimed damages appear to arise either from the elevation of the grade of the freeway
or from increased traffic due to the freeway improvements, Neither the construction of the elevated
ramp or the reconstruction of the freeway itself, however, occurred on Admiral's property; the only
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improvement constructed on Admiral's property was the relocation of the 500 West frontage road
Utah cases have been consistent in holding that severance damages are limited to those caused by
the taking itself or attributable to improvements constructed on the taken property. The court in
Miya. in finding compensable the loss of view from a remainder property caused by construction of
a highway highway structure, noted that "the loss of view occasioned by a proposed public structure
to be erected, in part at least, upon a parcel of property taken by condemnation from a unit" was a
factor to betaken into account in determining severance damages. Miya, 526 P.2d at 929 (emphasis
added).
This precept was emphasized in Utah Dep 7 ofTransportation v. D 'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220
(Utah 1987), where the state took a private road to two residences, which it paved and made public
in connection with a highway extension, The Court rejected the landowners' claim that they were
entitled to severance damages from construction of the highway:
The general rule is that damages attributable to the taking of others' property and the
construction of improvements thereon are not compensable. Such damages suffered
generally by all the property owners in the area are deemed consequential.
Severance damages are those caused by the taking of a portion of the parcel of
property where the taking or the construction of the improvement on that part causes
injury to that portion of the parcel not taken.
Jd at 1221-22 (emphasis in the original).
The court reemphasized its D 'Ambrosio holding in Harvey Real Estate, supra, an appeal of
a trial court's grant of the state's motion in limine excluding certain severance damage evidence.
In Harvey, the landowner sought severance damages for the diminution in value of its remainder
property resulting from the closure of an intersection as part of a road project for which a portion of
its Jand was taken. Similar to an argument Admiral makes here, the owner contended that the
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inlerSectionclosure'^

UT 107,112. Harvey asserted that limiting severance damages to only those resulting from
movements constructed at least in part on the portion of the property taken conflicted with the
broad language of U.C.A. § 78-34-10(2), which provides for assessment of damages to a remainder
from the talcing of a portion of the property and from "the construction of the improvement in the
manner proposed by the plaintiff [condemning authority]." The court disagreed:
Section 78-34-10 gives a landowner therightto present evidence of damages caused
r c o n s t u c t i o n of the improvement made on the severed property, ftdoes not
g i v t t n e S o w n e r the right to present evidence of damages caused by other facets

bv

of the construction project.
* *

*

We held essentially the same in Utah Department ofTransportation v.
^mbr°m
773pTdl220,1222(Utahl987)^
S
we stated that "severance damages are those caused by the taking of a portion
ottte ^ d of property where the taking or the construction of the improvement on
tollhouse!injury*
that portion of the property nottaken." (Emphas* addai
ffidSWS
accords with the well-established common law pnnctple that
fevemnc damages "may be made for any diminution in the value of [an owner .
^ S t e m S d land], as long as those damages were directly caused by thetahng
§ 368 (1996) (emphasis added)
Id. at 1110-11 (interpolations and emphasis in the original, some citations omitted).
The court therefore concludes that damages resulting from construction of the elevated ramp
just

outside the taken parcels, as well as damages from the reconfiguration of the freeway as part of

tbereconstructionprojectarenotcompensableasseverancedamagesunderUta^
to include evidence related to all of "the components of severance damages" that were "taken into
account" by Admiral's expert appraisers and enumerated at paragraph 7 of the Affidavit of Robert
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A. Steele and paragraph 7 of the Affidavit of John C. Brown (Exhibits A and B, respectively, to
Admiral's Memorandum in Support), except for "loss of parking."3
ORDER
11 is therefore ORDERED that UDOT's Motion in Limine is GRANTED, and Admiral's
Motion in Limine to Admit Evidence of All Factors That Affect Fair Market Value is DENIED.
^,

_]_ day of October, 2005.
BY THE COURT:

Stephen L. Roth
DISTRICT JUDGE \ \

1

The facts of this case illustrate the sometimes arbitrary nature of the rule that the court has
relied on in making its decision here. Without so finding, it is certainly possible that the court's
decision would have been significantly different if the offending elevated freeway ramp had been
built six inches within, rather than six inches outside, the condemned parcel 109. In this regard
Admiral has advanced an argument that has special appeal given the harsh result the difference of
a matter of inches may produce. That argument proposes that if a taking is part of an integrated
oroject (which Admiral argues is the case here), the landowner should be entitled to compensation
for damages resultingfromspecific improvements related to the purpose of the taking and causing
specific injury to the remainder, even if they were not constructed within the immediate boundaries
of the take. See Admiral Beverage Corporation's Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion m
Limine * at 6-10. This approach recognizes that the actual reduction in value of the remainder
from the improvement, as a practical matter, may be no different when it is located just within or just
outside of the taken parcel.
The court believes, however, that the repeated (and apparently unequivocal) holdings of the
Utah Supreme Court, as addressed above, constrain it from seriously considering such an approach
at this level because it would involve a departure from current law. In this regard, the appellate
courts are better equipped to identify., analyze and resolve the competing public and private interests,
well as the legal complications, that would be implicated in such a change, in approach to
severance damages. The resolution of these issues must therefore be left to some future appeal.
-10-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO. 970905361
97090536B
(Consolidated)

Plaintiff/
vs.
ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION
(ASSIGNEE OF MARK INVESTMENT
COMPANY) ; PARK CITY WEST 6
ASSOCIATES; VALLEY BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, nka BANK ONE, UTAH;
VALLEY MORTGAGE COMPANY, nka
UTAH INVESTMENT COMPANY,
Defendant*.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff/
Vfl,

ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION.,
Defendant.

UDOT's Motions in Limine on the issue of view and visibility and
concerning Jerry R. Weber's testimony on the subject of severance damages
caused by loss of view and visibility was heard by the Court on December
18

2007, at 10:00 a.m.

After hearing arguments thereon, review of the

pleadings and a specific review of the Decision dated October 318t, 2005
issued by Judge Roth in this case, che Court grants UDOT's Motions in
Limine.

The Court also refers the parties to Judge Roth's decision and

adopts the same here,
Defendant

is- able to assert

claims for any severance

damages

r e l a t i n g t o abutment r i g h t s pertaining to being an adjoining landowner
to 500 West.
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court.
Dated t h i s 24th day of December, 2007.

A
ROBERT P. FAUST
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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I hereby
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Assistant A t t o r n e y s General
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Reed L. Martineau
Korey D. Rasmussen
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

ITQA^IAPM^

^ / ^ I

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

CASE HQ£ 9 7 0 9 0 5 3 6 1 '

Plaintiff/

(Consolidated)

vs.
ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION
(ASSIGNEE OF MARK INVESTMENT
COMPANY) ; PARK CITY WEST &
ASSOCIATES; VALLEY BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, nka BANK ONE, UTAH;
VALLEY MORTGAGE COMPANY, nka
UTAH INVESTMENT COMPANY,
Defendants.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff/
vs.
ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION,
Defendant.

UDOT's
(concerning

Motion
Jerry

in
R.

Limine
Weber's

on

the

testimony

issue
on

damages caused by l o s s o f v i e w and v i s i b i l i t y )
December 18, 2007, a t 1 0 : 0 0 a.m.

of
the

view

and

subject

of

visibility
severance

was h e a r d by t h e C o u r t o n

A f t e r h e a r i n g arguments t h e r e o n ,

review

of the p l e a d i n g s and a s p e c i f i c r e v i e w of t h e D e c i s i o n d a t e d O c t o b e r 3 1 ,

UDOT V. ADMIRAL
B^ERAGE CORP.

*m«m~
tt^w
MINUTE ENTRY

PAGE 2

2005 i s s u e d by Judge Roth in t h i s case, the Court grants UDOT's Motion
i n Limine.

The Court r e f e r s the p a r t i e s to Judge Roth's d e c i s i o n and

adopts the same here.
Defendant

is

able

to

assert

claims

for

any severance

r e l a t i n g to abutment r i g h t s p e r t a i n i n g t o being an a d j o i n i n g

damages
landowner

t o 500 West.
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court.
Dated this 24th day of December, 2007.

^i—A-

ROBERT P. FAUST
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

UD0T

V . ADMIRAL

MJNUTE
PAGE

BEVERAGE CORP.

B J T R y

•*

MATTING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this ^ M
200g:

Randy S. Hunter
Barbara Ishimatsu
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. BOX 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Reed L. Martineau
Korey D. Rasmussen
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah B4145

N

frttcLETte
v

c o

g.^

the

day of X ^ i b e r ,

U

TY'

November 5, 2009Utah Dept. of Transportation v. Admiral Beverage, et al.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
20081054

ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION; PARK
CITY WEST 5c ASSOCIATES; VALLEY BANK
& TRUST COMPANY; AND VALLEY MORTGAGE
COMPANY,
Defendants and Petitioner.

SUPREME COURT ORAL ARGUMENT
November 5, 2009
Salt Lake City, Utah

Rebecca M. Martin, CSR No. 759

Associated Reporting Inc
208.343.4004

November 5, 2009Utah Dept. of Transportation v. Admiral Beverage, et al.

Page 2

Page 4 g

1 from State roadways and the value of viewfromthe
I
2 property are important factors that have very
1
THE COURT: When you're ready, Counsel,
3 significant value as between buyers and sellers in
1
4 the marketplace and also in condemnation by other
1
would you enter your appearances for the record and
5 condemning authorities. It's recognized in those
1
let us know how you want to divide your time for
appellants?
6 cases.
1
MR MARTINEAU: Thank you, Your Honor. Reed 7
Yet the Utah Courts permit the right of
1
Martineau and Jason Huffins for the appellant. I'd
8 visibility of the property, for example, to be taken
i
like to savefiveminutes for rebuttal.
9 by UDOT without payment of any compensation, let
|
THE COURT: All right Thankyou.
10 alone just compensation. The present case is a case
1
MR. BURNETT: RickBumett appearing on
11 of first impression, and it represents yet another
I
behalf of the Department of Transportation, Your
12 request by UDOT to further expand the Court's
1
Honor.
'< 13 sanction of its privilege of taking without payment.
1
THECOURT: Thankyou. You may proceed.
14
No other case has involved the taking
1
MR MARTINEAU: Thank you, Your Honor.
15 where the remainder property abuts the edge of the
1
May it please The Court, Counsel. This
16 very property taken by UDOT for relocation and
I
case highlights the direct and irreconcilable
17 construction by UDOT of a city street.
1
conflict in the Utah cases on the issue of what
18
No other cases involve the taking where
1
constitutes just compensation in cases where the UDOT
19 the property was condemned by and taken in the name
1
2 0 of UDOT, paid for by UDOT, and where the roadway and 1
is involved
21 storm sewer construction were undertaken by UDOT at I
To begin with, the cases all confirm
22 its expense for relocation of a city street all as an
1
without qualification the requirement of both the US
23 essential part of an integrated UDOT project.
1
2 4 rights may not be taken without payment of, quote,
24
Just as in the recent Ivers case, the
I
2 5 remainder property of Admiral abuts property taken by
(
J 2 5 just compensation, end quote. Neither the US nor
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

PROCEEDINGS
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1 Utah Constitution qualifies this just compensation
1 UDOT, upon which an access road and other
I
2
improvements
were
constructed
by
UDOT
as
an
essential
1
2 mandate in any way. This requirement is repeated
3 part of the highway project. Significantly,
E
3 over and over again in the cases as an unqualified
4 Salt Lake City was in no way involved in the taking,
1
4 Constitutional mandate.
5 entitled to the property taken, or in use of the take
1
5
Next, the cases all provide that just
6 and payment for construction of the relocated access
1
6 compensation is measured by the difference between
I 7 road and the large storm drain, both of which were
1
7 fair market value before the taking and the fair
8 placed on the property taken.
§
8 market value after the taking.
9
THECOURT: So, Counsel, who actually holds
g
9
Third, the cases say that fair market
10 title to fee Frontage Road, or is it 500 West Street?
g
10 value is determined by what a willing seller will
11 Is that title in Salt Lake City?
|
11 take and what a willing buyer will pay.
12
MR MARTINEAU: Tve asked UDOT to clarify 1
12
It is also stated without qualification
13 whether the City owns it or not. They cant tell me.
1
13 that an owner must be placed in the same monetary
14
I
just
wanted
to
be
honest
with
The
Court
on
feat.
B
14 possession after the taking as before the taking. It
15 Because I did make that inquiry.
g
15 must be noted that these clear rules apply without
16
THE
COURT:
So
we
don't
know
who
owns
it.
S
16 qualification to takings by all condemning
17 But what we know is that the construction and design
1
17 authorities in the State of Utah, including takings
18
and
all
of
that
was
done
by
UDOT.
1
18 by UDOT. Even the US Government must pay full, just
19
MR. MARTINEAU: We know that title was taken 1
19 compensation for property it takes.
20
in
the
name of UDOT. We know that they relocated and |
20
No justification is given, either in
21
reconstructed
that road on the part taken, along with
1
21 statute or otherwise, for the special privileged
22
a
storm
drain.
We
know
that
fee
remainder
property
f
2 2 treatment requested by UDOT. However, in takings by
2 3 adjoins that road that supposedly is a city street.
I
2 3 UDOT, the courts have sanctioned repeated and clear
24
UDOT doesn't deny that the price paid by
|
2 4 violation of these Constitutional mandates.
1 2 5 Admiral for these properties was based upon a formal
§
1 25
The value of visibility of the property
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Page 6
appraisal prepared by a well-qualified, certified
appraiser that reflected accepted appraisal
standards, or that the appraisal reflected very
significant values for both visibility of the
property and view from the property.
Nor can UDOT claim that it does not seek
in this case to force a transfer to it without
compensation of a substantial part of that value that
had been actually paid for the properties by Admiral
i just before and after - and just before the take.
. UDOT cannot dispute that what it is asking The Court
to approve is grossly unfair to Admiral.
The irreconcilable conflict has been
complicated further by the recent Ivers case, that
allows damages for loss of view but denies damages
for visibility. UDOT is now asking The Court to
exempt even the loss of view damages from payment.
The inconsistency in the cases is
dramatically illustrated in the instructions the
trial court is going to have to give the jury in this
case. The Ivers case THE COURT: Could I just ask a question
about the sentence before last? Do you understand
the Department of Transportation to be arguing that
there's no recovery in any case for loss of view, or
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that value is included in the property's fair market
value when it was just purchased by Admiral. The
Court would then instruct, to be consistent with
UDOTs new position, that the fair market value is to
be further reduced by the value of view from the
property.
And the jury must be told that those
values, which were included in the price of fair
market value Admiral just paid for the property for that same property, that they must be deducted
from - these values must be deducted from their
finding of fair market value.
This demonstrates the undeniable
conflict in the case law between the Constitutional
mandate that just compensation be paid for property
condemned by UDOT and the sanction given by the Utah
Courts for UDOT to take valuable property rights in
cases such as the present case without payment of any
compensation for those rights taken.
THE COURT: Counsel, is it your view that
theMIL MARTINEAU: I'm sorry?
THE COURT: Is it your view that the
transfer of a fee simple title carries widi it a
property right with respect to view and visibility
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simply that there's no loss of view on the facts in
this case?
M R MARTINEAU: They say we don't have a
valid claim for loss of view.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. MARTINEAU: And they also claim,
pursuant to the Ivers case, that we dont have any
claim for loss of visibility.
THE COURT: Right.
M R MARTINEAU: Yet both of those were paid
for when we bought the property.
Since the Ivers case, how does The Court
properly instruct the jury? The trial court must
first explain the requirement that UDOT is required
to pay just compensation. It must then instruct that
just compensation is to be measured by fair market
value before the taking, less fair market value
after. The Court must also explain that just
compensation requires a property owner to be placed
m the same position, in terms of money, before and
after the take. The cases all support this - these
instructions.
Then, according to UDOT, The Court the jury must reduce just compensation as so defined
by the value of visibility from 1-15, even though
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unless it is otherwise excluded in the deed?
MR. MARTINEAU: Yes. Those views are
specifically included in fair market value as that is
determined, and that is an accepted method of valuing
these properties, Your Honor.
In case after case, UDOT lias repeatedly
sought, and as in this case, continues to seek The
Court's approval to further expand the property
rights it can take for free in violation of the
Constitutional mandate. As noted, no other agency or
entity in Utah with power to condemn, including the
Federal Government, is given this approval,
There's no just reason why UDOT should
be permitted to force property owners to transfer
these valuable property rights to it for free.
Certainly, this permission should not be further
expanded as the UDOT is seeking in this case. Thank
you.
THE COURT: Thank you very much. You may
respond.
MR. BURNETT: May it please The Court, first
a correction. Fifth West is, was, continues to be a
Salt Lake City-owned street. Yes, the Department of
Transportation, as part of the I-15 remodeling, did
move a purchased property so as to remake Fifth West
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for Salt Lake City.
THE COURT: It was part of the integrated
project for which this property was taken?
MR-BURNETT: It is, yes. But the road
itself is owned by Salt Lake.
THE COURT: But to the extent, though, that
we're applying the Ivers standard that says it's part
of the integrated project, it meets that requirement?
MR. BURNETT: It meets the integrated
project requirement.
The problem we have in this case, as
shown by oral argument by my esteemed colleague,
opposing counsel, is really the question of, what are
the property rights involved?
At issue was several motions in limine
in which the Department of Transportation sought to
exclude evidence of alleged property rights that
don't exist. The trial court granted those, and that
was the issue. The two property rights are both one
alleged and one real, a pertinent easement.
Pertinent easements are unique, because
nonnally when you have a piece of property, you have

2 4 of property. In the circumstance of public roads, an
1 2 5 exception is made.
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that is given as early as Hampton where this Court
said - excuse me - that what the police power may
give an abutting property away of traffic on the
highway may take away.
I submit that, Your Honor, no court has
ever said that that was part of the fair market
value. They talk in the generic. But this Court has
repeatedly said that what by police power the State
has put on that roadway and made it accessible to
motoring public as it changes.
This is no different than when the
interstate system is extended or was originally
created, that those people who had businesses that
were now being circumvented, that were no longer
easily accessible to the motoring public because they
were not at a new exit ramp, that those people did
not have arightto the ongoing traffic on the
byroad, which is now being bypassed.
THE COURT: That's surely not the claim
here. The claim here is: They used to have a piece
of property that people could see, potentially
customers, or whatever, and now they're in a hole
28 feet deep. Isn't that this claim? This isn't
that the road bypassed them.
MR. BURNETT: No, Your Honor. But it's the
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The initial pertinent easement was that
of access; that if you owned property abutting a
public road, you had the right to access that public
roadfromyour property. Over time, that was
extended to pertinent easements of receiving light
and airfromthat abutting public road. Finally,
with Mia, it was further extended to have a pertinent
easement right of view from that abutting road.
The problem that Admiral Beverage has is
that Utah has never recognized a pertinent easement
of visibility. Indeed, they're caught in a quandary.
They shout that this is Ivers, and yet this Court in
Ivers expressly rejected and said that Utah never
accepted a right of visibility, and indeed followed a
long line of Utah decisions that said that you do not
have a property right in ongoing motoring traffic,
public traffic.
THE COURT: Counsel, how do you square the
end result of this with the Constitutional mandate
for just compensation, where the touchstone of just
compensation has got to be fair market value, and
these, you know, view, visibility, all that kind of
stuff, does make up part of fair market value?
MR BURNETT: Your Honor, what it does fair market value of the property, not of something
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same principle. Indeed this Court - same principle
in Ivers, is the exact same thing in Ivers where
there was - the roadway was elevated, putting the
RVs Restaurant in a hole, as it were. This Court
said that there is no right to visibility, that's not
part of fair market value, hasn't been under Utah
law, and is not compensable. UDOT does not have to
pay for it.
THE COURT: Counsel, if 500 West Street were
a State road as opposed to a Salt Lake City road,
would you have to change your position in this case?
MR. BURNETT: None. Not at all. Because
still, just as an access and other pertinent
easement, the pertinent easement is to the abutting
roadway. Lef s assume for a moment that UDOT owned
500 West at all times. The abutting rights are still
to 500 West. You cannot say, because I abut
500 West, you also own 1-15 or 300 West farther out.
I haverightto access directly over that other road.
THE COURT: What if you say, I abut
500 West, which is a part of the integrated project.
Why couldn't they say that?
MR. BURNETT: Because it's still the
question of, where are your rights? Your rights are
only to 500 West Has there been anything involving

I
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500 West that has taken your view? Otherwise, you're
saying something THE COURT; Well, it moved
MR. BURNETT: What?
THE COURT: It moved
MR. BURNETT: It moved, yes. But where did
that, in any method, take away the view?
THE COURT: Well, that's a question of fact.
They still have a right to view, and if it did
> interfere with their right to view, they've got a
. compensable claim.
!
MR BURNETT: But it's not a question of
• fact, because it's already agreed there was nothing
t done to 500 West that changed the view out from the
> remainder property.
>
THE COURT: So you claim the facts are
f
undisputed?
1
MR BURNETT: The facts are undisputed.
)
THE COURT: But that's different from
) claiming that simply because their pertinent rights
. abut on 500 West, that anything that happens with the
I integrated project beyond 500 West boundaries
I impeded in some significant fashion by what was on
5 the other side of 500 West as part of the project,

1
MR. BURNETT: It was an off ramp from 89,
2 which was becoming more limited access. So the
3 Frontage Road really was off the southbound off ramp,
4 meeting Shepherd's Lane, the cross street.
5
THE COURT: Why, then, does the - why can't
5 the inverse argument be made, that if we define
7 abutting rights as meaning, can you still see across
8 Fifth West, 500 West, then Admiral has nothing to
9 complain about there.
10
But if we were to take the inverse
11 argument and say, well, if UDOT hadn't widened
12 Fifth West, our view would be the same, why doesn't
13 that - why isn't that included in the abutting
14 rights? Because if you had not widened Fifth West,
15 could you have raised the
freeway?
16
MR. BURNETT: No. For the purposes of this
17 motion in limine, we agreed that it was an essential
18 part of the project.
19
The difference comes down to, as
1 2 0 Judge Faust pointed out, he stated they could assert
21 any - in his decision thafs being appealed,
2 2 defendant is able to assert claims for any severance
2 3 damages relating to abutment rights pertaining to
-24 being an adjoining landowner to 500 West.
25
THE COURT: I guess my question to you is:
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they'd have compensable claims there, would they not?
MR BURNETT: No. Because their right is to
the abutting road
THE COURT: How does that differ from what
we had in Ivers? That's what I'm struggling with.
Because in Ivers it was part of one integrated
project, and they were, under our opinion, awarded
compensation for loss of view.
MR BURNETT: Because the road feat was
being elevated - the highway that was the abutting
highway. They did not have to look beyond abutting
rights, as the Minnesota Supreme Court, who we
pointed in our briefs, states, extend to the full
width of the street. They don't go out beyond to
other property. That would be an extension ofTHE COURT: So in Ivers it was only because
the abutting road was raised?
MR BURNETT: That the abutting road, that
they had rights to, was the road that abutted their
property.
THE COURT: Ivers it was, what, 89 was the
abutting road?
MR BURNETT: Highway 89, exactly.
THE COURT: 89 was raised and there was an
access that was created
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The way you describe the interpretation of that, it
has only to do, can you see across 500 West?
MR. BURNETT: Yes.
THE COURT: Vm asking, why couldn't that
precise same legal principle be used to examine,
what's the result of widening 500 West on your view?
MR BURNETT: Because what you then are
doing is going beyond an abutting right, a property
right for the abutting road and saying that other
property beyond that roadway that was never — that
was just property on the other side is now subject to
myrightto view.
THE COURT: But isn't that exactly what the
integrated project doctrine was intended to permit?
MR. BURNETT: No, Your Honor. What the
integrated doctrine project was intended to permit
was that if the property taken from you was not part
of the obstruction, the construction that elevated a
road or otherwise obstructed your view on the
abutting road, you could still reobtain relief, to
avoid what happens in Colorado.
The Colorado Supreme Court has said that
if your right to view, you allege has; been violated,
you must show it was violated not by obstruction that
was part of an integrated project, you must show it
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was obstructed by that portion of the construction
that was done on the condemned piece of property.
This Court has gone extended beyond many
other courts and said you had to show that it was the
use of your property, that the obstructive
construction was on your property that was condemned.
Now, if it was used for that abutting road project,
it can be even if it's not on the part that's
condemned.
THE COURT: Assume for a moment that instead
of a warehouse on the property, there is occupying
the property the last existing Frank Lloyd Wright
house. Change your view on visibility?
MR. BURNETT: No.
THE COURT: So it's, in your view, a
categorical position?
MR. BURNETT: Yes. For both view and
visibility. Because in the same circumstance, that
wonderful Frank Lloyd Wright house, because of its
importance, do we now say that all adjoining,
adjacent, or nearby property owners have no right to
put up an office building that might mar the
beautiful view or visibility of this construction, of
this edifice?
THE COURT: Well, but the difference is that
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can condemn it. And the Constitutional right is to
be compensated for the take.
The question becomes: Where the State
exercises that power and insists on something that
you otherwise might be able to block as a private
citizen against another private citizen, why should
we prohibit the measure of damages if it is directly
linked, not necessarily abutting property, but just
simply you can make the causal factual connection as
a matter of feet in law. Why should it be limited?
MR. BURNETT: Because to reach that, you're
taking a property right and extending it beyond the
property involved.
THE COURT: It's pretty hard to say that any
right to view wouldn't extend beyond the property,
would it?
MR. BURNETT: The right to view, though, is
only found to the abutting roadway.
THE COURT: In condemnation cases, yeah.
MR. BURNETT: No. In any case, Your Honor.
Because the right to view isn*t a pertinent easement.
You have to have earned it. Normal case youfinda
right to view is where youVe either burdened by an
easement in an adjoining property or adjacent
property, or where you have it as a law because it's
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if the adjoining property owners choose to do that,
that is in some ways a risk that the owner of the
historic house takes. But they can oppose that
But if the State chooses to do it, it's
very difficult for them to oppose it. It's very
difficult for them to say, you can't build it. They
can argue about what it costs, but they can't say you
can't do it, right?
MR BURNETT: But the difference here, Your
Honor, is that you have a property right or you
don't. You have a property right of pertinent
easements to the abutting road.
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR BURNETT: Just because the State owns
the road - the property on the far side of the road,
doesn't give you any further right to object. If the
construction had been not a road of 1-15 being
elevated, if it had been a new State office complex
that would block out all view or visibility from
further road, at that point -THE COURT: The argument is that if my
neighbor wants to build an apartment building next to
me, but in order to do it he needs three feet of my
property, I can block it if that's important to me.
If the State wants to do it, I can't. Because toy

Page 21
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

a public road. So this would be extending it beyond
that property.
But indeed, this Court need not even
reach that issue. Because the reality is: Everyone
of the appraisals was rejected not only because it
sought arightto view above and beyond that to
500 West. Every one of the appraisals also included
claims of right to visibility. This Court has never
accepted right to visibility, and each of those
appraisals would have been properly rejected, thrown
out under the motions in limine, because of their
seeking to present evidence to the jury of a right
that doesn't exist.
THE COURT: Counsel, how do you sever those
damages? It seems to me that the appraisal business
looks at fair market value when the part of fair
market value as a whole always is going to include
that right of visibility. So on what basis could an
appraiser segregate that value out?
MR. BURNETT: By taking out that part which
is due to the motoring traffic and the value of
ongoing business because of motoring traffic and
accessibility to having the motoring traffic viewing
in or visibility in.
THE COURT: Did your appraiser purport to do
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that?
MR. BURNETT: Yes, I believe so. The
question was that the other side's appraisers well, I don*t want to go into something that's not in
the briefs. But there was a question earlier about
whether or not there was any right to view that was
valuable, if it was all just the right to be visible
to motoring traffic.
But the important point is: If this
Court would need to under our stare decisis, reject
its long line of precedent, including Ivers, that
Admiral Beverage claims it's relying on, Ivers is the
most recent one that expressly said, there is no such
right to visibility. It is not - it does not exist,
does not need to be compensated, The burden of
overcoming stare decisis has not been met, was not
even attempted to be met by Admiral Beverage.
The fact is: What is right of
visibility? To be seen by the traveling public.
THE COURT: Well, as I understand Admiral's
argument, a value is assigned, either explicitly, but
it sounds to me more likely implicitly, to view and
visibility in every appraisal that is made of real
property in the United States of America, which
strikes me as a factual question, actually.

Ifthere are no further questions, I'd
submit.
THECOURT: Thank you very much. Youmay
reply.
MR. MARTINEAU: Thank you, Your Honor.
There's no question that the property
involved here was an essential part of an integrated
UDOT project. Td also like to say that the way that
just compensation, under the rules of this Court has
announced, depends on decreasing fair market value.
Fair market value takes into account all of the
elements that a willing buyer would pay and that a
willing seller would take for that property.
THECOURT: Counsel, I think it has to be
clear, I think beyond reasonable dispute, that
visibility has value. The fact that a property can
be seen by motorists on a road, no doubt increases
the value of the property.
MR. MARTINEAU: Yes, this is the most THECOURT: But the question here is: In
the case where that value arises by virtue of the
State having decided to put the road there in the
first place, is it necessarily compensable as a
taking, given that the State could close down the
road all together if they wanted. I mean, I think
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MR. BURNETT: Your Honor, it still comes
back to the question of law. Because this appraiser
says, I can't parcel it out, not because I can't
factor, but when I only look to other purchases and
sales in the area, I can't parcel out visibility,
does that mean that this Court needs to reverse its
case law and find that we made a mistake, visibility
is compensable?
All you have to do is play a game of how
you plead it. If you plead it as a separate,
distinct item, it's rejected because it doesn't
exist. If you put it into a generic amount, contrary
to statute, where the statute says as far as
practical compensation shall be assessed for each
source of damage separately. If you disregard that
and put it into a lump sum, you can have it, even
though this Court has routinely said it doesn't
exist.
The Court of Appeals was correct in its
Footnote 2 in this case when it pointed out that
regardless of what happens with right of view, that
it's completely contrary to Ivers and the decision of
this Court to continue to seek a recompense for a
right of visibility, which this Court has routinely
said does not exist.
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thafs the issue that needs to be addressed.
MR. MARTINEAU: There's no reason why that
ought to be the case. If UDOT bought property that
weren't adjacent to thefreeway,they'd pay die full
market value, and that may have substantial value in
visibility or view. Why are they given a special
dispensation here? Makes no sense.
Not only that, but since the definition
of just compensation depends on fair market value,
and fair market value has to include those very
items, how can you say it's consistent with the duty
to pay just compensation to let them have these
values for nothing, without paying anything for them?
Even the Federal Government, when
they're doing a federal project, have to pay a just
compensation. And there's no basiis for reducing that
in those cases. Only UDOT, and only on cases
involving property next to afreeway,is given this
kind of a by.
THECOURT: Mr. Martineau MR. MARTINEAU: Let me say this. The only
difference between this case and Ivers, the only
difference, is that before the take, the Ivers
case - the Ivers case was not adjacent to a State
road. That's the only difference in this case than
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that one. The only difference is thatTHE COURT: Well, it was adjacent. It just
wasn't abutting it,
MR. BURNETT: It wasnft abutting. That's
what Vm saying.
THE COURT: It was visible from the State
road.
MR MARTINEAU: They say that because
Admiral's property abutted 500 West as opposed to
1-15 prior to the take, that we're not entitled to
anything.
Now, I might say this: There's no case
that I have found and no authority that says that the
property that's damaged has to abut UDOT or a State
highway.
THE COURT: But even if y o u MR MARTINEAU: This is a case of first
impression.
THE COURT: But even if you were to win on
that, what evidence do you have of a loss of view as
opposed to visibility?
MR. MARTINEAU: It's in the appraisal. It's
in the appraisal. And the appraisal was done ~
THE COURT: It cannot be extricated from the
evidence of loss of visibility, then? You can't tell
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1 Mr. Martineau and Mr. Burnett. We appreciate the
2 argument this morning. We'll take the case under
3 advisement, and The Court will be in recess.
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the difference - there's no difference in the
appraisal between what Admiral has lost in its view
looking out from the property, versus what it's lost
in the ability of the traveling public to see it?
MR MARTINEAU: UDOT wants us to separate
those out and deduct that from fair market value.
THE COURT: Well, you're asking us to
overrule Ivers and the line of cases on which Ivers
relied in determining that loss of visibility was not
compensable. If we decline to do that, I'm asking
you what's left of your claim?
MR MARTINEAU: Well, I think that Ivers
should be overruled and that the cases should be
consistent with the Constitutional mandate.
But at least it shouldn't be expanded theirrightto take property without payment
shouldn't be expanded in this case. Because there's
no case they've cited that would come to that
conclusion.
Not only that, but this case complies
fully with all of the requirements of Ivers and of
the appropriate sections — it's section 70 - Til
find it here. Just a moment. Yeah. 78(b)-6-511
sub22. Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you very much,
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had no such law before. We have had that the word "whereof" be stricken
nothing declaring this Inequality, but out and the words, "of which" be subthey have been equal Just the same. stituted.
Mr. EICHNOR. I think that is the
But there may a contingency arise In
this country when this power, or rather language of the Constitution of the
this limitation upon the power of the United States.
Mr. WELLS. Exactly.
state government, will be exceedingly
Mr. EICHNOR. I believe in adhering
dangerous. 1 think that it ought to be
wiped out and left entirely to the legis- to the Constitution of the United States
lature. For that reason I am in favor of when we copy it.
the motion to strike out.
Mr. WHITNEY. It is a hundred
Mr. WELLS. Mr. Chairman, I desire years old.
to state—the gentleman has said that
The question being taken on the
this is the same proposition that is in motion of Mr. Whitney, the amendthe state of Wyoming. I will say that ment was rejected.
It Is also In North Dakota, Arkansas,
Section 23 was read as follows:
Nebraska, South Dakota, Wisconsin—
Section 23. Private proj>erty shall
as many as that and I don't know how not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation.
many others.
Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. Chairman, I
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, 1
would be In favor of the motion for move an amendment by adding the
this reason, that there may come a words "first made," so that his comtime when the safety and defense of our pensation shall be made before the propgovernment might require that there erty is taken. That is in accord with
should be a distinction between aliens most of the constitutions.
and citizens, in regard to holding propMr. ROBERTS. Does that mean boerty, and I think that it can be safely fore the damage is clone?
left to the Legislature.
Mr. THURMAN. No; I move to strike
The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, the out the words "or damaged."
motion of Mr. Varian, of Salt Lake, was
Mr. VARIAN. Mr. Chairman, I call
to strike out section 21. Mr. Wells for a division of that—there are two
moves to amend by striking out the motions.
word "resident" in line 2.
The CHAIRMAN. The chair will diMr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, I vide the motion so that the question on
raise a point of order on that; that is striking out "or damaged" will first be
not germane.
voted upon.
The CHAIRMAN. If the point of
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, 1
order is raised, I shall have to sustain would like to suggest to the gentleman
it.
from Salt Lake, Mr. Varian, that my
The question was taken on the motion purpose in offering this amendment is
of Mr. Varian, and on division there to provide for a compensation being
were: ayes, 49, noes, 43.
made before the property is taken. If
Section 21 was stricken out.
the words "or damaged" are put In
Section 22 was read as follows:
there that cannot be very well deterSection 22. Neither slavery nor invol- mined. There ought to be a separate
untary servitude, except as a punish- section covering the damage of the
ment for crime, whereof the party shall property.
have been duly convicted, shall exist in
Mr. VARIAN. Mr. Chairman, I am
this State.
-in-accord with the motion of the genMr. WHITNEY. Mr. Chairman, I tleman to require the compensation to
propose a slight amendment in line 2, be first made, but it seems to me that
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to strike out "or damaged" is a very
material matter. I have taken pains
to look at it a little to-day in the late
works on eminent domain, and I find
it is put in other constitutions or statutes to meet the entire case. In some
states some courts have held that damage to property of a consequential kind
was not necessarily within the meaning
of the article of the constitution. For
instance, I believe in Pennsylvania—I
may have confounded the state—the
question arose where an elevated road
was eitfcted upon a street and while it
did not touch the property of the abutting owner, did not destroy a brick, did
not take afoot of his ground, it did affect his use and occupation of his premises very disastrously. It affected the
convenience of the inhabitants of a
house, and in this particular cane, following later, it was held that there was
no remedy. There was nut the taking
of the property. Now, the courts of
New York went off in another direction
and it is finally settled in that case that
such injury as that could t>e compensated under the law of eminent domain.
To make it perfectly clear this word has
been put in laws and constitutions, and
the text-writers say that it is an equivalent for any kind of injury of that
kind.
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, I
agree that the compensation ought to
to be made, but the trouble would be to
make it first in the case of a consequential damage.
Mr. FAKR. I do not see why. Take
a case like that. It could be estimated.
There could be no subsequent change;
there is the railroad; there is the house;
there are the windows; there is the
deprivation of light and air; there are
all the necessary inconveniences of noise
and soot and cinders, and disturbing
the peace and rest of the family. That
can be compensated for just as well in
the beginning as it can after the lapse
of ten years, because the means of arriving at the estimate are within the
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knowledge of men and can be adduced
before a jury. I do not care how the
gentleman does it. I do not wish to be
technical about it; I would like to see
those words, "or damaged," kept in
some way.
I hope those words, "or damaged,"
will remain in that section. I do not
wish to argue the point, but I can Bee
in a great many instances where it
would be very important. For instance,
on a sidewalk, a person owning land;
they dig down a bank ten or fifteen feet,
and damage that lot to a great extent.
I think the man should be remunerated
for the damage done to his lot. I move
that those words remain in that section
if they possibly can remain there.
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, my
objection to the words "or damaged"
is the utter impracticability of providing for compensation before the
damage is done. Now, I will cite an
instance familar to a great many. A
few years ago people in Salt Lake
County placed some boards in a dam
here at the point of the mountain;
they had a right to do that if they did
not damage anybody and I don't suppose they thought they would damage
anybody, at the same time they did It;
but the result was that a great many
people in Utah County were damaged,
after the act which cauned the damage.
Now, in a case of that kind how would
compensation be made before the act
was done which caused the damage?
Damage is not always—in fact is not
often contemplated or expected. It
comes unlooked for as the consequence
of an act which the party performs.
Consequently it seems to me that as to
taking property by the law of eminent
domain they should have the right to
take it when they pay for it, if the necessity for taking it exists. As regards
damaging it, why, it ought to l>e paid
for as soon as the damage can l>e ascertained. It seems to me that this is the
only way that it can l>e done.
Mr. EICHNOR. Mr. Chairman, if 1
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understand the gentleman correctly,
from Utah County, he would i>e in
favor of striking out the words, "or
damaged." Gentlemen. I hope this
amendment will prevail. Jm-t for the
very reason that the gentleman from
Weber County said it should be in the
Constitution. Take a city like Salt
Lake, where grading is required, or any
other city where grading is required,
and you will bankrupt those cities if
you place this in the Constitution.
Every man that owns property in the
street—the street will lie graded and
one or two or three j>eople will claim
damages and the result will be it will
bring the municipalities into court.
Mr. VARIAN. Would not the compensation benefit always allowed in a
case of that kind more than equalize
the damage?
Mr. ELCHNOE. The law is unsettled
at present in regard to the grading of
streets whether they can secure damages; it would simply bankrupt Salt
Lake City, I tell you that, gentlemen, if you place this in the Constitution.
Mr. PIERCE. Mr. Chairman. I am
in favor of retaining the words "or
damaged." I recollect a spectacle a few
years ago of grading in Salt Lake City.
There was a certain street—I believe it
was State street—the grade h*td been
established for some years, and the city
came in and established a different grade
and built the street up some ten feet
higher than property abutting on it.
There is a spectacle where they could
not get any damages for it, and the
street as it was built absolutely destroyed the value of their property and
they could not get a cent for that. I
say that it ought to be fixed so that
the city must adjust the grade for the
accommodation of people that own
property along a certain street and
that is the reason that I am anxious
that the words "or damaged" should be
left in. And in speaking to the remarks Mr. Varian made, I desire to
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read a line or tw<* from Lewis in his
work upon Eminent Domain:
"When the people of Illinois revised
their constitution in 1870, they introduced an important change into the
provision respecting the power of eminent domain. The provision reads as
follows: * Private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without
just compensation/ Every other state
which has revised its constitution since
1870, except North Carolina, which
never had any provision on the subject,
has followed the example set by Illinois
by adding the word 'damaged' or its
equivalent to the provision in question."
And the question not only refers to
street grades in cities, but refers to
grades of railway property. For instance, it is unfair that a railroad should
run right next to a man's front door or
almost next to his front door, ahd that
his property should be destroyed or
half the value taken away without
making some compensation for that
property which is really not reached,
as no part of the property is taken;
that is, the part of the property that is
damaged; and I say I am in favor of
being liberal in eminent domain act, but
whenever we grant this liberty to corporations in any way—public or private
corporations, we should make them pay
for whatever the}' take, and I believe
the words "or damaged" should remain
in the Constitution.
Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I am
opposed to the motion to strike out the
words "or damaged." I l>elieve, as has
lieen said already in this discussion,
that when the public use a man's property or make an improvement that virtually destroys the use of that property,
that they should pay for it a* much as
if the property itself were taken. Of
course, as lias l>een suggested by the
gentleman from Salt Lake, whatever
benefit results by reason of this improvement is setoff against the damage
that is caused, and in that way the
public gets absolute justice in relation
to the matter, but to say that a public
corporation should be i>ermitted l»,\ the
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raising ol a grade or by the lowering of erty has been taken and the party disa grade or by any other kind of im- possessed and that the property be litiprovement to injure private property gated for for considerable length of time
and because they don't actually enter and the party kept out of possession,
upon and take the property itself, 'notwithstanding there may be a bond
although they do destroy the use of there, and at the same time probably he
the property, that they should be liable would have to sue upon the bond
for damage; I think it is unjust and afterwards. I think it is a very strong
unfair and I am therefore opposed to proposition anyway to give the public
a right to dispossess a private person of
this motion.
Mr. RALEIOH. Mr. Chairman, I pro- his property summarily and it seems to
pose a slight amendment, "Private me he ought to l>e compensated before
property shall not be taken for public that is done, because he may be put to
use or damage without just compensa- a great inconvenience and loss of time.
tion first be made." Simply a recon- He may have to sue even upon the bond
after he should vindicate his rights in
struction of the section, that is all.
The CHAIRMAN. The chair rules the court. Therefore, I am in favor
that that would be a proper question that if that should be required, he
should be first compensated before his
on revision and compilation.
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, I property is taken.
will withdraw the motion to amend as
Mr. GOODWIN. Mr. Chairman, I do
tar as "or damaged" is concerned if it is not believe the committee can pass
not objected to.
such an amendment. Emergencies may
Mr. PIERCE. Mr. Chairman, I don't arise when it would l>e simply imposthink that 'first made" should be put sible to carry it out. What there
in there. If I recollect the statute cor- ought to be is a law (and that belongs
rectly now, whenever a corporation is to the Legislature) to compel fair treatpermitted to enjoy the benefits of the ment both ways. It is true that raileminent domain act and desires to take road companies have had the right of
property at all, before they can do it way, and they own and have owned
they have to apply to the court, and it for thirty years where they have gone
is within the discretion of the court to through. It is just as true that if you
fix a bond and require good sureties try to build a railroad through some
before that property is taken, and I back street in Provo, or up to some
l>elieve it should be left to the Legisla- mining camp, you would find yourture as to how it shall be taken. This self confronted with the most ridiculous
is simply a declaration of principles property values you ever heard of, and
that it shall not be taken. The Legis- every man in that town that you would
lature can require any corporation get as an appraiser would raise the
either private or public, to put up a price. It is all right as it is; let the
bond before they take anybody's prop- Legislature fix it Bometime within a
erty or damage it, without any consti- year that the property shall be paid for
and that the party taking the property
tutional provision.
Mr. CREER. Mr. Chairman, I am in shall give ample bonds. In this bill of
favor of the motion of the gentleman righto it is simply foolish to put somefrom Utah, that the amendment shall thing that cannot be executed, because
be added to the section for the reason emergencies would arise in the mines,
that notwithstanding the gentleman in the cities, and in the fields, where
from Salt Lake says compensation may there are floods that would make it imbe secured, yet we know of cases—there possible. Sometimes the thing is to be
are many in the Territory where prop- acted upon in a moment, and there will
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be no one to pay in advance, or to estimate in advance what the damages
shall be.
Mr. VAN HORNE. Mr. Chairman, I
want to call the attention of this committee to the fact that there are other
cases in which it would be Impossible to
make the payment before the work
was done, which would be held to be
damaged. Take the instance that has
been brought up by grading of a street.
We all know by experience that many
a time men at the time the street was
driven through and the grade is changed
think their property is injured and injured very severely. But upon further
consideration, and seeing the benefits of
the work that had been done for the
public they find that where they would
have considered themselves greatly damaged in the first instance their property,
in the eyes of every real estate man,
has actually been improved and increased in value. Now, if the damages
have to be paid t>efore the property
was taken or damaged,do you suppose
that any one would come to the conclusion, no matter how much others
did, that he had been robbed in receiving the damage that he thought he
had sustained at the time and was
ready to pay it back to the public?
Another instance, we will take the
case of a railway which in some manner, rightfully or wrongfully, has acquired its right of way, and we will say
a hundred feet on each side of the railroad track, or two hundred feet wide
in all. or a hundred feet wide; another
railway wants to cut across the line
and they know they are going to be a
competing line, how long do you suppose it will take the railway in possession to come to the conclusion that
they are not going to let those people
go through on a decent rate of damages? They will hold them there until
the charter of the other railroad expires if it was possible to do it. And
where you make a law of this kind and
say that the damage must l>e paid first,
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how are you going to estimate your
damage? They say, "we will be damaged ten thousand or ten hundred
thousand dollars by you crossing our
tracks." The law provides for it now,
it says, "you can proceed with your
condemnation proceedings by giving a
bond to answer in damages." What is
the trouble with that? Why not have
it? Are we going to have only the
railroads that we have here now or are
we going to have others that will
cross the tracks of this, that, or the
other corporation? The same thing
will come—suppose a railroad was
going to a mining camp and there was
a narrow canyon and some fellow had
a claim and one corner of it lapped
over the proposed course of that railroad: his claim is benefitted by the railway, that strip of land with no mineral
on it would be worth for that occasion
ten times the value of the mineral part
of the claim, and he would assess his
damages to the railroad company at
such a figure that if they paid many
such claims as that, it would cost them
double the amount to build the railroad. Now, is not the citizens protected by the fact that our laws
would say that the bonds must be filed
to secure the damage, then the work
can proceed, so that there will not be
this unnecessary delay? Would not the
public be benefitted by forcing a railroad company upon bonds being given.
to let another railroad company cross
their track? Are not we looking for
the development of this country and
not to say that those who are in possession of surface ground of one kind
or another shall say to the world, "Oh.
you cannot cross our ground without
paying us what we estimate it is
worth, no matter what the development is that is done; we do not want
the land; we say we do for this occasion. We are not using it, but you cannot use it; we will sit here as guardians
of the right of way, and this, that,
or the other thing, and say you must
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not come until you pay us Just what
^we see fit?" Gentlemen, such an act ae
that, in ray 'opinion, would be putting
into*the hands of men who wanted to
act as obstructionists, the power to act
as highwaymen to every enterprise
that came along, and say, "throw up
your hands and give all your money
to me."
The Hon. John Clark was admitted
to the floor, at the request of Mr.
James.
Mr. BOYEK. Mr. Chairman, I hope
the motion to amend will not prevail
for the reason that I have a case in my
mind now. Some two or three years
ago a certain railroad company building a railway to Springville, having
right of way, and they had fairty and
justly compensated the parties for
properties that they had used for their
road. Subsequent to the building of
the track and the running of the line it
appears as though the erection of the
grade had caused also some swamp
lands to arise to a very great damage
to the party that was interested there.
It was a subsequent damage to that
that could not possibly have been
thought to have been asked for at the
time of the construction of the road;
hence I think, as it has been stated by a
number of persons here, that to collect
a consequential damage would really
be inconsistent, and as I construe this
section as it reads "private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use, without Just compensation,"
that it conveys to the party owning
the property the idea that he holds and
has an inherited right in his property,
and when just compensation is made
therefor, he is entitled then to convey
a title to the property. And furthermore, in answer to the gentleman on
my right in relation to a railway holding another railway company off, the
construction I place upon this argument is this, that if one railway company be a private corporation, owning
private property, all other railway
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companies of necessity muBt be private
corporations, and consequently in relation to railway companies may not
fully apply here; or private property
taken for public use does not really and
necessarily mean that a man's private
property taken for railway purposes
is converted to a public use, but it is
converted to a private corporation and
the private corporation eventually uses
the road for public purposes; and hence,
I believe that the right in private
property is covered and provided in the
section following, 24. I believe it is
there fully covered and that section 23
guarantees all the rights of the individual that are necessary. And if 1 understand what constitutes the conversion of proj>erty to public use, the public is alwayg good for the damages that
may accrue against the private individual.
Mr. THURMAN. Let me ask you a
question.
Mr. BOYER. Yes, sir.
Mr. THURMAN. Please tell me under
what provision of the next section you
place a railway company.
If it does
not come under the head of public use,
where does it come?
Mr. BOYER. I would say this, that
I have to place it in just the same position that I would a man that would
own one acre of land—a railway running through and across that ground,
that is given to a railway company, I
would hold to be a private corporation,
and as such they would be entitled to
compensate the individual for the damages they would do the property they
would take and also be liable for any
subsequent damage that might be done.
Mr. Howard offered the folio wing substitute for section 23:
Private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation first made, and no private property shall be damaged for public use
without just compensation to be determined by a competent tribunal.
Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I am
opposed to the substitute, and I am op-
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posed to the amendments, because as
has been shown here already m this discussion, it is very apparent that emergencies may arise when It will be impossible to determine the amount of
damage or the value of the property
taken before the property would have
to be used. Not only that, but if this
section applies to railroad corporations,
as I am Inclined to think it does, then I
am opposed to the amendment for
this reason, that It would prevent the
construction of railroads and the making of other Improvements—that is,
other improvements that would be for
public use. It is true that private property taken for a railroad would be taken
by a private corporation, but It would
betaken for a public use because the
public use the railroad. Now, I am not
in favor of any railroad corporation, or
of any corporation, public or private,
taking any private property that It
does not pay for. I want that distinctly
understood; but I do say that when
provision is made by the giving of
bonds for the payment of the value of
the property taken, or of the damage
that may be sustained to the property
by reason of the use that It may be put
to, then the party owning the property
Is safely protected and the public improvement can go on, whether it be
taken by a public corporation or
whether it be by a private corporation.
For example, a railway company desires to construct a railroad and they
are met by the exorbitant demands of
perhaps one or two or three, or a dozen
persons owning laud on the line of their
road. These people say "we absolutely
refuse to make any terms with you/' or
they put their price so high that the
railroad company feel they cannot pay
it and ought not to pay it. Perhaps
several times as much as the property
is worth; perhaps they do not want the
railroad there at any price. What is the
result? Proceedings for condemnation
would have to be taken, and according
to the experience of the courts, as we
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have had them here for years past, one
or two years would be consumed in determining the value of that property,
and the compensation to which the
owner was entitled, before the railway
could be constructed. Railroads would
not be built under those circumstances,
and railway companies do not project
railways this year in the expectation
that they will construct them two or
three years hence. By the time they
had acquired the title to their property
and the right to pass over it, tlje exigency, or the desire, or the necessity for
the railway may no longer exist. It
may not be desirable and the road
might never be constructed.
I say that under the present law, they
have all the protection that is necessary. Just such a law as we may presume that the Legislature would pass
in the new State, and that IB when any
company—a private corporation or &
public corporation—would enter upon
the property of another person, or of a
company or a corporation, that they
should give a good and sufficient bond
to be responsible for the damage that
may be awarded and then they can go
on and construct their Improvement,
and as soon as the courts can determine
the question, the party gets his pay.
Mr. VARIAN. Will the gentleman
answer a question?
Mr. RICHARDS. I will try to if the
gentleman will ask it.
Mr. VARIAN. 1 just want to know if
it is your idea that the railway company should take the man's farm
whether he is willing or not, and then
litigate It or not?
Mr. RICHARDS. It is my idea that if
a railroad is projected through my farm
and I refuse to make reasonable terms
with the railway company, that the
company may euter upon that ground
and by giving a proper bond they may
take possession of it, and when the
value of that property is determined
and the damages I have sustained—
they are to pay it. That is my idea of
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it exactly, and I way that if I don't
adopt this method—if you adopt the
other method, then you put a block in
the way of progress and of development in this country, and in this new
State, that the people of the State do
not want to have there; that is what I
say. I instanced it in the very example
I have stated. I can point to cases now
that are pending in the district court
in this district that have l>een pending
there over a year—Just such cases as I
am speaking of where companies have
entered upon the property of people,
who refused to enter into negotiations
with them or to agree with them on a
fair compensation for that property;
they entered upon it and gave their
bonds, and from that day to this the
court has not reached that case and
they haven't been able to litigate it.
Now, would you say that railroad
should not have been constructed—that
that public improvement, whatever it
might be, ought not to t>e made. Why,
II you say that, you will not have railroads, and many other public improvements will not be made, for the reason,
as I have stated, that when men enter
into these undertakings that involve
the expenditure of large amounts of capital, they do it because the time is ripe
when the}' enter upon the enterprise
for the accomplishment of it, and if they
cannot accomplish it within a reasonable time, if they have got to w#ait two
or three years before they can commence
the construction of the road, they are
not going to build a railroad, they are
not going to project it. For that
reason, I say I am opposed to it and J
say that the individual has ample protection, when the owner of the property
and the company that desires to take
it cannot agree upon its value and upon
the damage that will be incurred, and a
sufficient bond is put up, as soon as the
matter is determined he gets his money.
Mr. JAMES. Mr. Chairman, I hope
the gentlemen will be a little patient. I
don't believe there is a question to come
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up before this Convention that will be
of greater importance to it than the one
that is being discussed right now. I am
heartily in accord, Mr. Chairman, with
the remarks of the gentleman who has
just been on the floor, Mr. Richards; 1
don$t believe we can afford in this Convention to take that matter out of the
hands of the Legislature.
I am in
favor of the Legislature meeting and
arranging how this shall be done. I say
that we can afford to be as liberal as
the great state of Illinois. There is a
state that is almost one Bolid garden.
It is said that there is not one point in
the state of Illinois that is ten miles
from a railroad. Now, what do they
do? They leave it to the Legislature,
and as it has been read on this floor
already during this debate, they simply
say that damages and compensation
shall be allowed by a jury or fixed by
the state. They leave it to the Legislature. Nowr, why cannot we be as
liberal as they are? Mr. Chairman, I
can tell you why we cannot be more
liberal than they are, for the very reason
that the lands that our railroads are
built over into this great vast desert
country are far less valuable than they
are in the state of Illinois.
This is a country of the most difficult
kind to build railroads and maintain
them in. We have long hauls, and the
most heavy grades that are to be
found anywhere in the world, and in
order to build railroads we must give
them an opportunity and a fair show.
Now, the gentlemen that are familiar
with the construction of railroads
through these canyons and these mountains all know what the builder of a
railroad has to contend with. 1 have
seen it myself, within twenty-five miles
of this town. I have seen a railroad
blockaded for three months and our
men behind their breastworks to prevent that railroad from passing over a
little piece of land that was not worth
one cent, and is not worth to-day one
cent, only for to lay that roadbed upon*,
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and the work that existed there at the
time when these gentlemen took possession of this land was nothing more
than some holes dug into some copperstained rock by some gentleman that
had thought previous to that that
there might be some mineral found
there, and when this man found the
survey was being made and the road
must come over that point, he rushed
out and locates and takes possession,
and what did he do? He blocked the
Bingham canyon railroad for two
months and two men were shot over
it. Now, why not allow this matter to
be put in some shai>e so that these
difficulties can be adjusted without
compelling the land to l>e paid for, or
the damages to be assessed and paid
for before that railroad is built? I
want to call the attention of the gentlemen of this Convention to a
point that they may not stop to
think of. You take the state of Montana, the state of Wyoming, the state
of Idaho, and the territories of Utah
and Arizona, and the state of Colorado,
and the state of Nevada, and the territory of New Mexico, and it represents
an area in extent equal to a country
east of the Mississippi river, or say east
of the Missouri river, that contains
pretty nearly thirty-seven millions of
population. What iR the population of
these states of this inter-mountain
country that I have just named to you?
Less than eleven hundred thousand.
Now, in that sparsely settled community with interests in common with
each other, where railroad^ must extend in order to make them valuable,
are you going to put an obstruction in
the way of building those roads? You
will, my friends, if you adopt the
proposition that the lands must be
paid for and damages assessed and
paid for before the railroad can move,
or, as Mr. Richards says, you will find
instances where they will remain in the
courts maybe for two years and prevent an enterprise being carried out
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which will be of great advantage and
great value to the community in which
that railroad is constructed. And I
hope that the original proposition will
prevail. I hope this Convention will
leave our legislators to regulate that
matter so that we can go ahead with
our enterprises, with any railroads,
with any factories, with any ditches,
and all such things. And if we do not
have them, we cannot be a prosperous
and happy people. And, Mr. Chairman,
the industrial system of a nation or a
state is a more delicate thing than is
often thought. We have an object lesson before us in the last few years,
when the country was all in prosperity
and everything was moving and nobody could realize
Mr. PETERS. Mr. Chairman, I arise
to a point of order; I submit the gentleman has left the main question and
is not talking about rights of way.
The CHAIRMAN. The chair thinks
the gentleman is in order.
Mr. JAMES. With this condition of
things, before we knew it, we were in
one of the hardest and most panicky
conditions that a country ever saw,
and I simply mention this, Mr. Chairman, to call the attention of this Convention to the importance of l>eingcareful how they deal with our industrial
institutions in our new State.
Mr. EVANS (Utah). Mr. Chairman, I
must confess that in listening to the
oratory displayed by gentlemen of this
committee upon my right and upon my
left, I can hardly tell what some of
them are in favor of. They think in
their remarks it ought to be left to the
Legislature. They presume to say they
believe such a law ought to be enacted,
while others believe it ought not to be.
One of the gentlemen from Salt Lake,
speaking upon this question, has reminded us very fortunately that many
of these cases are taken into court and
they are litigated for two or three
years, I want to say to you, sir, that
that is one of the reasons why I am in
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favor of this amendment—for the reason that if it should be in litigation for
two or three years, the individual
whose property would have been damaged would have been taken and diverted for uses other than his own, has
to remain out of the use of his money.
I am opposed to that system. But, if
the corporation that is seeking to take
the property of the individual shall be
told "thus far and no farther,'' you
will find that there won't be a single case
that will be in litigation for six months,
but those corporations will proceed, as
they will have the right to do, and they
will force that question to an issue,
when perhaps the power of an individual will be unable to accomplish that.
If they should come against one of that
class, he has assumed to say he had refused to make a Just compensation, I
take it, sir, that in that language he desires to say that railroads offer compensations that are just in every instance,
and because men refuse to take them
they are not just. Upon the other hand,
my opinion goes in favor of the individual. I believe in nine cases out of ten
that the individual whose property is
to be taken for these uses is willing to
make a sacrifice rather than to demand
what is just, and I am in favor of this
prevailing. I want to say to you that
the Legislature have not done that in
the past, and so far as I am concerned I
am ready to cast my vote to place that
restriction and say that they must do
it in the future.
Mr. EICHNOR. Mr. Chairman, I am
in favor of striking out the words "or
damaged/' I gave my reasons particularly for it, but the committee thought
differently. I am opposed to the amend
ment for several reasons; but the main
reason I am opposed to the amendment
is this: The Constitution of the United
States says, "Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation." That is the law
of the United States. Now, why not
have the same law in this State?
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Mr. VARIAN. Will the gentleman
permit me to answer him—because that
was made a hundred years ago and it
is found necessary by experience to
change it.
Mr. EICHNOR. The amendment was
not made a hundred years ago. Now,
I am opposed to tacking on this proposition that compensation shall be first
made, and I hope this committee will
vote it down. I tell you, gentlemen,
frankly, that if we sit here, day after
day, and commence to improve on the
Constitution, that the people, when
they receive this Constitution, will vote
it down.
Mr. HOWARD. Mr. Chairman, I am
in favor of the language quoted by Mr.
Eichnor from the Constitution of the
United States, and I believe that language is incorporated in that substitute. I am also in favor of the last provision which reads, "And private property shall not be damaged for public
use without just compensation, to be
determined by a propertribunal." Now,
that does not mean the damage must
be paid for before it is done. It means
that after the damage is done that a
proper tribunal will take hold of it and
assess the damage, and the party who
did the damage shall pay for it. The
first means that no property shall be
taken until it is paid for. The other
means that the damage shall be paid
for after the damage has been done, and
after the damage has been properly assessed. I believe the substitute will
cover the ground of the objections
made, and I think it ought to carry.
Mr. SNOW. Mr. Chairman, it is not
often that laymen have interjected their
opinions into the discussions that have
taken place over the bill of rights, and
I think the great majority of us would
have been content to let the lawyers
discuss these matters, inasmuch as they
mostly pertain to law,-but this is a
question that vitally affects all the people. If corporations can be allowed to
take private property for public use,
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even if they say they shall have Just
compensation, without some manner
to be indicated how that compensation
shall be arrived at, I think that the
rights of the individual will be infringed
upon as the experience of the past has
shown that they have been infringed
upon. I am in favor of the amendment
of the substitute. I should have liked
to have seen it drawn a little farther
and provide how the farmer whose
right is taken from him should be compensated. I find that in California,
Colorado and other states, that in
their constitutions they have provided
that the amount shall be paid into
court for the owner before the right of
way shall be appropriated. They have
also provided, in some states, for a Jury
or a number of commissioners to decide
what the damage or the compensation
shall be before ever the right of way
accrues. I think that that is just. It
is humane, and I don't think any law
ought to compel the farmer or the citizen to litigate for his natural, inalienable and indefeasible rights, and I think
a right of property is just as useful, just
as good, and just as near to the individual in many canes as life itself, for
life is dependent upon those rights of
property. I am in favor of the amendment or the substitute: 1 don't care
which prevails, as I believe either will
arrive at the point that we wish to see
obtained.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM-. Mr. Chairman, 1
am surprised at many gentlemen here
in their remarks that they have made.
We must have a very wicked j>eople—
people that own little pieces of land
where the railway companies go
through—and very holy, just, and
righteous railway corporations. It
must be all in favor of the corporation
and nothing in favor of the people.
Now, I believe people have rights, and
we are here to protect the rights of the
Biajority of the people and all the
people, and I believe, as one of the gentlemen has said—although 1 lielieve on
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the other side, that if we want this
Constitution voted for we must protect
the right* of the masses, even if it does
not suit the righteous corporations.
Mr. MURDOCK (Wasatch). Inasmuch
as this discussion has got down to the
laymen, I feel that I ought to say a
word or two, inasmuch as I disagree
with the gentlemen that have spoken
upon the question. As it has been
stated by our legal men, the laws of
Utah make provisions for damage to
parties who are injured by railroads
and by other corporations passing over
their lands. I think we can safely trust
this to the Legislature to protect the
man, to protect private individuals
from corporations trespassing upon
them, but I think that if this substitute
of the amendment prevails it will place
an obstruction in the way not only of
railroads, but of enterprises like irrigation companies. In my short experience,
had this law been the law without any
other legislation, it certainly would
have stopped several irrigation companies from building their canals for
three or four years, long enough to
have prohibited the owners of the land
from raising enough grain to have paid
the expenses of building those canals.
Now, I am opposed to the substitute
and to the amendment, and I trust
that this committee will vote them
down, and that we will leaye it in the
hands of the legislature of this future
State to make such laws that shall be
necesssary for the protection of property owners.
Calls for the questiou.
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, I
don't know whether this committee
desires to hear me or not. I made this
motion and have not had a single
chance to speak to it. I made it in
good faith. I believe that the right of
property is a sacred right, and no matter if it is the widow'B mite, I believe
that the man who owns just one little
ewe lamb has just as much right to
that ax the man has to his cattle th*t
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graze on a thousand hilin; having a
sacred and absolute right to his property, having paid for it and the company owner; it may be his home—it
may be all he has and the proposition
here now advanced is that a railroad
company may come along and stake
out this lot and tell him to get off and
await the slow process of the law in
litigation; and we know what it is
when you come to litigation with the
railroad company; they Just simply
have the advantage at every turn.
They have their attorneys paid by the
year; they have money to bring forward all the witnesses they want, and
to secure every advantage that the law
possibly gives. And if delay is of any
benefit to them in that case they insist
on the delay and they get it. In the
meantime, the man is deprived of his
property, his home is taken away from
him, and because his home is only a
matter of three or four hundred dollars—it did not amount to much anyway as the gentleman from Salt Lake
in front of me here intimated, very
much in the language of a corporation attorney—it was not worth anything anyway—land that was not
worth a cent. Now, the facts are,
gentlemen, that this proposition will
not retard the development of the
country.
It will not retard the
progress of the country, but as suggested by one of the gentlemen on this
floor if railroad companies understood
that they must determine this compensation in advance, they will see to it
that instead of ceaseless and endless
litigation, they will be anxious to bring
their cases to the front, if it comes to a
case, and have them disposed of, and if
a man does ask them what they may
think is a little bit extraordinary in
its terms, had not thejr better, in view
of the fact that they had this extraordinary right to take away a man's
property, without his consent—had not
they better pay a paltry sum even in
excess of the value and go on with
22
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their work, than to ha\e the poor man
kept without the use of his property
and sitting by and seeing another man
reveling in the possession of it, while he
has not anything in return for it? Now,
Mr. Chairman, 1 am about as much
surprised as my colleague from Utah
County to hear men talking Just as if
this provision of the law which stands
to-day in two-thirds of the modern
constitutions in the United States was
an innovation here. As if the progress
of the whole country was going to l>e
stopped, because we want to get into
the Constitution n provision which
says that before H person using the
power of the State can take from a
man the property that belongs to him
he must first pay for it. I sajr there
are two-thirds of them. I will not
take the time to read the clauses in the
various constitutions, but nearly all
the modern constitutions provide that
this payment must be made in advance;
and I believe the constitution in the
state of Washington ha* been referred
to more than any constitution in the
United States—has been referred to
more by members on this floor than
any other constitution, and I am going
to read that paragraph as it will only
take a moment:
Private property shall not be taken
for public use, except for private wayH
of necessity, and for drains, flumes, or
ditches, on or across the lands of others
for agricultural, domestic, or sanitary
purposes. No private property shall
be taken or damaged for public or
private use without just compensation
having been first made or paid into
court for the owner, and no right of
way shall be appropriated to the use of
any corporation other than municipal,
until full compensation therefor be first
made in money or ascertained and paid
paid into court for the owner.
Now, I ask what could be more just
than that? That is all that is demanded in this, and gentlemen, it does
seem to me for the protection of the
individual as against corporations we
ought to vote for this amendment.
Mr. JAMES. Mr Chairman, I rise to
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a question of personal privilege. I
have l>een misquoted on this floor and 1
want to correct it. Mr. Thin-man save
the idea that I had stated that a man's
home was worth nothing;, etc. If I
said anything of the kind, I did not
mean it. 1 cannot l»elieve that I said
anything: of the kind. Mr. Thnrman
knows very well that when I spoke
about a worthless piece of land, I was
speaking; about undeveloped, unimproved land in these canyons, and he
knows very well that I meant this
Mr. THURMAX. I object to the
gentleman making an argument under
cloak of ]>ersonal privilege; he can not
do that.
The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule the
gentleman has a right to speak as
many times as he pleases and as long
as he pleases.
Mr. JAMES. That is the very reason
why I inferred that this matter should
l>e left to the Legislature, because we
have these different kinds of land, and
these different conditions of things existing here so that provision should t>e
made without hardship to the railroad
or without hardship to the settlers and
the inhabitants.
Mr. BUYS. Mr. Chairman, if the
amendment of the gentleman from
Utah Includes, as he indicated, the payment in advance for the lands, I am in
favor of it. 1 am in favor of provision
being made where property is taken
for public use that the money shall be
paid to the owner or to l>e paid into
court for his use. If the amendment by
the gentleman from Utah would secure
this, I would vote for it, but as it is, I
hardly think that it would,
Mr. THURMAN. The substitute does;
for the information of the committee I
will say that I expected the substitute
to be in lieu of the amendment that I
proposed.
The secretary read the substitute proposed.
Mr. BUYS. That is all right. I will
accept that and I think it is just right.
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Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I desire to call attention to the fact that
that amendment does not meet the objection that has been made. It does not
provide that the money may be paid
into court in case of taking property.
As I understand it, it is an absolute requirement that compensation must be
made before the property is taken,
but in case of damage, then the money
may be paid into court. Now, I say
that if this amendment prevails at all,
there ought to be a provision that the
money may l>e paid into court in every
case. In other words, that the property may be taken by paying a compensation to the owner or paying the
money into court, and that is not this
amendment.
Mr. VARIAN. It seems to me so.
Mr. RICHARDS. Not necessarily.
The CHAIRMAN. The amendment
first offered by Mr. Thurman is withdrawn from consideration and the only
question before the committee is the
substitute just read.
Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I
offer as an amendment to the substitute
the insertion of these words, "or paid
into court for the owner," after the
words **first made."
Mr. THOMPSON. I will second the
amendment.
Mr. EVANS (Utah). Mr. Chairman. I
am opposed to that amendment for the
very reason that it places the matter
in the very same condition that it was
t>efore.
The corporation can pay
money into court. They can go to work
and plow up the man's land, tear down
his house, turn him upon the street, and
wait along three years before it is determined whether they are to have that
money or not. That is the reason I am
opposed to it.
The amendment of Mr. Richards to
the substitute was rejected.
The substitute was adopted.
Mr. VAN HORNE. Mr. Chairman, I
call attention to the fact that the Con-
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vention resolved itself into committee
of the whole until 5 o'clock.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is
mistaken; as the chair understands it,
the motion to fix a definite time was
changed.
Mr. VAN HORNE. Mr. Chairman,
l>efore going any further I want to move
an amendment to section 23, to insert
at the end of the section as amended, a
declaration of public use. I move to
insert at the end of the section the following:
Public use shall include dump, mill,
and tunnel sites upon and easements
over and across the lands of others for
tunnels, roads, tramways, reservoirs,
waterways, water supplies, and drains,
for agriculture, mining, milling, municipal, domestic and sanitary purposes:
and such other public uses as the Legislature may declare.
The amendment "was rejected.
Section 24 was read as follows:
Section 24. Private property shall
not l>e taken for private use unless by
consent of the owner, except for private
ways of necessity, and for reservoirs,
drains, flumes, or ditches, on or across
the lands of others, for agriculture,
mining, milling, domestic or sanitary
purposes, and in no case shall such propertv be taken without due compensation.
Mr. VAR1AN. Mr. Chairman, I move
to strike out the entire section.
Mr. VAN HORNE. Mr. Chairman. I
was going to move as an amendment
to that that the amendment 1 propose
be inserted in place of the section.
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). I second
that.
Mr. VARIAN. That presents substantially the same question that was
presented on his motion to strike out.
Now, it will be observed that this section contemplates the taking of private
proi>erty for private use. There is no
question here of a public use. Of course
the proviso in the second line of the section amounts to nothing. Of course
private property can be taken for
private use by consent of the owner;
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that simply amounts to the right of
contract, which we have anyhow. But,
the objectionable feature of this is in
the exception "except for private ways
of necessity,'' etc. That is very farreaching, Mr. Chairman. That simply
amounts to this, that if I have a lot or
a farm, and my neighbor deems that it
is necessary for him to have a private
way across it without reference now to
the public use, without reference to
whether it is necessary for the convenience and benefit of the public,
which comes in under the other section
prior to this, he is entitled to go into
court, if I don't choose to allow him to
go upon my land, and proceed to condemn it, because it is in the organic law,
and I am compelled to surrender my
right; not for the benefit of the public,
not for the good of the community as
a whole, but for the benefit of ray neighbor, and I would like to know why he
stands in any better position than I do
in that particular. If there is anybody
to be inconvenienced it Bhould be the
one who had not the vested right of
property: I have it, it is mine, it belongs
to me, it is vested in me, it is protected,
not onl}- in the Constitution in other
sections, but by the general law underlying all constitutions. The right of
eminent domain is founded upon necessity. It has never been and ought never
to be accorded in anywise to any individual; it is only accorded in the name
of the State upon the fears and assumption that the good of the entire community is the supreme law, and the
rights of individuals must yield in
order that the rights of the whole may
be benefitted. That principle does not
apply here. You are opening a wedge,
you are invading the rights of the private citizen in these particulars named.
Where are you going to stop? Under
this section, gentlemen of the committee,
I can go upon your land if it adjoins
mine, I can make use of it for domestic
purposes; I can build an outhouse or a
kitchen there, I can put a cesspool upon
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it, upon my showing to the court or the
Jury that it is necessary for the convenience of myself. Do you want that?
Whoever drafted this has interpolated
a provision as to mining in order to
cloud it a little. There is no question
now in this country about mining being
a public use. It is so recognized in all
the mining states and territories. The
legislatures declare it so, courts have
upheld It. This matter of a public use
ought to be maintained Just as It was
entitled or Just as it means,—a use for
the public. If it be necessary to develop
the mines to get a right of way on
another man's lands, to secure a dumping ground, as the law now stands, as
it has been construed in all these mining
states and territories, by the legislatures
and the courts, it is deemed to be a public use. I lay no stress upon that word
"mining" there, because it would be
included in section 23 if the Legislature
so declared it. Agriculture ought not
to be deemed a public use; it is not a
public use in the sense of the law of
eminent domain. One farm is as good
as another. The farm of forty acres is
Just as good and sacred in the eye of the
law, and ought to be, as the farm of
three thousand acres, whether it be
used as a range or for wheat growing
or grain raising. Underlying it all is
the fact that it is an innovation, invading the vested right, that ought not to
be lost sight of here. As the law now
stands, private ways of necessity as
indicated by the courts in certain classes
of cases, are given; that is to say, if
you sell a man a piece of your land and
the situation of the land that yon sell
is such to the land which you retain
that it is necessary for that vendee to
cross your land to get out, the implication of law is, and it is so held—it is
the law of real property, that you have
conveyed to him the right to go out
over your land; but if he goes and buys
somebody else's land adjoining you, settles himself down there to build up a
home or a farm, he takes it as he finds
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it and he is not authorized to cut your
farm up with a water ditch because he
needs to get water on his land, nor to
cut your farm up with a private way,
because it is more convenient for him to
cross it, and it should not be so, because
you simply transfer a right from one to
the other, and so far as the State is concerned, it is a difference between the two
individuals. He must take the situation
as he finds it. I can imagine cases
under this law where a man's farm can
be cut in two with a big water ditch
and every time he runs his plow or his
harrow or reaper up there, he would
have to stop and turn around or get a
bridge and Jump his horses across. It
is not right. The same application can
be made of it in cities and towns.
Going back to the first proposition,
though, the main and the serious objection to it is that it is an interference
with vested rights and you had better
leave the disposition of property rights,
except where the State is interested and
concerned, to the subject of contract
between the citizens of the State.
Mr. PIERCE. Mr. Chairman, I would
like to ask Mr. Varian a question l>efore
I make any remarks. Mr. Varian, do
you maintain that the right to build irrigating ditches is a public use?
Mr. VARIAN. No, it ha* not l>een so
declared here.
Mr. PIERCE. Is the right to build
reservoirs
Mr. VARIAN. l^et me qualify that
and answer the full question. If the system of irrigation shall assume such proportions here as to necessitate a thing of
that kind and the Legislature should
declare it, I doubt not that it would be
held as it was in the case of mining,
after some difference of opinion among
judges, that because of the situation of
the community and because of the
prominence of that particular branch
of industry in the community, it had
become on the line of the building oT
the railroads and other great public enterprises and public uses.
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Mr. PIERCE. Mr. Chairman, I want
to make a few remarks upon this proposition. I agree in some points with
the remarks o! the gentleman from Salt
Lake Connty, that this section as it
stands invades the rights of private
property and I think we should well
consider the amendment made by Mr.
Van Home. The voting down of the
amendment to section 23 I believe was
done without very much consideration.
The section as it stands I am not in
favor of it; it says, "except for private
ways of necessity." It has been argued
by gentlemen who have preceded me
that the law gave a man a right by necessity. That Is all right, I believe that.
That is the correct principle of law,
**for reservoirs, drains, ditches, etc."
It seems to me that the Convention
should protect the rights of irrigation
as much as any one thing that they
should protect. As it was well argued
on the floor of this house not long ago
by the gentleman from Wasatch, that
the prosperity of a community depends upon the rights of irrigation,
and if it is not a part of our system
of law that the right of irrigation
and the right to build canals is a
public use, then, gentlemen, we ought
to make it a public use right here and
now; and I differ from the remarks
made by the gentleman who has Just
preceded me upon the proposition that
the right of condemnation for mining
pro)>erty is a public use. Some states
have held that the right to condemn
property for mining purposes wax a
public use, but the majority of the states
hold that it is not a public use and that
it cannot be condemned under such a
clause as we have in section 28, which
we have adopted. 1 have before me a
collection of cases by Lewis on Eminent
Domain, upon that proposition, and 1
desire to read some selection** from the
work so you gentlemen can see just the
drift of the current of the decisions that
the gentleman upon the other side has
referred to. It is true, gentlemen, that
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Nevada had said that the right to condemn property for the benefit of mines
was a public use and existed under the
ordinary clause in their constitution, as
we will have in ours, that private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation,
but there are several other states that
hold that that is not the law. Those
states are California, Pennsylvania,
West Virginia, and some others, and the
whole practice is approved by Lewis in
his work on Eminent Domain. 1 would
like to read from section 184:
The tendency of those decisions
which sustain the mill acts is illustrated
by some cases now to be noted.
The mill act was the right to dam up
a stream and set the water back in a
pond to create water power.
The legislature of Nevada passed an
act in which it was declared the production and reduction of ores are the
vital necessity to the people of this
state, are pursuits in which all are interested, and from which ail derive a
benefit, so the mining, milling, smelting,
or other reduction of ores are hereby
declared to lie for the public use and
the right of eminent domain may be
exercised therefor.
That is the language of the legislature
of Nevada. In Nevada the law was
sustained and under that law the supreme court of Nevada in the case of
Daton Mining Company vs. Sewell held
that the right of eminent domain existed in favor of the mining companies,
and in their opinion there is some
language which seems to l>e worth
reading.
(Reading):
In the light of these authorities,
nearly all of whicliwere decided prior to
the adoption of the state constitution,
I think it would In? an unwarranted
assumption on our part to declare that
the framers of the constitution did not
intend to give the term "public use"
the meaning of public utility, benefit,
and advantage, as construed in the
decisions we have quoted. The reasons
in favor of sustaining the act under
consideration are certainly as strong
as any that have been given in support
of the mill dam or flowage acts, as well
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as some of the other objects heretofore
mentioned. Mining is the greatest of
the industrial pursuit* of this state.
All other interests are subservient to
it. Our mountains are almost barren
of timber nnri our valley lands could
never be made profitable for agricultural
purposes, except for the met of a home
market having been created by the mining developments in different sections
of the state. The mining and milling
interest gives employment to many men,
and the benefits derived from this business are distributed as much and sometimes more among the laboring classes
than among the owners of mines and
mills. The mines are fixed by the laws
of nature and are often found in places
almost inaccessible. For the purpose
of successfully conducting and carrying
on the business of mining, smelting, or
other reduction of ores it is necessary
to erect hoisting works, to build mills,
to construct smelting furnaces, to secure
ample grounds for dumping waste rock
and earth, and a road to and from the
mines is always indispensable.
Then he goes on to say that the public utility is so great that the state of
Nevada has said that the right of eminent domain exists in favor of mining
property. But, gentlemen, that is a
disputed question, and I believe that is
the question that this Convention wants
to adopt. We want to declare that the
mining industry is for the public benefit,
and we should treat the mining Industry as a public use. We do not, I believe,
in that section wre have adopted, adopt
this. And it cannot be so construed unless we are particular to declare it in the
Constitution. That decision was followed by a decision in Georgia. Lewis
on Eminent Domain further says:
On the other hand the validity of such
laws has been denied In California, and
Pennsylvania, and virtually so in West
Virginia. This is undoubtedly the correct view.
Now, gentlemen, it seems to me that
we should either amend this section so
that the right of eminent domain will
exist in favor of mines for tramways,
public grounds, tunnels, etc., or else we
should amend section 23. I do confess
that there are some pernicious clauses
in section 24 and 1 am not in favor of it
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as it stands. It seems to me no harm
will ever come to this State by reason
of declaring in our Constitution that
the mining industry is a public use. You
know that the mines are situated in our
mountains here and it is very rarely
that any agricultural lands will be
taken or any kind of agricultural
rights will come up when the question
of the right to condemn land for mining
purposes for dumps or tunnels or tramways is in question. And then again,
you know, gentlemen, that where one
mine wants to pass over other ground
and it does not injure it^-the value of
the mine is, by reason of the value of
the ore underneath the ground. 1 am
not in favor of striking out the section,
but of amending it so that it will contain these provisions or amend section
28 so that it will also contain them.
Mr. VAN HORNE. 1 am in favor of
striking out the section providing for
private property to be taken for private use. I do not think it is right. 1
do not think it is a safe thing to do, to
go into taking private property for private use, but I do think that accompanying that it 1B wholly in line with
the good of this Territory and with the
good of the people of this Territory
and all the people of this Territory that
we should make a declaration of public
use for public Industries in such ways
that our courts will not be at liberty to
construe them against the uses and industries of our people. I think that the
amendment that I propose does that, i
do not know whether it had a second
or not, but 1 can use it for the sake of
argument. It provides for their condemning a dump, a mill site, or a tunnel
site, upon the land of others, and only
an easement over or across the lands of
others for those ways for waters, roads,
tramways, etc. It seems to me that we
cannot err if we give our people the right
for the good of the public to Bay to the
man who has property and who is unwilling that others should use it to pass
over that, "by your being paid a just
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compensation, it is ior the public good
that you should not be privileged to say
we cannot pass this wray, or you cannot
come through my land with your irrigation ditch, with your tramway; you
cannottake a comer of my land for an
aqueduct, for a mine; you cannot take
a ravine In my land, that I do not use,
as a site for a tunnel/' Nobody wants
this to be done without the man being
paid a just compensation for it, but I
believe we can well afford to declare
that the citizen who IK HO un reasonable
in his use of his land that he will not
allow it to be used for a great public
purpose, such as mining and irrigation
schemes, tramways, roads, reservoirs,
as are going to be in this country—that
he will not allow it to be used by his
consent on the payment of just compensation, that we, representing the people, would have a right to say to him,
"You cannot act that way to the detriment of all of us. If you will not take
the Just compensation when it is offered,
we will bring you in a suit saying this
is for the good of you and the rest of
them, and upon paying you the just
compensation by the court, we will
compel you to let that land of yours be
used for the public good." I think we
would do injury to our constituents
if we did not declare HO that our
courts could not construe against it,
what would be public uses of the
lands of another.
I believe it is
right that a man who owns land
near where another man owns a mine
and ha« land that is suitable for a dump
which is not used by him, should be
compelled to say that upon taking a
just compensation for it, it may be
used by the other man and should not
be entitled to say regardless of what
use might be made, "you want to have
the land and you have got to have it,
and you shall not pay me a just compensation, sir, but you shall pay me
whatever I ask/'
I believe it is also right that in this
country where there will be great irri-

343

gation enterprises, needing reservoirs
to hold the waters in our canyons, the
public should say to the man, "You
cannot say, because you have a hole
that might be made a reservoir out of,
that is no line to yon now, but that
would be of use to a reservoir company—you cannot say to them, gentlemen, 1 won't take a just compensation
for this, your company is going to invest a million dollars, I want two hundred and fifty thousand dollars for the
hole the water is going to be banked
up in." I believe that we would be
derelict in our duty if we did not say to
him. Sir, yon cannot do that." But
we ought to say to him, in my opinion,
"When you have a suitable site for a
reservoir not in use by yourself and are
unwilling to sell it for a just compensation, that the company who is going to
reclaim thousands of acres of land have
a right to bring you into court, sir, and
say to you what is the just and reasonable value of your property, to determine the matter and condemn it for the
use of the public."
Gentlemen talk about invasion of
private rights. We do not have much
difficulty practically about it now. One
man owrns a farm here and another one
has to bring his ditch through it; he
goes to his neighbor and says, "I will
pay you all the damage for that
ditch," his neighbor says, "all right, go
8head." We are just simply declaring
against the man who happens to be
more arbitrary than most of the people
of Utah and saying if he won't do what
is reasonable, that he can be made to
do what is reasonable. Take our valleyB, dry, without irrigation they are
worthless; with irrigation they pour
into our State a continual product.
Shall the man that has a piece of land
across a canyon from which water is to
be brought say, "Gentlemen, before I
will let you take an irrigation ditch
through my land that will enable forty
thousand acres to l>e brought under
cultivation, you must pay me half the
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value of the forty thousand acres, when
the water is put upon them?" Would
that be a proper thing for this Convention to allow? Would not it be proper
for this Convention to prevent such a
man from saying that he would ask an
enterprise of that kind anything more
than a just and fair compensation for the *
land that was taken and damage that
was done by such enterprise? It seems
to me, gentlemen, that if we pass from
the consideration of this question without making some provision that will
protect people In enterprises of this
kind we will go back to our constituents and when they ask us why we
did not do this, we will have to be
ashamed to say, we did not do it because we did not think that it was a
public use and for the public good.
Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, to my
mind we have struck no proposition of
this bill of rights up to this time that
should receive the grave consideration
that this proposition now presents.
Ours is a very peculiar country and I
Hee that the committee have copied
almost HteraDy Wyoming upon this
proposition, and I trust that before
any Immediate action shall l>e taken
looking to the striking out of this section the greatest care will be given. It
seems to me, as gentlemen on the floor
have explained in regard to the mining
Interests, the same proposition affects
our irrigation interests in this Bection of
country. Our farms, as a rule, it is true,
are usually small. We have got to cross
each other's farms in order to carry our
irrigation on properly and raise crops
at all, and if this section be stricken out,
it is going to leave us in the most defenceless condition, in my judgment,
and I trust the motion to strike out
will not prevail, but that further consideration of this proposition will be
taken.
Mr. VAR1AN. Let me ask the gentleman a question. He will observe
that this matter proposed to be
stricken out includes many things. If as
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suggested, it is the sense of the Convention that they want to put in a clause
protecting irrigation, mining, it might
be put in a proper way separately, but
this includes sanlviry purposes, domestic purposes, private ways of necessity,
etc. It includes too much.
Mr. VAN HORNE. Mr. Varian, the
amendment 1 suggested did not state
the private ways of necessity.
Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, this
is a very important subject and I do
not believe that this committee can act
intelligently on this amendment without having it printed. I am not in
favor of the section as it stands. I
think it ought to be printed. Probably
a substitute ought to be adopted, but
It is a matter of such importance, I
think we ought to postpone further
consideration of it until we can have
the amendment printed and consider
what language we will adopt, if we are
going to adopt a substitute or what
amendment we will make. If it is in
order, I would therefore move the
postponement of the further consideration of this section until the further
meeting of this committee.
The CHAIRMAN. The chair rules
that a motion to postpone is out of
order in committee.
Mr. EVANS (Utah). Mr. Chairman,
I move we now arise and report.
The motion was agreed to.
The committee of the whole then
arose and reported to the Convention
as follows:
The committee of the whole have had
under consideration the preamble and
declaration of rights and haveeonsidsidered the same and desire to report
progress and ask to sit again.
The Convention then, at 5.35 o'clock
p. m., adjourned.
TWENTY-THIRD DAY.
TnrRHDAY, March 26,1895.
The Convention was called to order
by the President at 10 o'clock a. m.
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Section 22 was read.
Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. President, I
move as an amendment to that section
that the words, "or secured to be made
to the owner thereof,'* be inserted in
line three, between the words "made"
and "and." I desire to say in support
of this amendment that I have examined the constitutions of all the
states of this Union and I find that this
proposition only appears in a very few
of them. It appears in a modified form
in eight constitutions out of forty-four,
and In almost everyone of those it is
modified to some extent. All the other
thirty-six either provide that Just compensation shall be made and then
stop at that declaration, or if anything
further Is said they put the alternative
"or secured to the owner thereof or
paid into court." Now, a very great
hardship may be occasioned by leaving
this section as it now stands, and no
possible hardship, It seems to me, can
result from the amendment that I propose. It would be in the power of an
individual owning property on the line
of a railroad or a canal, that might be
in course of construction to supply a
whole settlement of people with water,
to demand an exorbitant price for the
right of way and refuse to be reasonable. Now, you may say that it is not
fair to assume that anybody will do
this, but I am telling you what they
may do, and that such things have been
done is within the knowledge of many
of us. And as was testified to before
the committee of the whole when this
matter was under consideration, such
instances have occurred. It would be in
the power of one individual to say, "I will
Bot settle without exorbitant compensation, "something that would be entirely
unreasonable and the whole progress of
the enterprise would have to be stopped
until an adjudication could be heard in
regard to that matter, and the damages
assessed in court. Now, my proposition
is that the words "or secured to the
owner thereof," be inserted so that if a
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person will not agree—if they cannot
agree or do not agree upon the compensation, then under the laws that will be
enacted by the Legislature proceedings
for condemnation will be commenced,
but before anybody can enter upon the
property a bond "will ha^e to be given
or the money will have to be paid Into
court, which will secure the owner am •
ply as to whatever amount may be
adjudged. Now, I think this is fair, and
I think it is just. The suggestion was
made the other day that this provision,
the way it now stands, will be in the
interests of the poor man. Now, It
might be and It might not be. For example, suppose a settlement of poor
farmers desired to obtain water from a
distant source, and suppose, in order to
get a right of way they had to pase
over a large tract of land owned by
some wealthy corporation. Suppose
that corporation were to say, "You
cannot have my land nor the right of
way over it unless you pay an exorbitant price." A whole settlement of
people could be deprived of the use of
this water, could be deprived of the
right to construct this canal and perhaps prevented for a whole year from
getting any benefit from it or else they
would have to accede to the exorbitant
demand that would be made upon
them. A man might charge a thousand
dollars for property that was only
worth a hundred and compel them by
extortion to pay this money or to lose
the whole season. Now, it seems to me
that no possible harm or injury can
come to the owners of property, if the
compensation is secured to them in advance, and that is what my amendment
proposes, and as I say it is in harmony
with the constitutions of thirty-six
states in this Union, and the eight which
have provided that compensation shall
be first made have modified the effect of
that by prescribing summary proceedings by which these damages may be
determined; and I submit, Mr. President,
that this amendment ought to prevail.
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Mr. EVANS (Weber). Mr. President,
I desire to offer another amendment, by
striking out all in section 22 after the
word "compensation," in the second
line, "providing property shall not be
taken for public use without Just compensation."
Mr. RICHARDS. I second the amendment.
Mr. EVANS (Weber.) Now, I want
to give a reason for that. That is the
usual method of constitution making
throughout the country.
I do not
know of any instance where any hardship has ever accrued by reason of the
fact that the additional clause has not
been inserted in the constitution. There
is no gentleman upon this floor who
has studied the law who will deny that
the Legislature has a perfect right under
the section as it now stands if these
words were stricken out, to make such
regulations and such conditions that
the property might be taken by the individual or corporation or might not be
taken, without first having paid compensation for it, or the Legislature would
have the right to require a bond, would
have the right to require security as our
legislatures have already done in this
Territory.
Tt seems to be wholly a matter of legislation that we are inserting in the Constitution. The principle is what we want.
The two lines, "providing private property shall not be taken for public use
without Just compensation," declare the
principle. That is, that no man's property shall be taken even for public use
without just compensation. Could we
say any more? Do we want to go Into
detail in this bill of rights and determine the particular manner in which it
Bhall be done—the particular manner in
which it shall be paid fur1' Now, gentlemen, I am not a corporation lawyer;
the fact is, all my business has been
against corporations. That is, in the
main, and I would do nothing at all to
favor a corporation as against the individual, or anything which would op-
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press the individual, but I say that
through my experience in this Territory
I do not know of any instances wherein
the individual has been oppressed by reason of our present laws or provisions of
this character. If any gentleman does,
I would like to have him point it out.
The reasons given by my esteemed
friend from Utah County the other day
were that it would compel corporations
to settle with Individuals by paying a
fair price rather than go into court and
have the expense and trouble of litigation. Now, in one sense, that might be
a very admirable thought, but I say to
you, gentlemen, is it right that even a
corporation should be held up? I say
that a corporation and an individual ought to stand upon equal footing before the law, and I say, too, that
if this section passes in this way, Ita
tendency will be to retard business enterprises in this Territory, and I say
that if it passes as I suggest, it would
not retard business enterprises, neither
could It possibly injure the individual.
Corporations would rather settle with
the individual, and they usually pay a
fal r price, rather than to have litigation. They are not seeking litigation
any more than the individual.
They desire to avoid it. If they are unable to contract between themselves
they resort to a court for the purpose
of determining the just value of the land.
But, why say in this Constitution that
they shall first pay before they take
possession? It might be that even a
preliminary survey could not be made
by a corporation, because they would
not have the right to take possession,
although I think the weight of authority is against that, but the law would
permit individuals or corporations to
make the preliminary survey over the
land of others, although they would
have no right to do anything at all
with the land without first having
made payment for it. It might be that
the enterprise was not fully developed.
It might be that It would require cer-
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tain manipulations and negotiations for private use. I understand he is prein order to secure the money for the en- paring an argument on it.
terprise, but if men who desire to enMr. SQUIRES. He might want to
gage in business enterprises see this pro- strike out one and amend the other.
vision in our Constitution and see that
Mr. EVANS (Weber). No; he talked
they can not go upon an individual's to me about it.
land without first paying for it, would
The proposed amendment of Mr.
not it have a tendency to retard this Evans was read.
progress which we all so much desire? I
Mr. PIERCE. Are you going to put
say that the corporation ought to se- in the words, "or damaged?"
cure the individual for the value of his
Mr. EVANS (Weber). I am willing t o
land, but I say the Legislature has al- as far as I am concerned.
ready done that and it always will do
Mr. PIERCE. Weil, I am in favor of
it, and if in the good judgment of the the motion with those words in.
people who compose the next LegislaMr. ELDREDGE. With the consent
ture, they deem it necessary and proper of the gentleman I would suggest it read
to require payment first to be made, let as follows: "Private property shall not
them do it, but let us not put a rigid, be taken or damaged for public or priunyielding thing of this kind in our vate use without just compensation,"
Constitution, which is so hard to and leave all the balance to the Legislaamend. Leave it as it has been left ture.
by other states.
Leave it as it is left
Mr. EVANS (Weber). Section 23 proby the Constitution of the United
vides that it shall not be taken or
States. That is a good model with redamaged.
Bpect to a matter of this kind, and I do
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). Mr. Presinot believe that any injury would result
dent,
I offer this as a substitute for
from it.
section
22:
Mr. SQUIRES. Mr. President, I would
like to ask that this section and the folPrivate property shall not be taken
lowing section, 23, pass over without for public use, or damaged, without
just compensation as determined by a
action for the present, and for this rea- jury,
which shall be paid as soon as It
son. Mr. Varian Informed me on yester- can be ascertained and before possesterday that he had been making a care- sion is taken. No benefit which may
accrue to the owner as a result of an
ful examination of this subject and he improvement made by any private coris satisfied that the action already taken poration shall be considered in fixing
compensation for property taken or
on section 23 Is In violation of the law the
damaged.
of eminent domain'.
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. President, if
The PRESIDENT. No question about
any of these proposed amendments
It.
Mr. SQUIRES. And the proposition prevail, I hope it will be the last one
which he has, I presume would be to proposed. There is something in that
strike out one of these sections and that has the true ring. I cannot say
have the two sections consolidated, that I am exactly in full sympathy
and for that reason and in his absence, with it to the extent to which it goes,
I would like to have the Convention but, gentlemen, this is a serious question
pass over these two sections, or further we are dealing with. There is nothing
consideration of them, for the present. more sacred than the right of property,
Mr. EVANS (Weber). Mr. President, unless it be the right to live and enjoy
I desire to say that Mr. Varian desires your liberty. These amendments, exto be heard on the other section in re- cept the last proposed by the gentleman
gard to private property being taken from Weber, simply propose to thresh
40
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over the straw again that was threshed
in committee of the whole. That is
right. These men have a right to do
that, but in the committee of the whole
the vote was, very emphatic and it was
overwhelming that if this principle of
the right of the public by the strong arm
of the law was to be exercised to the extent of taking a man's property away
from him, it is as little as the public could
be expected to do to pay the owner of
the property in advance. Now, to
show that I do not wish enterprises to
be obstructed or stubborn men to have
the chance to annoy, harass, or prevent them, I do not care how summary
the proceedings may be provided by
law as long as it is an impartial method
by which the compensation may be
ascertained, but I say let it be ascertained and the party who proposes to
take the property be compelled to pay
for it before possession is taken. If the
ordinary course of the law is too tedious
and too slow and may retard private
enterprises, I do not care if you make
a summary method by which a jury of
three men may be picked up from the
neighborhood of the owner—men ac
quainted with the property, and let them
appraise the value, and when they have
appraised the value, demand that payment be made in advance or hands off.
No matter who it is, no matter how
grand and how mighty and how all
pervading the power may be that proposes to lay its hands upon the property of the individual, I say compel it
to pay for the privilege, or hands off.
Has it come to pass that here in free
America we attach less importance
to this than they did in old England a
hundred years ago? Why, if I were an
eloquent man, I might repeat to you
the words of Lord Chatham, spoken
upon the floor of the house of commons
when he says, "The poorest man in his
cottage may bid defiance to all the
armed forces, the wind may blow
through it, the rain may enter, but the
king of England cannot enter." But
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here we propose to give a railroad corporation, and I speak of that, because
the trouble always is with those
Mr. JAMES. May I ask Mr. Thurman
a question? Do you know in the last
fifteen years in Utah Territory where
the railroads have taken a piece of
property from any individual and not
paid for it?
Mr. THURMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. JAMES. Would you name a
case?
Mr. THURMAN 1 will name the instance.
Mr. JAMES. Will you name the company and the case?
Mr. THURMAN. Yes, I will name
the company; I do not suppose it will
be giving away secrets.
Mr. EVANS (Weber). Without the
consent of the owner, Mr. Thurman?
Mr. THURMAN. Why, of course it
was without the consent of the owner.
I will name an instance under the law
which exists in the Territory of Utah
to-day, in which a man was cited to
appear in court and have the question
of the necessity of taking the property
determined and also appraise the value
of i t That corporation had offered the
man $800 for his property. They were
willing to pay him $300 and rather
than go to law he offered to take $800
for hiB property, though protesting all
the time that it was worth more than
that. At last when we reached a jury
the Jury gave the man $1500 for his
property. There was this righteous
corporation that my friend from Utah
County referred to the other day, and
this same question, when the committee
of the whole overwhelmingly voted to
place this measure in the article as we
find it here. There was the righteous
corporation exercising a power under a
constitutional law. In that case it
was unconstitutional.
Mr. RICHARDS. Will the gentleman
from Utah permit me to ask him a
question?
Mr. THURMAN Ytt sir
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Mr. RICHARDS. If the money had
been secured by a bond or the money
paid into court, how would this individual have suffered, except by not having the use of the money during the
pendency of the suit?
Mr. THURMAN. The exception answers the question.
Mr. RICHARDS. That is the only injury he could have suffered, is it not?
Mr. THURMAN. The exception answers the question. I may say to the
gentleman, if he needs money and if he
is deprived of his home he needs money
to buy another. I might ask him the
question which is the better, a bond or
promissory note or gilt edge note payable at some indefinite time in the
future, or the hard cash? We passed
through a crisis in the last two or
three years in which we found that
there is just a little bit of difference in
actual money and anybody's bond.
Now, it is the principle that I protest
against. Taking a man's property
without his consent is bad enough.
Take it without paying him in advance
before the taking is an outrage and it
ought not to be permitted. Now, I
come back to the question to show
that I am not here fighting corporations just because they are corporations. I say if you will make the
principle of payment in advance before
the taking, I do not care how summary
the method may be if it is an impartial
one by which the property may be
taken. That is the point. We may
provide right here that the Legislature
may provide a speedy remedy so that
the question will not be raised that
you have got to take it in the ordinary
course of law. Anything, gentlemen,
but do not take men's property away
from them against their consent by the
strong arm'of the law without paying
them for it. A man may even have to
litigate the bond. The men on the
bond may fail. The bond may prove
worthless. There are a thousand and
one contingencies that may happen
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that would show you in this proceeding proposed even by my friend
from Salt Lake that it is not adequate
in a question of this kind.
Mr. EVANS (Weber). Don't you recognize the fact that the property itself is
always held as security for the payment of the land?
Mr. THURMAN. Well, let us see.
Suppose it is.
Mr. EVANS (Weber). No title passes
until he gets paid.
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. President, we
will fall back" now on railroads. Men
understand railroads, and understand
what they mean. We all understand it,
and we comprehend about how they
sometimes do business. A railroad
starts in a line. It is a tangent. They
do not propose to swerve to the right
hand or to the left to avoid running
through a little house if need be,
worth four or five hundred dollars,
they go right through a man's house—
a thing that is liable to happen any
time where a railroad is built, and
always happens through a thickly settled country at some point or another.
They tear this house down. They spoil
the ground that it stands on for any
other purpose. He is secured. The bond
is not worth anything, how about the
land being still security for the loss
that man has sustained?
Mr. EVANS (Weber). Now, do you
know of any such case as that that
ever happened?
Mr. THURMAN. I say it is a case
that is liable to happen at any time
and in any country wherever a railroad
may be built. I will ask the gentleman
a question now. If a railroad starts
upon a tangent in a certain direction
and there is a little house—a home
where a man lives, worth two or three
hundred dollars, right upon the line of
it, will the railroad swerve around it?
If not, then It will go through it. It
spoils it, it destroys it. Gentlemen,
unless we can provide a summary
remedy by which the compensation
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may be ascertained and payment made
in advance, let us pass this proposition
just as it stands. Just one word as to
how this has been construed. The
federal Constitution has been construed
to mean all that I contend for, but
state constitutions in exactly the same
language have been construed by Borne
courts to mean that the legislature
may do what the Utah Legislature has
done. Provide a bond. Other state
supreme courts have construed the
same language to mean as the federal
language has been construed. Just how
our Constitution would be construed—
if I thought it would follow the construction of the federal Constitution,
then I would favor the proposition of
my esteemed friend from Weber, simply
leave it just as it was first written, but
we know not whether it will be construed that way or not, and whether or
not the precedents in those states that
hold to the contrary may no the followed. For that reason, Mr. President,
I favor fixing this in the Constitution so
that it willbe unequivocal and unambiguous, and that the right of thecitizen to
hiB property may be protected against
any power whatever.
Mr. EVANS (Weber.) I want to ask
Mr. Thurman a question. Under the
provision, as I propose it, "private
property shall not betaken or damaged
for public use without just compensation," has any court anywhere in the
land ever decided that the corporation
can take possession of it before payment is made?
Mr. THURMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. EVANS (Weber.) in the absence
of a statute?
Mr. THURMAN. Yes, sir—no, not in
the absence of a statute, but courts
have held in some of the states that
under that kind of a constitution the
legislature may provide the very procedure that my friend from Salt Lake
desires, and that is just exactly what I
want to prevent if possible.
Mr. EVANS' (Weber). That is true.
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kU£ UQder this eongtitutional provision
private property cannot be taken can
it, until paid for, unless the legislature
comes to its aid?
Mr. THURMAN
I think not, but
there is nothing to prevent the legislature in one view of the authorities coming to its aid and we are here to prevent the legislature from aiding such
things. That is Just what the bill of
rights means.
Mr. MALONEY. Mr. President, I am
in favor of the substitute offered by my
friend from Weber County. It strikes
me it meets the objections raised by Mr.
RichardB from Salt Lake. It does not
stop the enterprises, it does not prevent
progress, and I do not care how summary the proceeding may be, as soon
as the compensation is determined by
a jury, then let them pay for the land
they take before possession is taken.
"Which shall be paid as soon as it can
be ascertained and before possession
is taken." I maintain that that meets
all the objections.
And above all
things in this world, I say protect the
owner of this property and do not take
his property and turn him out of his
house and home to litigate with a railroad or any other corporation for a
great number of years. It has been
tried in South Dakota and it has been
found to be acceptable to the people and
at the same time it is sufficient protection to the railroad companies.
Mr. CREER. Mr. President, I do not
think property ought to be taken until
paid for. I know of instances where it
has worked great injury to the citizens.
Now, those of you who are aware of
the location of the railroads in Utah
County know that after the railroad
leaves Springville, it runs diagonally
across the country pretty much to the
south end. of the county. When the
first railroad was located through
there the probate court at that time
assumed the whole jurisdiction and appointed a commission'to "value the
lands; and this commission, I believe,
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was a standing commission. However,
they persuaded the people that it would
be of great benefit to them if they
would only consent to accept of the
propositions that were made, and quite
a number did so, but others did not,
and it went into court. Subsequently
there was another railroad located and
they also went diagonally through a
great tract of country—valuable land,
and now there is another contemplated railroad going diagonally
through this same country, and some
individuals upon a single farm have
now a contemplated third railroad cutting right through their land diagonally. Now, while it may seem that
it would be wrong to obstruct enterprise, at the Bame time, you can see
that the farm would be useless almost after it was cut and divided up
into pieces of that kind by three
railroads, and perhaps more might follow. And furthermore, I have in mind
another condition over and above that.
I had a near relative that was near and
dear to me that was killed by a railroad. There was no particular wrong,
however, at the time, but still she lost
her life because of the close vicinity of a
railroad to the domicile—to the houseshe did not contemplate it and did not
see the disadvantages of having a railroad so near to the house. That was a
little south of American Fork.
Mr. EVANS (Weber). How would it
do to require the railroad company to
make compensation for the lives of the
people before killing them?
Mr. CREEK. I am speaking about
this fact that when the matter is left to
the court, in fact, that is invariably the
case, they take into consideration the
benefit that might accrue. Now, all the
benefit that might accrue would not restore that party's life again, and all the
benefits that might accrue would not
justify cutting up a person's home or
domicile or even their farm, and just as
remarked by my colleague from Utah
County, when a railroad starts out they
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are going to go, no matter where it is.
Supposing, now, in Salt Lake City, these
railroads that run diagonally through
some valuable blocks for instance—of
course they have the power to do so, if
they so desire, but it seems to me that
there should be some check upon this
matter, and I believe a greater justice
would be done if they were required to
pay for the land before the possession
was taken. And I know of instances
where they were kept out of possession
for a great length of time in our neighborhood. It seems to'me nothing but
just and right that they should at least
pay for the land before they took possession of it, therefore, I am in favor of
the gentleman's substitute from Weber
County.
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I am
in favor of the motion of Mr. Evans, of
Weber County, to strike out all after
the word "compensation" in the second
line. Mr. President and gentlemen, I
have noticed this fact, that while men
are opposed to railroads when they
come to a consideration of this kind,
every man is anxious enough to have a
railroad built to his particular village
or town or locality. You take the people of any county in this Territory and
those people are particularly anxiouB
that the railroad should be built to their
town, but after the line is fixed, after
the survey has been made, after a man
finds that it is going to cut right
through his land, then we always find
a certain class of men who rise and
want to exact an exorbitant amount.
There is nothing in this section as left
by Mr. Evans that does not provide for
compensation. It leaves to the Legislature the matter of fixing details as to
how that compensation shall be arrived at, when it shall be paid and ail
other matters connected therewith. It
may be true, and it doubtless is true,
that sometimes people have been inconvenienced by railroads, but where one
man has been inconvenienced in this
way hundreds of others have been ben-
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efltted. There is a certain amount of
benefit to any community and to any
locality to have a railroad brought to
it, and I think we should not hamper
railroads, and as stated by the gentleman from Salt Lake, Mr. Richards, this
does not apply to railroads alone. It
applies to all kinds of enterprises of a
public nature, and in many cases poor
people have combined their efforts in
order that they may accomplish something, and it is Just as well that they
should have this matter left to the Legislature who will be able to fix the matter properly.
Another thing is this, if we leave it
to the Legislature and if they find by
practical experience that the law which
they enacted does not operate for the
protection of the people, they can
change it at any subsequent Legislature.
But if we fix it here, we are then fixing
it so that it requires a large vote and a
great change in public sentiment before
it can be changed. I am in favor of the
motion of the gentleman from Weber.
Mr. HART. Mr. PresidentJ trust that
the amendment of the gentleman from
Weber County to the original section
will not prevail, and while I have little
choice between the proposition of the
gentleman from Weber County, Mr.
Kimball, and the original section, yet I
do prefer the proposition that the gentleman has offered in preference to section 2, for the reason that a proposition
which he offers is one that has been
incorporated in the constitution of
another state and I believe has already
been adjudicated upon, and for the
further reason that section 22 is a production that was produced right here
in committee of the v hole by amendments from various quarters of this
house, and as it now stands it is somewhat uncertain in my opinion and
poorly constructed. For instance, the
provision that where private property
is damaged for public use the compensation is to be determined by a competent tribunal would almost give rise
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to the inference that where private
property is simply taken for public use
that a public .tribunal 1B not to pass
upon it. I think, Mr. President, as that
section stands, that there is an opportunity for the misconstruction of the
true purpose that we want to reach in
bringing forward this section. I do not
think that it is injustice to a railroad
corporation, or to any other corporation if they are taking private property,
to require of them that they shall make
compensation for it. I do not think
that there can be much of anything in
the suggestion—and I make the remarks
with all due deference to the opinion of
the gentleman from Salt Lake, Mr.
Richards, when he claims that a provision which requires compensation to
be made in advance would Btop the
business enterprise of the construction
of a railroad or of some other enterprise. I see no reason, Mr. President,
where a railroad company is being
taken through a county or district of
country, why compensation should not
be made, and the matter of what is
adequate compensation arrived at within the short period for instance of tfiirty
days. I do not believe that this would
be an injustice to any railroad company
or to any corporation to require that
they shall pay in advance before they
take the property.
Iowa, Indiana,
and a number of other states have
provisions that are equally as strong
as the provisions that the gentleman
from Weber brings forward
Mr. RICHARDS. Did I understand
you to say the state of Iowa?
Mr. HART. Yes, sir
Mr. RICHARDS.
The amendment
tha t I offered is in the language of the
state of Iowa.
Mr. HART. I did not know that the
gentleman had an amendment before
this house. I thought the one of Mr.
Evans of Weber was the only one
pending.
Mr. RICHARDS. I offered an amendment in the very language of the con-
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stitution of Iowa and Mr. Evans offered
as an amendment, striking out all after
the word compensation, which I accepted.
Mr. HART. The constitution of Indiana on this subject—the portion of
the section which refers to this matter
Is, "No man's property shall be taken
by law without just compensation, nor
except in case of the state without Just
compensation first assessed and tendered/' And the provision of Iowa constitution on the same subject 1*, "Private
property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation first
being made or secured to be made to
the owner thereof, as soon as the
damages shall be assessed by a jury,
who shall not take Into consideration
any advantages," etc., being the same
provision that the gentleman from
Weber produces; the only difference between the Iowa constitution and the
provision which the gentleman from
Weber offers, is the matter of securing
compensation to be given, but I take it
that the provision of the Indiana constitution and of the others Is a better
provision in this: that it requires the
money to be paid in advance without
the danger of a worthless bond, and it
absolutely does no injustice to any
man to require him to pay the money
before he takes the property.
Mr. CANNON. I want to ask Mr.
Hart a question. I understood that In
the case of Indiana it requires the
money to be tendered, but not paid.
Mr. HART. Well, that te equal to a
payment; if the man won't take his
money when you offer it to him, why
every good purpose Is subserved.
Mr. CANNON. He may not agree on
the price. There is a great difference
between allowing a man to make a tender of a fair price and making a payment.
Mr. HART. Well, it says it must be
assessed or tendered in advance.
(The President here called Mr. Anderson to the chair.)
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Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I have
been thinking considerably over this
matter and to me it is a matter of very
grave concern. The other day in committee of the whole, I remember that
some of the constitutions had sections
in li^e section 28. I became a little concerned that possibly we might do a
wrong if we did not put the 23d section
in, but in the consideration of this section It seems to me if we tie this up too
completely and too perfectly it is going
to strike back in a way that it will not
only plague us but will do extreme hurt.
I trust that the spirit of this Convention is that so far as it is possible we
will declare in our Constitution what
we want and that the legislative power
shall be left with power to do some
things where questions may arise of the
character that present themselves here.
This section to my mind as proposed to
be amended by Mr. Evans is less liable
In my judgment so far as I can weigh
this matter, not being an attorney,
the safest for all concerned. *'Private
property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation." It seems to me that if we were
to work a month to shape that language and to change it andfixit in every
form possible we could not more perfectly shape it so that the Legislature in
the exercise of Its powers would deal
rightly and properly with this proposition, and BO far as I, myself, can weigh
this language it strikes me that the
safest thing for us to do In this matter
Is to adopt the amendment proposed by
the gentleman from Weber County. We
may add to it and merely Insert words
—we may change it to follow the various ideas and views, but we simply
strike the ground of legislation when
we, do it and when this has once become
law, established in this bill of rights, it
seems to me that it may place us in a
position that It will work extreme hardship possibly to men who are In the
condition that Mr. Richards mentioned,
unable to meet the responsibilities that
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might be required of them by wealthy
people. So far as the wealthy are concerned In these matters, we recognize
this fact, that they can usually take care
of themselves, and these wealthy corporations can do this, but In a country
such as ours where any day of the week
almost there are occurring little combinations of interest—a half a dozen men
perhaps to take out a water site or
enter Into some little business enterprise,
it would be In the power of a strong
corporation or of men possessed with
wealth to so tie them up that It would
be impossible for them to act and the
reverse might be the case, so far as that
Is concerned, for I am not here myself
upon the basis of trying to curry favor
with the poor or with the wealthy.
That Is not the proposition. The proposition Is to secure in this law a law that
will be sufficiently broad and at the
same time will protect the rights of all
men so far as possible, and give them
their day in court when the Legislature,
under the enactment under this Constitution as it shall be provided, shall
determine what are the rights of those
Individuals.
It seems to me that any attempt to
reach the interests of this friend or to
guard the interests of the other friend
on some idea that may be engendered
in our minds as affecting the other interests or this Interest, will simply
plague us In the future and that it will
hurt the very ones that in our judgment
we are seeking to guard. I trust that
when the vote shall be taken upon this
proposition and this section shall have
been passed, It will provide that property shall not l>e taken for public use
without just compensation, and In my
judgment when that Is done It amply
covers the ground and our people are in
less danger than they otherwise would
be.
Mr. VAN HORNE. Mr. President I
am in favor of the amendment of the
gentleman from Welier It Is exactly
in the language of the orip^nal draft
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presented to ug by the committee 011
declaration of rights, and It seems to me
it covers every possible plea that has
been made on this subject. It Is admitted by the gentlemen who oppose
this amendment that no court has construed such language without statute
passed by the Legislature In such a way
that could be a hardship upon persons
whose property is to be taken. Are we
to say on the very beginning of the new
State of Utah that we are afraid of our
legislatures and the laws that they will
pass, that we will presume that they
will pass such laws that the court will
have to construe them as doing injury
to the people? It seems to me that we
can safely trust tfce legislatures of Utah
to pass only such laws on the question
of eminent domain as shall be just and
fair to the citizen. I am opposed as far
as It Is possible to avoid It, to putting
legislation details and specialties Into
the Constitution. I believe that the
language of the committee on that section now incorporated In the amendment of the gentleman from Weber is
all that is necessary. It Is all that Is
needed to protect the rights of the citizen against public use, and I am in favor
of that amendment.
Mr. THORESON. Mr. President, 1
am In favor of this section as we have
received It from the committee of the
whole, or If amended at all as amended
by the gentleman from Weber, Mr. Kimball. We are sent here as I take It to
defend the rights of the citizen of the
proposed State. We have provided for
the preservation of certain rights. We
have now arrived at their property
rights and I am In favor of providing
here that before property Is taken from
the private citizen for any use that he
be paid a just compensation lor that
property. You say, "Leave it to the
Legislature." This Is something that
we ought to fear when the rights of the
citizen are set In opposition to those of
corporations. Why, corporations wield
a better influence and a greater influ-
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«nce with a smaller body than with the
present one. I am in favor and I believe
the citizens of the Territory of Utah demand of us that we guard their interests, guard their lives, their liberty and
their property, and that we restrict the
Legislature upon this very point and
upon all such points. If I understand
it right, that is what we are here for,
and I Bay that a corporation or an in•divldual—if I want anyone's property,
I look upon it as honorable to first negotiate with the person and pay him a
just compensation, if we can agree upon
it, or submit it here to a tribunal that
will decide it and then tender him his
money before I take possession, and I
say, gentlemen, it was our almost unanimous conviction upon this subject as
•expressed in committee of the whole,
we then concluded, and 1 think we were
guided by the spirit of our constituency
when we almost unanimously voted
that compensation must first be paid.
Mr. FARR. Mr. President, I have
yielded the floor to different ones in
hopes that this subject would come to
a close without detaining this assemblage so long, but I am opposed to this
amendment. That is, that the Legislature has full power to enact. Of
course, we want to limit them and tell
them how far they Bhall go. This section seems to be all that is necessary,
"Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use." And I see in
the next section it has got private use.
If that is the wish of the Convention to
have that in, why not insert it here—
4
'shall not be taken or damaged for
public or private use without just compensation?" Who is going to take private property for private use without
first making reparation? The man has
access to the law, that will be made in
the Legislature, right straight, and if
we put that in it does seem to me it
covers everything without lumbering
up our constitutional laws with legislative matters. Why not leave it to the
Legislature? They have full powers to
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do it. They know what they should
and should not do, and why not leave it
there? What is the use of spending our
time here day after day trying to legislate things that the Legislature is paid
for to make laws, and then if they find
that it don't work and they want to
change it at the next session, they can
change it; but to go to work and tie it
up here, we put shackles on them and
they cannot amend it. I do not want
to find fault with members. I like to
see them get up and express their views
and knowledge upon things and give
vent to their understanding, and so on;
but to my mind it does not interest me
at all. I want to see the Constitution
broad and comprehensive and give the
people all their rights they need instead
of depriving them of rights as this section will do. I leave it to the Legislature.
Mr. HEYBOURNE. Mr. President,, I
am not here,if I understand my duty ,to
legislate against railroads or other
corporations, nor am I here to retard
any enterprise that may be established
in our midst for the development of our
country, yet at the same time, I think
that we should have due consideration
for the rights and privileges of the
people and seek to protect them in
every way that is possible. I understand that we are living in a country
that is not thoroughly developed.
That there will be great improvements
made in regard to railroading and in
reclaiming many hundreds of acres of
land that are now lying waste, and
that in this latter matter canals and
reservoirs will of necessity have to be
constructed that will be of vital importance to the people at large, and I
have not in my mind at the present
time any of these enterprises that are
under way that have not got at least
some pecuniary object in view, and in
carrying out their projects they will of necessity have to cross over tracts of land,
they will of necessity have secure places
for reservoirs. In theadventof railroads
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into the Territorj or coming State,
rights of way will have to be secured,
and I think, Mr. Chairman, that the
section as reported upon in the committee of the whole is that that is
necessary, and that that we require.
That it has a due regard and consideration for those who may invest in this
enterprise, and it will reasonably recompense and protect those whose property may be taken and used for the
consummation of these purposes that
I have referred to. Therefore, I am in
favor of the section as it now stands.
That we in taking this course do not
detract from the enterprises that may
be introduced in the midst of the
citizens here, and we offer reasonable
protection to those whose lands may
be taken for these enterprises.
Mr. IVINS. Mr. President, I just
want to say a word in the same line
of argument used by my colleague from
Iron County. This section was elaborately discussed in committee of the
whole. All of the ground was gone
over and we concluded that as it
passed that committee it was a
good section, and I have Been nothing nor heard nothing here this
morning that would lead me to
change the opinion in regard to it I
do not regard it as legislation at all.
It simply provides that compensation
must first be made. It removes that
question from any further discussion.
It removes it from the province of the
Legislature, so far as the enactment of
a law by which it might be made possible for corporations to take advantage of individuals by the filing of
bonds and promised compensation that
would result in long drawn out lawsuits. I have instances that I recollect
that have come under my own observation where railroad companies have
built grades through private property.
Compensation for damage done has
been deferred and shortly after the railroad has become insolvent, and the
man has been left with a grade through
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his farm, and the privilege of levelling
it down again at his own expense. All
we ask is that it be plainly defined that
before private property can be taken
for public use compensation shall first
be made, and I believe this section is a
good one just as it was reported from
the committee of the whole, and it
seemsto me that it ought not to be
changed.
Mr. HOWARD.
Mr. President, I
think that the section as it stands now
will give satisfaction, for the reason
given in argument made here to-day.
It has been said by some of those who
are opposed to it or who are in favor
of some of the amendments, that
a man would have the power to
ask a thousand dollars or ten thousand dollars for a piece of property
that is not perhaps worth over one
hundred. This does not give him the
power to do that. The first part of the
section reads: "Private property shall
not be taken for public use without just
compensation first made." Now, that
does not say the man who owns this
property, be he a poor man or whatever he may be, can demand just what
he pleases, and the party that wants
the property has got to pay the price
that he asks for it. It leaves it with
the Legislature to determine that. It
leaves it with the Legislature to provide how and in what way this property might be assessed. And the latter
part of the section reads, "And no private property shall be damaged for
public use without just compensation
to be determined by a competent
tribunal.*' It looks to me, Mr. Chairman, as though that was fair. To
change this section and leave it as
some of these amendments suggest, it
would throw this question into the
courts and perhaps leave it there for
years to the detriment of the poor man
that owns this property that might
want to be taken, whether it be by a
railroad corporation or any other corporation The amendment offered by
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Mr. Kimball, from Weber, covers some
of the ground that this section already
reported covers,* but it provides that
the compensation is determined by a
Jury. If that should prevail, it would
compel the man to go into the court.
He may go xo a court to get a jury, he
cannot arbitrate it, he cannot settle it
in any other way provided there is any
trouble over it, only by going into
court to get a Jury. Some of the gentlemen who want this changed admit
in their argument that it is good
enough but they want to leave it to the
Legislature. Let the Legislature provide for these things, that this section
now asks for. This body of men here
to-day is a larger representation of the
people of the Territory than you can
get in the Legislature, and if they conclude that this is good enough why let
them put it in the Constitution. If it
must go and it is left to the Legislature
to fix how this shall be done, there is a
possibility that it might be changed or
left in a way that corporations would
have the advantage. It is possible—
we have heard of such things being
done—that corporations have influenced legislation, and if this is such
an important article to be considered in
the interests of corporations, they certainly would take an interest in this
matter when it came before a Legislature and would do all that they possibly could in their own interests to
keep the Legislature from protecting
the rights of the citizens, and I think
that it should be left as this section
now provides, that this should be determined by a competent tribunal. Let
the parties when they disagree in regard to the value of a piece of property
choose arbitrators if they want to, or
let the court appoint a commissioner to
take testimony and to present in the
case if they want to, or let it go to a
Jury if they like; let them choose the
mode, but do not compel them to go
into court and take a jury. I think we
should leave it the way it is.
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Mr. LAMBERT. Will you allow me
a question? You are living in a sparsely
settled country. There are canals to
be taken out in your region. Who are
taking out those canals?
Mr. HOWARD. The people as a rule
are taking them out,
Mr. LAMBERT. Are they not composed, as a rule, of poor men, and would
not it make it a hardship if they had to
put up cash for a right of way?
Mr. HOWARD. I think not.
Mr. THURMAN. How about the
other fellow, ie not he a poor man, toot
Mr. HART. I would ask if a private
canal company has anything to do
with this section? This is for public
purposes, as I understand it. That
would come under the following section.
Mr. LAMBERT. You can incorporate canal companies, can't you?
Mr. RICHARDS. I desire to ask the
gentleman from Cache a question. I
understand you to say that the taking
out of water might not be a public use
—the construction of a canal?
Mr. HART. I say that that probably
comes under the consideration of the
succeeding section—section 23, I think it
is—taking private property for private
uses.
Mr. RICHARDS. I ask the gentleman
from Cache this question. Suppose the
inhabitants of a town were to construct
a canal to convey water from any
source, would not that be a public use?
Mr. HART. Well, it would probably
be so construed, but we have not
considered it as such in framing the
provision of this Constitution. We
have public uses and private uses and
we have placed as private use rights of
way for the construction of ditches and
canals. There is a doubt as to what
the construction would be.
Mr. RICHARDS. I desire to ask the
gentleman another question. Is it not
a fact that this section 28 does not relate to that kind of a case? Is it not a
fact that section 28 does not apply to
the case that I suggested? Would not the
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case that I speak of Lie a public use and any property had been taken and conwould not the case where an individual fiscated without first being paid for by
or two or three individuals desired to any corporation. Now, I have in my
use the property of another—would not mind one Bpecial instance that trans
that be the kind of a case that Is pired in Utah County
reached by section 23?
Mr. JAMES. May I correct the gentleMr. HAKT.
Well, it is possible, man?
Mr. BOYER. Yes, sir.
as I stated, that the case stated by the
Mr. JAMES. You have not quoted
gentleman would come under section
22, but the restriction given by the gen- my question exactly right. I asked the
tleman here of three or four men taking question of Mr. Thurman, did he know
out a ditch and going a/ross another's of an 3 property having been taken
land is certainly in contemplation of within the last 15 years where compensation had not been had and owners of
section 28.
Mr. LAMBERT. If they would incor- the property had not been paid for 11
porate it would come right under that and to name the property and name
the corporation. I wanted to ask it
section.
Mr. BOYER. Mr. President, I only for information. I wanted to know if
arise especially to place myself straight it had been done under the law which
before this Convention. The worthy provides that property can be taken
gentleman from Utah County in hiB re- and a bond given for the payment of
marks referred to his colleague from the property.
Utah County taking opposite ground
Mr. BOYER. I will confine my answer
t© him on the particular question before to that question or endeavor to. The
the house a few days ago. Now, when case that 1 have in mind is something
this question was up, I remember dis- like this: a corporation desired a certinctly objecting to placing in this Con- tain piece of property and running in
stitution any provision that should front of a gentleman's land in the consubject any corporation to consequen- struction of a railroad, and this intial damages, and that those damages dividual gave a certain piece of his land,
should first be paid before gaining pos- very meager though, in quantity, yet
session of the property that would be to him somewhat valuable—gave to
necessary for their use. That objection this corporation certain property and
having been thoroughly overcome in then there was a difference still existing
this section, as now provided—in section between the corporation and the in22 upon this subject. 1 then voted fairly dividual. The private individual wanted
and squarely for the provision in my a thousand dollars for his property
mind as it now stands, for the amend- and the railway declined to make any
ment; and I hope that every amend- concession and then went away. Bement that has been offered to the sub- fore taking forcible possession of this
stitute, as it has been offered, will not property the railway agent, conversing
prevail, but that section 22 as it now with the individual owner of the propreads may stand in this Constitution; erty' asked him whether he would take
and I desire, while on my feet, to make five hundred dollars for his claim. The
reference to one particular case that I gentleman replied, "I want one hour to
now have in my mind, in furtherance of consider," inferring to him that he
answer to the questionof the gentleman would accept of the proposition. In
from Weber County, and that is whether the meantime, the same agency came
—I think, however, if I mistake not, it before me and desired to enter proceedwas Mr. James that asked the question ing by way of obtaining a warrant to
—whether within the last fifteen years suppress the individual from doing
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damage in the event that the company
should take possession of his property
forcibly. I declined to issue him a
warrant on any information or belief of
that kind, that would so deprive the
individual of his personal liberty. Consequently—I will not say consequently
of that action, I will say, right along
here, before the individual and the
agent got together, the company itself
took forcible possession,and with a score
of men with ax in hand took possession
of the property of the individual,
chopped his forest trees, etc., down, held
possession of it, and it was months
afterwards before the individual got
his pay and that was by the award of
a jury in the district court of the first
judicial district of the Territory of
Utah.
Mr. EVANS (Weber). Mr. President,
I desire to ask the gentleman a question. Could not a corporation do the
same thing under this section as you
desire to have it passed?
Mr. BOYER. Certainly not.
Mr. EVANS (Weber). That is simply
a lawless act?
Mr. BOYER. I should say so.
Mr. EVANS (Weber). I could go
upon anybody's property and lawlessly
do the Bame thing.
Mr. BOYER. I have no fear of anything of this kind when we have the
law emphatic. When we provide that
no property shall be taken without
compensation first made therefor, then
we have no question about it, and he
subjects himself to a double prosecution.
Mr. BOWDLE. Mr. President, in all
these cases there will be individual
hardships, and it is a well settled prin.
ciple that the general good must first
be subserved, even if an individual occasionally does have to suffer. I do not
believe in taking any man's property
without just compensation, but as we
stand here to-day, we cannot see exactly what will be the future in all its
bearings on this subject, and all that I
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have heard said with reference to this
section and urging against the amendment of the gentleman from Weber (Mr.
Evans), is casting a doubt upon the
wisdom and the ability of the future
Legislatures to take care of this matter.
Under the amendment as offered by Mr.
Evans, and which I most certainly
favor, the Legislature can take ample
care of this whole subject. They will"
have the power to pass any law that
they may see fit regarding the manner in
which the compensation shall be made.
They can say it shall be made before the
property is taken. They will come up
from the people; they will be persons
that will be representing the people,
and I take it, not the corporations, and
it seems to rae that we can safely leave
that to them when we say that no
property can be taken or damaged
without just compensation.
That
covers the whole ground. The only difference is that some say it must be paid
in advance or there must be a bond
given. That is all. Those are the only
things upon which they differ. We
must not lose sight of the fact that we
want this Territory developed, and
while we must take care of our citizens
and protect them in their property
rights and in their homes and all that,
we must not at the same time make
such a Constitution here as will discourage private enterprise and proper
development of this country. Now, If
we put this in as the gentleman has by
the substitute offered, that fixes it for
all time to come. The Legislature at its
first session may do that very name
thing that is here proposed by thin substitute. There might come up such a
circumstance or such a complication of
circumstances that the Legislature in
its wisdom would say that it was not
a good thing. The Legislature could
remove that, but as we fix it here the
Legislature can do nothing at all in the
matter. They are compelled to leave
it just as we fix it here, and I am in
favor of leaving it with the Legislature
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when we say that you shall, not 'take
the property without you make compensation for it—I believe we can safely
leave to the Legislature the question of
how and when that compensation shall
be made, and I am In favor of the substitute and leaving it just as that will
leave it, and then the Legislature can
adopt the ways and the means which
will be eminently within their province
by which this can be done.
Mr. MURDOCK (Beaver)., Mr. President, as I regard it, we are in the interests of all parties. That is not only
those that may constitute a corporar
tion, but individuals and all there is of
a corporation, they are just simply a
little larger "Idler" than the individual.
That is all there is of a corporation.
They represent a company, and they
should be treated as an individual, and
if it is right to take the property of
individuals for a public purpose, which
all corporations is more or less regarded
as a public enterprise, that is instituted
to what? To develop the country* making roads, railroads, to make canals,
or reservoirs, and all these things, and
it Is very possible that directly an individual may be injured but indirectly he
may be greatly benefitted by that enterprise whatever it may be. He may be
greatly benefitted and we are here to
not only look after the individual, but
we are here to look after what? Men
who are enterprising, men of means,
men who are desirous to make perhaps
money for themselves. That is their
main object, is to make money for themselves, and while they are making
money for themselves, they are making
money for the individual. We are
dependent upon enterprising men, we
are dependent upon men who will bring
their means into the country, and we do
not wish in any wise to hedge up and
hinder their progress. We have only
commenced
Mr. THORESON. Will the gentleman
allow me a question?
Mr. MURDOCK (Beaver). fee, sii
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Mr. THORESON. Would that hedge
up the way of any citisen or corporation by juBt saying, "if you want private
property you must pay for it."
Mr. MURDOCK (Beaver). I am not
arguing against a man's private property being properly—
Mr. EVANS (Weber). That is what
the section does say, "If you want
private property you must pay for it."
Mr. MURDOCK (Beaver). Yes, sir, I
fully endorse the section and the very
most I think is necessary is the amendment of Mr. Evans from Weber County.
We do not want to make the matter so
stringent that men of enterprise will
feel discouraged. I believe in giving
them a chance to bring forward any
enterprise that will be beneficial to the
public. I do not believe in being so particular. While I desire to have individual interests guarded and well guarded,
and we are not hereto legislate, gentlemen, I believe that we are here simply
to make a boundary that will surround
and protect future legislation, and we
do not want to legislate in all these particulars in a detailed condition, which I
see are many, if it is in bills that an
brought here, that to my mind t« a
great deal too much legislation. 1
think we should leave these matters. I
have confidence in the men that will
represent the people here in the future
in the Legislature. Let them have as
much at stake as we will here.
Mr. HAMMOND. Mr. President
The PRESIDENT. Mr. Hammond.
Mr. RICKS. Mr. President, I move
the previous question.
Mr. VARIAN. 1 hope thi
vail, I protest against it.
Mr. ROBERTS. I sincerely . „,will not prevail.
The PRESIDENT. I had already
acknowledged Mr. Hammond before
Mr. Ricks had presented his motion.
Mr. HAMMOND. I am now getting
tired. I do not purpose to detain you,
gentlemen. It has been well said that
this is a very important question that
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we are debating. I have had some experience; I am not a lawyer nor the son of
a lawyer, but I have my thoughts and
convictions. A long resident of this
Territory, saw a great many acts of
corporations, I am utterly opposed
and ever have been for any individual
or corporation of any character jumping down onto my land without my
having a voice in saying—at least preventing me from having any voice in
the act. The government which I love,
our great and good government, with
Grover Cleveland at the head—I am not
good on dates, but I think in the year
1888 there was a commission sent out
to make a trade with the Southern Ute
Indians, and it placed them over into
San Juan County. The secretary, a
very able gentleman—a clergyman of
great repute and high standing, was
the secretary, and they rode about our
country up and down for four months
until they expended every last cent of the
appropriation, I think it was ten thousand dollars, before ever they returned
a report at all, and finally by paying
the chiefs over two hundred and fifty
dollars—five hundred dollars possibly,
they got their names to a treaty to give
up their present reservation and placed
them over in Utah, and this secretary
wrote to me afterwards asking me to follow with a report or an estimate of the
settlers' claims—the value of our claims
there? $80,000 was embodied in the bill to
pay settlers for their thirteen years of
hard labor there. In connection with
some other gentlemen we got together
and submitted an appraisement of the
valuation of our claims there exceeding
$100,000, and afterwards, I went to
Washington on that rerj thing to keep
every—inasmuch as we were bound to
be ousted, and I submitted it to the committee, that they embody in the bill
$200,000 more or less, to pay the settlers
for their labor and claims there. Why
we had one canal that cost the people
$96,000, that this high toned commission was going to allow us $80,000 for
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all our land, land claims and water
rights. Now, I am opposed to this,
whether it is the government, or
whether it is corporations, private or
municipal, to squat down onto me or
on my people without giving us a
chance to have some voice in the bargain—two sides to a bargain, hence, as
I seconded this amendment, I am
heartily in favor of it.
Mr. VARIAN. Mr. President, I want
to suggest to my friends on the right
that they must not be impatient; the
discussion of these matters is long
sometimes and some of us have not the
opportunities of being in at the beginning when the work is done and hearing the discussion and the talk before
the committee. I muBt talk on this
question, and particularly the matter
concerned in the 23rd section. It may
be that if the views I entertain shall
meet with consideration at the hands
of the Convention, the Convention may
desire to add something more to section 22, the one under consideration
now. In the view I take of it, it does
not make very much difference whether
you put in the Constitution a provision that compensation shall be paid
for private property taken for public
uses, because otherwise you could not
take it. That is a fundamental proposition. 1 lay it down now. You cannot
take private property for a public use
without paying for it. The second
proposition is you cannot take private
property for private uses at all,
whether you put it in your Constitution
or not. The section as it stands perhaps is not objectionable unless it be in
the provision regarding compensation
to be first made. We went over all
that ground the other day and I had
supposed that the Convention had
finally and definitely concluded upon
that subject. So far as I am concerned,
I do not care to discuss that question.
I find in my mind at least serious
objection, however, to a portion of
the amendment, offered I believe
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by the gentleman from Weber, Mr,
Kimball, which, as I remember it, expressly provides that benefits accruing
to the owner of the condemned property shall not be taken into consideration in the award of compensation. I
do not believe that is right. I have
Berious doubts whether it could be
maintained. Perhaps, however, that
being for the benefit of the citizen,
might not present a serious question.
It is wrong in principle anyhow. Under
such a provision as that any municipality in opening a street in a city,
increasing the value of the property
immensely perhaps—for the Bake of
illustration, we will say, a hundred per
cent—why should the city be compelled
to pay the price for the land taken for
this great public purpose, which not
only results beneficially for the general
community at large—the entire city,
but absolutely puts money into the adjoining property owners' pockets? It
does seem to me that such a proposition as that ought not to be considered. It is not alone a question of
railroads or quasi public corporations.
This great question of eminent domain
includes a vast variety of matters. It
is founded on fundamental principles,
underlying which, all the time, as it is
the corner stone, is the right of private
property. I object, therefore, so far as
I am concerned, to that amendment,
and I understand that there is another
amendment by the gentleman from
Weber, which, if adopted, would simply
leave the first two or three lines, I
believe, in the section.
The amendment offered by Mr, Evans,
of Weber, was read.
Mr. VARIAN. ItWivr *1 I'.'V, brir.g
made."
Mr. EVANS (Weber). Yes, sir.
Mr. VARIAN. Now, gentlemen, this
is a mutter of popular—a matter which
you will decide without reference to
law, because it is a matter that can be
determined. It is a legislative question.
I do not care, to discuss that. I do
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want, however, to discuss matters arising particularly because of the 23rd
section, and while we have not reached
that yet, still as I said before, it is intimately connected with the 22nd section, and with the general subject, and
it may be that you will want to make
some further declaration as to what
public uses are. If I shall be able to
convince you as I have convinced myself since this matter was before the
committee of the whole, that all these
matters and declarations in the 23rd
section are absolutely in violation of
the 14th amendment to the Constitution
of the United States
Mr. BUTTON. Would not you prefer to take a recess and argue that
afterwards?
Mr. VARIAN. I very much perfer it.
I wanted to bring a volume or two
here to illustrate.
Mr. EVANS (Weber). Mr. Parian, I
desire to ask you a question. Would
it not be better for you to make your
argument on that subject when we
reach it? We are simply determining
this question now of taking private
property for public uses.
Mr. VARIAN. Well, I have concluded
to pitch right in here.
Mr. EVANS (Weber). I thought that
might confuse both sections. I simply
want to settle this question about
what we will do, that is all. I Bimply
want to ask you whether it would not
be a better order if you had no amendment of this section to dispose of section 22 and then go to section 23.
Mr. VARIAN. No, Mr. President, the
\ iew I take of it, the two sections
should properly be considered together.
And as I am advised, it might be necessary to present some additional
amendment to section 22, which cannot
be done without considering at least by
way of argument the effect of section
23.
The Convention then took a'"recess
until 2 o'clock p. m.
. -

Digitized by G 0 0 g l €

April 3.

BILL OF RIGHTS.
AFTERNOON SESSION.

Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). Mr. President, I do not desire to make a speech
at this time on my substitute for the
section that is now under consideration
and all the amendments, but I do desire
this, as the gentleman from Salt Lake,
Mr. Varian, has the floor, to correct
him in one thing that he mentioned this
morning. If you read my substitute,
it obviates the objection the gentleman
raised. I do not refer in that clause of
the substitute that refers to the nonallowance of benefits to public corporations, and I simply want to call his
attention to that matter now, so that
he may not be misled in his argument
that he may make hereafter in regard
to that matter, and if the gentleman
reads it himself, he will observe that it
is restricted to private corporations,
not municipal corporations, or any
other public corporations.
Mr. VARIAN. Mr. President, as intimated before the recess, the matters embraced in section 23 are intimately connected with the subject matter of section 22. It is impossible, I think, to
intelligently discuss the whole underlying principle which ought to be and
must be, I submit to you gentlemen
here, discussed and understood before
you can afford to pasB on either one of
these propositions. The matter has
been considered, Mr. President, at some
length in the committee of the whole.
I believed then as I believe now that in
the general desire to accomplish an
admitted good for the people of the new
State and to enable them to develop its
resources, the great fundamental principle underlying this entire doctrine was
overlooked, or if not, was passed by
too hastily. It was assumed that the
people in this Constitutional Convention
assembled had complete and full power
to even disturb vested rights, to invade
the sanctity of the private ownership of
property, and by a simple ipse dixit>—a
declaration to make of a private use a
public use. Now, I submit in the begin-
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ning that that theory is in violation of
the principles upon which this government rests; it is the right of eminent
domain which we are considering and
it is well to pause a moment and understand and admit what that right and
power are. It is the power inherent in
all governments, whether you declare it
in your Constitution or leave it out,
based upon the principle that the public
safety is the supreme law, predicated
upon a law of necessity, which authorizes the entire people, through the
medium of their common government,,
to reach out the hand and take the
property of the citizen, because it is
deemed necessary to advance the interests of the state. That is the principle
underlying it. It is well expressed by
the supreme court of the United States,
speaking through Mr. Justice Field, in
the following language:
The power to take private property
for public uses, generally termed the
right of eminent domain, belongs to
every independent government. It is
an incident of sovereignty, and as said
in Boone versus Pattereon, requires no
constitutional recognition. The provision found in the fifth amendment to
the federal Constitution, and in the
constitutions of the several states, for
just compensation for the property
taken, is merely a limitation upon the
use of the power.
I start with the proposition then (and
it is necessary to consider this from the
beginning in order to emphasize and
point what J have hereafter to say),
that it needs no declaration in your
Constitution to give your Legislature
this right. While I will admit it i* usual
to put it there, and it is found in all the
constitutions (generally for the purpose,
however, of connecting with the declaration a limitation upon the right relative to the compensation to be awarded
when it is exercised), if it is not there
it still exists in the government of the
new State as a very part and parcel of
its sovereignty. You will observe that
you do not have to declare the fact,
which of necessity belongs to. all gov-
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ernmentB, that you may take private nities; when a great fire eats away
property for a public use. If you. do arid destroys cities, the government
declare it, it is well to limit it and mod- may step in on such occasions and may
ify it to this extent, that when you shall arrest the progress of the flames, or
do so, you must make just compensa- attempt to do so, by destroying private
tion. It is possible we may admit, in property, for the benefit of the public,
the absence, at least without reference and unless there is a statute providing
now to the higher law as embodied in for it, no man is liable and no compenthe 14th amendment to the Constitution sation need be made. But, we are not
of the United States, that the whole dealing with exceptional cases, we are
people in constitutional convention dealing with the general principles, and
assembled might enact an act of confis- I want to start right from that broad
cation, which that would be, if com- foundation, upon which I stand, and I
pensation was not provided; but we affirm these propositions: First, that
must also admit that it would be so the right of eminent domain is inherent
foreign to the entire temper and dispo- in all governments and needs no consition of the people of the United States, stitutional declaration. Second, that
that it could not be maintained; public since the 14th amendment to this Consentiment would not maintain it, and stitution of the United States was
it is at least questionable at this time adopted, no state can take the propwhether the courts themselves would erty of the citizen for a public use,
not override the constitutional enact- * withomt compensation. Third, that no
ment, upon the ground that it was con- state can take the property of the pritrary to ail natural law and an inter- vate citizen for a private use under any
ference with vested rights that the circumstances or at all. Fourth, that
of necessity the question of public use
present age would not permit.
The second proposition, intimately must finally be determined by the
connected with this, is that after all, courts; that the simple declaration In
under your system, however you may your Constitution or in your legislacurtail it and modify and express it, in tive enactment, that the use of propyour constitutional enactment, it is erty in a certain way shall be deemed a
upon the judiciary that the weight of public use, Is not conclusive. This is a
determination must fall. It is impos- question of necessity, a shifting one.
sible for any American citizen to admit It depends upon different conditions,
for a moment that the power lies any- different circumstances, which overtake
where in a legislative body or in the a people from time to time as the years
people themselves to invade the owner- go by. What iray be deemed a public
ship of private property to the extent use in one locality, under certain conthat it may be taken, even for public ditions, with certain circumstances suruse, without compensation; and of rounding its people, would absolutely
course that principle is always accom- be deemed the contrary under other cirpanied with another, that in cases of cumstances and under other conditions.
supreme necessity, when the laws are So that, of necessity it is' always a
silent, when the necessities of the entire question, as we term it, not alone of
community require different action, it is law, but a mixed question of law and
not applicable then. As an instance it facts. The facts must be ascertained,
may be illustrated in cases of great the conditions must be ascertained, the
conflagrations and calamities of that circumstances must be known, the purkind, which have overtaken and may pose and objects of the proposed act
be expected to overtake large commu- must be defined, in order that the ap-
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plication of the law to such conditions
and such facts may be made by the
proper tribunal.
Now, if I have made no mistake in
that (and I don't think I have), we
are ready to proceed in the line to the
consideration of the nest matter. We
start, you will remember, with the
understanding that we do not need,
first, to make any declaration in this
Constitution at all. We are all agreed
that as it is usual and customary to do
so, it is better to do so, perhaps. We
are all agreed that we ought, in accordance with the times, with our system of government and with our ideas
concerning the protection of property
and the rights of the individual, also
couple with the declaration a limitation, as it were, upon its exercise; that
is to say whether we shall put in there
that it shall not be taken without just
compensation. Bujt, now we are confronted with the further proposition,
that we are to declare here, not alone
what shall be public uses, if we come
to condemn, but we have gone further
and attempted to say what shall be
deemed private uses; or, to reverse the
statement, we have attempted to declare that in certain classes of cases,
for some certain specific purposes, the
property of the private citizen may be
transferred from him to his neighbor;
and I undertake to Bay that it is in
violation of the Constitution of the
United States, as it is in violation of
all our understanding of vested rights;
that it is confiscation and spoliation,
in principle and in fact, as it is presented
here in this declaration. Why, the very
object of this government, the primary
object, is the protection of life, liberty,
and property. Property stands upon the
same plane with life and liberty. It is
simply, as it is affirmed in the opening
statement of this very preamble and
declaration of rights, a reaffirmation
of what has always been in this country
and in England since the days of magna
charta. The language is changed a
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little, but the equivalent is there, and
the meaning is the same, and none
other.
It will take no longer, as a part of
what I have to say, to incorporate in
my language what is said by others
upon this question, law writers, and
judges. Following this, of course, it is
apparent, Mr. President, that a constitution is not beginning of government.
Government existed before the constitution. It is not the origin of all these
rights, or privileges if you please, that
are affirmed and declared in it and are
protected in it or by it. Mr. Cooiey
says:
In considering state constitutions,
we must not commit the mistake of
supposing that because individual
rights are guarded and protected by
them, they must also be considered as
owing their origin to them. These instruments measure the power of the
rulers, but they do not measure the
rights of the government. What is a
constitution and what are its objects?
It is easier to tell what it is not than
what it is. It is not the beginning of a
community nor the origin of private
rights. It is not the fountain of law
nor the incipient state of government.
It is not the cause, but consequence, of
personal and political freedom.
It
grants no rights to the people, but is
the creature of their power, the instrument of their convenience, designed for
their protection, In the acknowledgment of the rights and powers which
they possessed before the constitution
was made. It IB but the framework of
the political government and necessarily
based upon the pre-existing conditions
of laws, rights, habits, and modes of
thought. There is nothing primitive in
it. It is all derived from a known
source. It pre-supposes an organized
society, law, order, property, personal
freedom and love of political liberty,
and enough of cultivated intelligence to
know how to jruard it against the encroachments of tyranny.
Mr. Justice Storey, speaking for the
supreme court of the United States,
has said:
Fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require that the rights
of personal liberty and private property should be held Bacred. The language of magna charta in substance
was. no freeman shall be taken or im-
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prisoned or be disseized of his freehold,
etc., but by the lawful judgment of his
peers or by the law of the land.
By "the law of the land" is meant the
due course and process of law, and that
has been affirmed of necessity, as it appears by the people of the United States
when they adopted the 14th amendment to the Constitution. The 5th
amendment covered the same subjects
but it only applied to Congress. It
never applied to the state, and it was
not until in latter days that the people
of the United States engrafted upon
their organic law that prohibition reaffirming the prohibition of the 5th
amendment, making it specially applicable to the states in this Union. Let
me read you the language particularly
applicable here:
No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United
States, nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the law.
That provision until of late has been
substantially the constitutional provision of every state; but within the last
few years, notably in those states that
have just come into the Union, Washington, Wyoming, and one or two
others, they have gone outside of that
and have adopted provisions which we
find embraced within section 22 of this
proposed preamble and declaration of
rights for the State of Utah. The construction and interpretation of this language of this constitutional guaranty
everywhere have been that you cannot,
under it, take private property for private uses. By no specious reasoning
has it ever been permitted to any legislature to evade that guaranty where it
existed, and the fact that that is so is
made apparent by the action of these
constitutional conventions of late years.
They have sought to limit, to modify,
to get outride of this constitutional
guaranty, and they have overlooked the
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fact that behind that and above that
there is a higher law, organic as to
these states, before which they must all
yield and to which they must all concede—the Constitution of the United
States, as amended by the 14th amendment. To that extent the construction
put upon those several constitutions by
the state courts is applicable to this
same language which is incorporated in
the Constitution of the United States.
It ail turns and depends upon what
"due process of law" means—what "the
law of the land" means, to be interpreted and understood in the light of the
general principles affecting human liberty and the rights of property in this
American republic. A great judge,
speaking for the supreme court of New
York, says:
Due process of law undoubtedly
means, in the due course of legal proceedings according to those rules and
forms which have been established for
the protection of private right.
And Mr. Justice Johnson, speaking
for the supreme court of the United
States, at an early day, said:
As to the words from magna charta,
incorporated in the constitution of
Maryland, after volumes spoken and
written with a view to their exposition,
the good sense of mankind has at length
settled down to this, that they were
intended to secure the individuals from
the arbitrary exercise of the power of
government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and
distributive Justice.
And Mr. Justice Sharswood, one of
those great justices of the olden time,
whose judicial life and history shine out
and emblazon the pages of jurisprudence in this country, speaking for the
supreme court of Pennsylvania, said:
If, however, an act of assembly,
whether general or special, public or
private, operates retrospectively to
take what is by existing law the property of one man and without his consent transfer it to another, with or
without compensation, it is in violation
of that clause in the bill of rights which
declares that no man can be deprived
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of his life, liberty, or property, unless
by the judgment of his peers, or the
law of the land. By "the law of the
land" Is meant, not the arbitrary edict
of any body of men, not an act of assembly, though it may have all the outward forms of a law, but due process
of law by which either what one alleges
to be his property is adjudged not to be
his, or It is forfeited upon his conviction
by his peers of some crime for which by
law it was subject to forfeiture, when
the crime was committed. If this be
not so, every restriction upon legislative authority would be a vain formula
of words without life or force. For
what more can the citizen suffer than to
be taken, imprisoned, disseized of Tils
•freehold, etc., and be deprived of his
property without crime?
And in the sinking fund cases, Chief
Justice Waite, speaking for the supreme
•court of the United States, uses this
language:
The United States cannot any more
than a state interfere with private
rights except for legitimate governmental purposes.
And Mr. Cooley again says:
But there is no rule or principle
known to our system under which private property can be taken from one
person and transferred to another for
the private use and benefit of such
other person, whether by general law
or by special enactment. The purpose
must be public, and must have reference
to the needs or conveniences of the public. No reason of general public policy
will be sufficient, it seems, to validate
such transfers when they operate upon
•existing vested rights.
And again, the supreme court of New
York on the same subject Bay:
An act to take private property for a
purpose not of a public nature, is to
take the property of one and give it or
»sell it, which is the same thing in prin•ciple, to another, would be a gross
abuse and fraudulent attack upon private rights.
Justice Nelson, in that great state,
•sitting as a member of the court, when
It was a great court, as it is now, perhaps:
It is now considered a universal and
fundamental proposition in every weD
regulated and properly administered
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government, whether embodied in constitutional form or not, that private
property cannot be taken for strictly
private purposes at all.
Mr. CREER. I would like to ask the
gentleman a question upon this point
he is on now. May I ask you if that
authority, taken from New York—why
is it then it makes no provision by general laws that private property may be
taken for private use?
Mr. VARIAN. I am endeavoring to
show and I have shown that the same
principle which has hitherto prevailed
in all the constitutions has latterly been
incorporated in the same language in
the Constitution of the United States.
I am simply alluding now to the interpretation of that language by the state
courts as to what it means in the Constitution of the United States.
In a late case in the supreme court of
the United States, Mr. Justice Brown,
Bpeaklng for the court, says:
Upon the other hand, it is probably
true that it is beyond the competency
of the state to appropriate to itself the
property of individuals for the sole purpose of creating a water power to be
leased for manufacturing purposes.
This would be a case of taking the
property of one man for the benefit of
another, which is not a constitutional
exercise of the right of eminent domain.
Mr. THURMAN. I would like to ask
the gentleman one question. I am in
sympathy with the gentleman on this
question entirely, but the query in my
mind is, how this discussion comes in to
this matter as it now stands?
Mr. VARIAN. If the gentleman will
allow me to lay my premises, I will
endeavor to explain how it affects the
discussion of section 22. I was going
to read from the report of the supreme
court of Illinois. I will not pause for
that purpose now.
Now, these are the premises that I
lay down, If I can make myself clear.
Of course it is a lawyer's argument,
and it would not be justified in a body
like this under other circumstances It
is a matter, as I shall suggest hereafter,
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which ought to be discussed and settled or at least investigated by a committee. The proper committee here
would be the committee on federal relations, but without any disrespect to
those gentlemen, they are not lawyers,
any of them, I believe, and this is
peculiarly a matter for lawyers, as
is quite apparent. Now, these are
the premises: First, that it does not
lie within the power of our government,
whether acting through the medium of
a constitutional convention or a legislature, to take the property of one
citizen and transfer it to another for a
purely private use. It is within the
power of our government, in cases of
public necessity, and those alone, to
take the private property of the citizen,
for the uses of the state, making Just
compensation therefor. We are also
bound by the prohibition in the
Constitution of the United States just
as if we were sitting here as a legislative
body, with an organic law of the state
controlling and restricting our action
with the same kind of language. Do
not the gentlemen see that? Do not
you see that it is Just exactly the same,
since this amendment has been adopted,
ag if we were dealing with a like clause
in a state constitution and were attempting to make an enactment under that?
Imagine for a moment now that this was
a Legislature of the State, and that this
provision of the 14th amendment were
incorporated in the organic law of the
State, and we were discussing a bill
containing these clauses. Take that
section 23 for instance; the entire question would be disposed of as this must
be disposed of. We would look into the
history and origin of the power. We
would review it in the light of the interpretation and construction it had received. We would review it in the light
of the necessities of our people with reference to these constitutional guaranties and protection, and it would be determined there, as it must be determined here, that you have no power,
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no right, to enact anything at all like
that in section 23.
Now, gentlemen say, what has that
got to do with section 22? This: If the
Convention shall be convinced that the
position I am taking is the correct one,
and that it will not do to leave section
28 in there, they may consider, "well,
there are some matters embraced within
section 23 that might properly be
declared public uses.'* That being so,
we want to consider section 22, which
refers to public uses, is dealing with that
subject in the light of these objections
to section 23, and ascertain, if we can,
whether we can take some of these uses
for which we have attempted to provide
in section 23 and make them public uses,
and incorporate them by amendment
or addenda to section 22. It is in that
sense and in that view €hat I consider
that the argument came on properly at
this time, because in dealing simply
with these amendments to section 22 in
the light of Just the matters embraced
within it, the Convention not having
its attention called to what was coming
in section 23, might undertake some
action that subsequently they would
want to reform and do away with.
Now, I submit, that we ought to take
those two sections, pass this question
for the time; the matter ought to be
recommitted with directions to the committee to investigate and ascertain
whether my position here is correct. I
do not ask nor expect that my ipse
dixit shall be taken by this Convention
on a question of this kind. It is a matter of grave and serious moment. It
involves one of the gravest question*
of constitutional law. It is not only
serious as to the effect upon the people
if the Constitution should be adopted,
but you will observe it is serious in this
particular if my position is correct: The
President of the United States cannot,
under his oath and under the Enabling
Act, issue his proclamation upon this
Constitution. The language of that act
is, "if it shall appear that the provisions.
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of this act have been complied with,
that the Constitution as adopted Is
republican In form and is not in conflict
with the provisions of the Constitution
of the United States, then the President
shall issue his proclamation, whereupon
the State shall be admitted/*
So, it is in no captious spirit, and certainly with no desire to be heard or to
make a speech (I have plenty of opportunities to do that in my profession),
that I have intruded myself at this
length at this time. It is in the honest
and earnest and sincere conviction that
you are Just now upon the eve of making a great mistake—and I will go further and say that I do not believe that
many of these matters that are contained in section 28 could be made public uses simply by a declaration; and
after all, in every case the matter will
have to be determined by the court;
that under the guise of a public legislative declaration, whether in the Constitution, or in the act of the Legislature, a fact is not changed, a merely
private use is not made a public use
Bimply because a body of men representing a government say so. I think
that ought to be borne in mind. This
matter ought to be investigated patiently and learnedly, if you please,
through the medium of a committee, so
that we will feel assured that no mistake has been made.
One word with reference to the suggestion made by my friend Mr. Kimball.
It seems that I misapprehended the full
force of his amendment, and to that extent I withdraw whatever criticism I
made upon it. I should still be opposed
to it upon principle, however, because I
believe that the best and safest way to
do is simply to put in your declaration
in this Constitution, that private property shall not be taken for public use,
except upon just compensation, and
put in, "first made" if you please,
and "taken or damaged/'and let it rest
there. There is no necessity of lumbering up the Constitution with enact-
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ments as to what shall be public uses,
because whatever you say or do, as I
said before, in the end you can do no
more than the Legislature could do, and
can no more take my property and turn
it over to my neighbor, compelling me
to sell it for a purely private use, by
constitutional enactment, than you can
do it by legislative enactment. And I
say right here that I would hesitate
long before I would vote to establish
over me as a citizen of this republic such
a law. I believe that it invades the
sacred private rights of the citizen. I
believe that it is wrong in principle. It
is in violation of all that we have understood concerning those things, and it
ought not to be, particularly in this Territory. It ought not to go into this
Constitution if it is going to Jeopardize
it in the least; and I simply ask you
gentlemen to consider now—I have
made no further suggestion. I am not
going to make any motion—whether it
would be better to take those two sections on that subject and send them to
a committee and let the committee report back after investigation what
ought to be done in the matter,
Mr. HOWARD. I would like to ask
Mr. Varian a question. You say you
have no objections to the words u private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation
first made?"
Mr. VARIAN. I said I had none.
Mr. HOWARD. What particular objection have you got to the balance of
that section 22?
Mr. VARIAN. None in particular—
none at all. I am not criticising section
22. I concurred in the judgment of the
committee the other day. I am not attacking that section, but I think the
two sections are intimately connected,
because it is one subject matter and
ought to be disposed of all at once.
Mr. HOWARD. Section 28 is not before the house, as I understand. I am
opposed to that.
Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I do not
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know—I would like to Inquire In regard to the length of time a person can
occupy In the debate.
The PRESIDENT. There Is no rule
In the Convention. The rule applies
only to committee of the whole.
Mr. FARR. I do not wish the Convention to understand by this question
that I got up for a long speech or anything of the kind. I do not consider If
I was to stand here for two hours and
quote you authorities It would have
any bearing on this matter. The question lsf what Is right In the matter?
That Is what I want to know, and
what law shall we enact for the benefit
of the future State of Utah? (Reads
sections 22 and 23.) Well, now, I maintain that the Legislature should provide
for all of these. I have a substitute
that I wish to Introduce here that embraces only a few words, that I think
will cover the ground of these two sections.
The PRESIDENT. We already have
an amendment to section 22, and a substitute, and another section, until we
take some action on this, would not be
proper.
Mr. FARR. Mr. President, I just
want to say this, for the consideration
of the house, while I may vote for the
other, this section I think will cover the
ground of both of these sections and
nearly all the amendments. There are
a great deal of exceptions taken to this
section, and they have provided a number of amendments to cover that. I
will Introduce this and read it and I
will leave it for the gentlemen of this
Convention to act upon it as they see
fit:
Section 22. The Legislature shall provide by law that private property shall
not be taken or damaged for public or
private use without due compensation
first being made.
I have noticed all the amendments of
the different gentlemen. I have tried to
embody their amendments as much as
possible in this so that It will provide
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for all the objections, and the section
will cover the whole In as few words as
possible. I do not believe In going Into
all this xigamarole of law when It can
be simmered down to a few words. I
maintain the Legislature can provide
all that there Is In this twenty-third
section. This Convention requires the
Legislature by this section to provide a
law for the whole of this. And I leave
this section now for your consideration.
Mr. SQUIRES. Mr. President, in view
of the remarks of the gentleman from
Salt Lake, who has just taken his seat,
and in view of the great Importance of
this subject as to the constitutional
of our own Constitution, when it is to
be adopted, I move that sections 22 and
28 be referred to the committee on Judiciary with Instructions to make an
early report on that subject.
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). I second
that motion.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I hope
that motion will not prevall,for the reason that I believe that this house Is prepared to settle this question now. We
have been making slow progress and I
think It Is time that we mcLde haste as
much as we possibly can. Not that I
am in favor of endangering any great
principle by hurrying it over, but after
the doctrines that have been expounded
here on this question, and the rights
and powers that the Legislature will
have In the matter, and the questions
also apparently having been pretty
well Bettled In the courts of the country, I think we can at this time adopt
section 22, and when we come to consider section 23, either declare such uses
public uses as will grant the privileges
desired to be obtained,or else leave It to
the Legislature and to the future action
of the courts, and we can do so with
perfect safety. For one, I am prepared
to accept section 22 as it is, and then
accept such amendments of section 23
as will remove the objections that are
made here to it.
Mr. CANNON. I would like to ask
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Mr. Varian a question with his consent.
I was not present at the time the gentleman commenced his addrees,but from
what he said in closing I understand
that section 22 as proposed to be
amended by Mr. Evans, of Weber, provides that private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without compensation, and that that would
be agreeable to Mr. Varian?
Mr. VARIAN. Mr. President, I would
say that I have no objections to section
22, but as coupled with section 23 there
is a still further question in connection
with it. If section 22 is allowed to
stand, the question of public uses is
complicated by the declaration in 28 as
to private uses. For instance, take
mining and milling, etc., that might be
construed as a prohibition against the
Legislature declaring certain public uses
under section 22. If it were certain that
28 were to be stricken out, I would not
have a word to say about section 22,
and am perfectly content with it.
Mr. CANNON. Then, I am opposed
to the motion to commit and in favor
of voting on this motion as proposed.
One reason is that section 10 was referred to the committee on Judiciary several days ago.
Mr. SQUIRES. Mr. President, I will
withdraw my motion with the consent
of the gentleman from Weber.
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). I withdraw
my second. I now call for the previous
question on the adoption of my substitute for section 22.
Mr. EVANS (Weber). Mr. President,
I want to make a remark or two before
this vote is taken, and I will be very
brief.
The PRESIDENT.
The previous
question is called for.
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). I submit
the previous question has precedence of
everything else. I object to the gentleman's speaking until that is disposed
of.
The previous question was ordered.
The PRESIDENT. The question is
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on the substitute offered by Mr. Kimball of Weber.
The substitute was rejected.
The PRESIDENT. The question now
recurs on the amendment of Mr. Evans.
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). Mr. President, I raise the point of order, the
previous question was on my substitute
and not on any other matter foreign to
that section. I now move to amend
section
Mr. IVINS. Mr. President, I rise to a
point of order.
Mr. PRESIDENT. The gentleman
was right; he moved the previous question simply on his substitute.
Mr. IVINS. The gentleman from
Weber (Mr. Evans) moved an amendment to this section. The other gentleman from Weber moved as an amendment to the motion a substitute. If a
substitute is in the form of an amendment, the question having been put
upon the substitute of the gentleman
from Weber, my point of order is that
the question should immediately follow
upon the amendment of the other
gentleman from Weber, without any
further debate.
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). Mr. President, my motion was the previous question on my own substitute. I believe
that the chair sustained me in that.
The PRESIDENT. I sustained i t
The question before the house is the
amendment.
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). I move now
to amend section 22 by adding at the
end thereof the following words:
That among other public uses shall
be included all lands for necessary reservoirs, drains, flumes, sewers, conduits, pipes, or ditches, for agricultural,
mining, milling, domestic, or sanitary
purposes.
Mr. EVANS (WeW). Mr. President,
I arise to a point of order, that the
amendment of the gentleman from
Weber is not in order. I made a motion to strike out a portion of that section and now he offers to amend by
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adding to the section. We have got
to pass certainly upon that matter
which I moved to strike out. I have no
particular objection to the gentleman'B
amendment, but I think we ought first
to dispose of that matter which I
moved to strike out. The amendment
which he otters is in the right direction,
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber.) Mr. President, I maintain that the gentleman's
point of order is not well taken. It is
true that he moved to strike out certain
matter of that section, but my motion
was to add to the end of that section,
and it does not make any difference
whether his amendment is adopted or
whether it is not adopted. My amendment comes to the end of the section.
Mr. EVANS (Weber). We can not tell
what the end of the section is now until we vote
The PRESIDENT. The chair is of
opinion that the gentleman's amendment is in order.
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, would
an amendment to the amendment be in
order?
The PRESIDENT. No; there are two
now before the house.
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. President, I
move the previous question on the
whole subject.
Seconded.
The PRESIDENT. The question now
recurs upon the proposed amendment
of Mr. Kimball.
The amendment was rejected.
The PRESIDENT. The question is
now on the adoption of this section as
proposed by Mr. Evans and accepted
by Mr. Richards.
Mr. HILL. Mr. President, it is some
time since we heard that amendment
read. I would like to have it read before
the motion is put.
The PRESIDENT.
It is the striking out after the word compensationall after that in that section be stricken
out.
Mr. VARIAN. Did Mr. Evans accept
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the suggestion over here, "or dam
aged?"
Mr. EVANS (Weber). I did.
The amendment was agreed to.
The PRESIDENT. Section 23 is now
before the house.
Mr. VARIAN. Mr. President, I move
to strike it out.
Seconded.
Mr. KEARNS. Mr. President, I have
a substitute here which I wish to otter
for section 28, taken from the 14th sec*
tion of the Idaho declaration of rights,
which I think will cover all the grounds.
Mr. VARIAN. I move to strike out
section 28.
The motion was agreed to.
The PRESIDENT. The secretary will
read section 24.
Sections 24, 25, 26 were read.
Mr. HART. Mr. President, I move
to strike out "a" as it stands in the
second line of. section 26, so that it will
read, "all laws of general nature shall
have uniform operation."
The motion was agreed to.
Mr. VANHORNE. Mr. President, I
move to strike out section 26.
The motion was rejected.
Sections 28 and 29 were read and
passed without amendment.
Mr. SQUIRES. Mr. President, I now
move the previous question on the
whole proposition.
The previous question was ordered.
Mr. CREER. Mr. President, I move
that we adopt the preamble as reported
by the committee.
The motion was agreed to.
Mr. WELLS. Mr. President, before
action is taken
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). Mr. President, I rise to a point of order. The
previous question was sustained.
The PRESIDENT. Only on the bill
of rights, not on the preamble.
Mr. WELLS. Before flnqJ action is
taken on this article I move that the
subject matter
The PRESIDENT. The previous question has been called for and ordered.
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Mr. EVANS (Weber.) Mr. President,
I move that he have unanimous consent
to speak.
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). 1 object; I
ask for the roll call.
Mr. HART. Mr. President, I arise to
a point of order on the previous question on this whole article. Thus far we
have arrived at no understanding as to
the scope of Rule 28
The PRESIDENT. It is stricken out.
Mr. HART. Rule 23. (Reads rule 23).
Now, Mr. President, while I think a
great many of us would not wish the
ayes and noes—I think in fact we can
unanimously agree that the ayes and
noes should not be called separately on
all these propositions, because I believe
that there are a number of these propositions that there is no objection to
from any person. But there are certain propositions here that individuals
should have the right to record their
votes on. There are some of these that
I shall vote on separately. My objection is to the previous question on this
whole proposition that it is out of order
under these rules, and that the proper
thing to do is to vote on each proposition separately.
The PRESIDENT. Not each section
—upon the proposition—this is a proposition. The ayes and noes are called
for under it.
Mr. HART. I think each one of these
sections is a proposition.
The PRESIDENT. Oh, no, it is a bill
of rights.
Mr. HART. And a man would have
a right to cast a vote against any one
section.
The roll was then called on the adoption of the article entitled declaration
of rights, and the vote was as follows:
AYES—96.

Allen
Anderson.
Barnes
Bowdle
Boyer
Brandley

Lemmon
Lewis
Lowe, Wm.
Lowe, Peter
Low, Cache
Lund
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Button
Buys
Call
Cannon
Chides ter
Christiansen
Clark
Coray
Corfman
Creer
Cunningham
Gushing
Driver
Eichnor
Eldredge
Emery
Engberg
Evans, Weber
Fair
Francis
Gibbs
Goodwin
Green
Hammond
Hart
Haynes
Halliday
Hill
Howard
Hughes
Hyde
Ivins
James
Johnson
Joiley
Kearns
Kerr
Kimball, Salt Lake
Kimball, Weber
Lambert
Larsen, L.
Larsen, C. P.

Maeser
Mackintosh
Maloney
Maughan
McFarland
Miller
Morris
Moritz
Murdock, Beaver
Murdock, Wasatch
Murdock, Summit
Page
Partridge
Peters
Peterson, Grand
Peterson, Sanpete
Pierce
Preston
Raleigh
Richards
Ricks
Roberts
Robertson
Robinson, Kane
Robison, Wayne
Ryan
Shurtliff
Spencer
Squires
Stover
Symons
Thompson
Thoreeon
Thome
Thurman
Van H o m e
Varian
Warrum
Wells
Whitney
Williams
Mr. President.

NOES—0.

During the roll call members explained their votes as follows:
Mr. BOYER. Mr. President, I do not
fully comprehend what we are voting
on.
The PRESIDENT. You are voting
on the bill of rights as amended.
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Mr. ROBERTS. Does that include
the preamble also?
The PRESIDENT. No, sir; the preamble will be voted on separately afterwards.
Mr. ROBERTS. And the ayes and
nays called on the preamble?
The PRESIDENT. Yes, sir.
Mr. BOYER. No further amendment
-allowed?
Mr. ROBERTS. Gentlemen, I would
•ask
The PRESIDENT. Gentlemen, you
•a/e out of order. The roll is being
called.
Mr. HART. Mr. President, I wish to
explain my vote. I can only vote yea, in
favor of this proposition as awhole,but
there are certain propositions in there
that I wish to have my vote recorded
on, and as I understood it I had the
right under rule 23 to so record my
Tote. I, therefore, desire to be recorded
against the striking out of section 23
and also against the adoption of section 10 as it no w stands.
The PRESIDENT. The gentleman
•has the privilege.
Mr. VARIAN. Let it go on the
minutes.
Mr. PARTRIDGE. Mr. President, I
am willing to vote yea on that article,
except the amendment of section 22. I
wish to be recorded as voting no on
Xhat section.
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. President, I
would like to vote upon the entire bill
with the exception of the amendment
to section 22, by which the Convention
refused to require that private property
should not be taken for public use without JuBt compensation first made. As
to that, I wish to be recorded in the
negative.
Mr. VARIAN.
Mr. President, in
voting yea upon the article, I simply
want to state that I have not changed
my views as to the article. I am opposed to section 10, but I don't understand we can vote yea on one proposi-
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tion and nay on another. Therefore, I
vote yeft upon the whole proposition.
Mr. FARR.
Put down the same
for me.
Mr. WELLS. Mr. President, I vote
yea and announce now that I do so
with the understanding that I may
move hereafter to reconsider, because I
am not satisfied to strike otlt section 23.
The PRESIDENT. The chair declares
article 1, the declaration of rights,
adopted.
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). Mr. President, I have stood up here so long in
order to get the floor, because I knew
that if I kept my seat my friend Dave
Evans, from Weber County, would be
ahead of me, and therefore I stood up
while you were announcing the vote. I
now move, Mr. President, that the
preamble
Mr. EVANS (Weber). Mr. President.
I arise to a point of order, that when
a vote is commenced on any proposition it must be continued.
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). The president had announced the vote.
The PRESIDENT. The gentleman is
not in order. I "had announced the vote
on the bill of rights.
Mr. EVANS (Weber). The question
is on the adoption of the preamble;
nothing is in order but the roll call on
that.
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). That has
been added to the many times my
friend has been wrong. He is wrong
again. My motion now is that we
adopt the preamble as reported by the
committee and as it appears in the
printed article, and that we take the
vote on it now. I move the previous
question now.
The previous question was ordered.
The roll was then called on the question to adopt the preamble, with the following result:
AYES—95.

Allen
Anderson
Barnes

Lemmon
Lewis
Lowe, Wm.
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Boyer
Brandley
Bowdle
Button
Buys
Call
Cannon
Chidester
Christiansen
Clark
Coray
Corfman
Creer
Cunningham
Cushing
Driver
Eichnor
Eldredge
Emery
Engberg
Evans, Weber
Fair
Francis
Glbbs
Goodwin
Green
Hammond
Hart
Haynes
Halliday
Hill
Howard
Hughes
Hyde
lvins
James
Johnson
Jolley
Kearns
Kerr

EXECUTIVE.
Lowe, Peter
Low, Cache
Lund
Maeser
Mackintosh
Maloney
McFarland
Miller
Morris
Moritz
Murdock, Beaver
Murdock, Wasatch
Murdock, Summit
Page
Partridge
Peters
Peterson, Grand
Peterson, Sanpete
Pierce
Preston
Raleigh
Richards
Ricks
Roberts
Robertson
Robinson, Kane
Robison, Wayne
Sharp
Shurtliff
Spencer
Squires
Stover
Symons
Thompson
Thoreson
Thome
Thurman
Van Home
Varian
Warrum

653

consider the next article on the calendar.
The motion was agreed to and theConvention then resolved itself into
committee of the whole with Mr. Pierce
in the chair.
COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE.

The article entitled executive was,
then considered.
Section 1 was read as follows:
Section 1. The executive department
shall consist of governor, secretary of
state, state auditor, state treasurer,
attorney general, and superintendent of
public instruction, each of whom shall
bold his office for four years, beginning
on the first Monday of January next
after his election, except that the terms,
of office of those who were elected at
the first election shall begin when the
State shall be admitted into the Union,
and shall end on the first Monday in
January, in the fourth year thereafter.
The officers of the executive department shall, during their terms of office,
reside at the seat of government, where
they shall keep the public records,
books, and papers. They shall perform
such duties as arepresc,ibed by this Constitution and as may be prescribed by
law.

Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). Mr. President, I move to amend section 1 by inserting after the word "governor," in
line 2, .the word "lieutenant-governor."
Mr. THURMAN. I second the motion.
Mr. KEARNS. Mr. President, I hope
that the motion will not prevail. It is
unnecessary to create any extra offices.
We find thirteen states in the Union
that are all of more consequence and
with more inhabitants and wealthier
states than this that get along without
Kimball, Salt Lake Wells
a lieutenant governor. Again, I find
that the secretary of state is an office
Kimball, Weber
Whitney
that contains a good deal more responLambert
Williams
sibility. We are apt to get a better
Larsen, L.
Mr. President.
representative in the office for secretary
Larsen, C. P.
of state than w* are for lieutenant
NOES—0.
The PRESIDENT.
The chair an- governor, and I do not Bee why at this
time we should create that office. I
nounces the preamble carried.
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). Mr. Presi- think it is unnecessary. I hope this modent, I move that we now resolve pur- tion will not prevail.
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). Mr. Chairselves into committee of the whole to

UT755

F

Donald J. Winder #3519
John W.Holt #5720
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C.
175 West 200 South #4000
P.O. Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222
Attorneys for Petitioners James Ivers, Katherine Havas and P and F Food Services

m THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION,
Defendant/Petitioner,

RULE 25 MOTION OF
JAMES IVERS, KATHLEEN HAVAS AND
P and F FOOD SERVICES
TO FILE AMICUS BRIEF

vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

CaseNo.20081054-SC

Plafctiff/Respondent.
Pursuant to Rule 25, Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure, James Ivers, Katherine G. Havas
and P and F Food Services (collectively referred to herein as "Arby's"), hereby moves the Court
for leave to file an - amicus brief in the above-referenced matter.

It appears the Court is

reconsidering the holding in Arby's matter entitled 'ivers v. UDOT, 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007)
with respect to the distinction, between loss of view and loss of visibility and the impact of
severance damages in a condemnation case.
Following two rulings by the Utah Supreme Court, the Arby's case was finally tried on
the issue of severance damages for loss of view in April 2010. Arby's was awarded no
severance damages despite suffering a loss of view. Arby's has now filed its own appeal (Utah

Supreme Court No. 20100511) in the walce of the jury verdict Arby's submits that the results of
the trial reveal the difficulty in trying a case pursuant to the ruling in Ivers concerning severance
damages. Arby's can provide argument and analysis on the relevant issues that will be helpful to
the Court in the present matter.
Arby's Docketing Statement and Retention Letter are attached hereto respectively as
Exhibits "A" and "B."
DATED this 26th day of July, 2010.

WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C.

DONALD J. WINDER
ibm W.HOLT
Attorneys for James Ivers, Katherine Havas and P
and F Food Services

-2-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this //& day of July, 2010, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing RULE 25 MOTION OF JAMES JVERS, KATHLEEN HAVAS
AND P and F FOOD SERVICES TO FILE AMICUS BRIEF to the following via U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid:

Randy Hunter
Office of Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857
Reed L. Marineau
D. Jason Hawkings
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

-3-

EXHIBIT
"A"

DONALD J. WINDER #3519
JOHN W.HOLT #5720
WINDER & COUNSEL, R.C.
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
P.O. Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants

UTAH SUPREME COURT

JAMES rVERS; KATHERJNE G. HAVAS,
and P and F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant),

DOCKETING STATEMENT

Defendants/Appellants,
vs.
District Court No. 020700665
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
_ Plaintiff Appellee.

Utah Supreme Court No. 20100511
j

Pursuant to Rule 9, UTAH R, A?P. P., James Ivers, Ka&erine G. Havas and, P and F Food
Services (referred to herein collectively as "Defendants"), by and through counsel, respectfully
submit this Docketing Statement.
1.
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b.
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c.

Date any motions werefiledpursuant to Rules 50(b), 52(b), or 59, UTAH

R. Civ. P., Rule 24, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, or UTAH CODE ANN.
§77-13-6 were filed: Not applicable.
4.

Inmate Mailbox Rule. Not applicable.

5.

Rule 54fbY This appeal is not from an order in a multiple party or a multiple

claim case in which the judgment has been certified as a final judgment by the teial court
pursuant to Rule 54(b), UTAHR

CIV. P.

6.

Hrimrnfll flases. Not applicable.

7.

Issues on Appeal

Following two rulings by the Utah Supreme Court, Ivers v.

UDOT, 154 P3d 802 (Utah 2007) ("Ivers 2") and UDOT v. hers, 218 P3d 583 (Utah 2009)
("Ivers IF9), the case wasfinallytried before a jury on April 13-15, 2010. The issue tried was
Defendants' claim for severance damages resulting from the obstruction constructed by UDOT,
The non-unanimous jury awarded no severance damages to Defendants based upon loss of view.
Defendants submit the trial court erred in permitting UDOT's appraiser to rely upon irrelevant
hearsay opinions of persons without any expertise in opining Defendants' loss of view had no
value. Additionally, the parties' attempts to craft jury instructions that reflected the Utah
Supreme Court's ruling in Ivers I and Ivers II resulted in jmy instructions that were
contradictory, inconsistent, and that did not reflect the ruling in and the intent of Ivers L
Defendants were awarded no damages in a case where they clearly suffered some level of
2

damages. Moreover, a case is currently pending before the Utah Supreme Court where the Ivers I
ruling may be re-evaluated on the issue of awarding severance damages for visibility and view.
See Admiral Beverage Corporation v. UDOT> Case No. 20081054-3C.
ISSUE: Did the trial court en: hi permitting UDOTs appraiser to rely upon non-expert
hearsay opinions to base his expert opinion that Defendants suffered absolmely no damage for
loss of view?
a.

Determinative Law: Utah Rules of Evidence. Rules 702, 703 and 801;

Ivers v. UDOT, 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007); Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d
1328, 1332 (Utah 1979); United States v. Cormier, 468 F,3d 63, 73 (1 st Or.
2006);

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78B-6-511(2); Article \ §22,

CONSTITUTION OF TEE

STATE OF UTAH.

b.

Standard of Review: The appellate court reviews the district court's ruling

for correctness, granting no deference to its legal conclusions. Woodbury
Amsource, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 73 P.3d 362, 364 (Utah 2003). See abo
Kauris v. Utah Highway Patrol, 70 P.3d 72, 75 (Utah 2003); and Smith v, Smith,
793 P.2d 407,409 (Utah App. 1990).
ISSUE: Was the jury appropriately instructed concerning severance damages for loss of
view based upon the mandate in Ivers £ and prior decisions of the Utah Supreme Court?
a.

Determinative Law: Utah State Road Comm'n v. Miya} 526 P.2d 926

(Utah 1974); Ivers v. UDOT, 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007); UTAH
§78B-6-511 (2); Article I, §22, CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH,

3

CODE ANN.

b.

Standard of Review:

ISSUE: Are the distinctions between view and visibility a jury is required to draw under
Ivers I appropriate and consistent with a property owner'srightsto receive fair compensation for
severance damages?
a.

Determinative Law: Ivers v. UDOT, 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007); Utah

State Road Comm 'n v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §78B6-511 (2); Article I, §22, CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
b.

Standard of Review: The appellate court reviews the district court's

ruling for correctness, granting no deference to its legal conclusions. Woodbury
Amsource, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 73 P3d 362, 364 (Utah 2003). See also
Kauris v. Utah Highway Patrol 70 P3d 72, 75 (Utah 2003); and Smith v. Smith,
793 PJ2d 407, 409 (Utah. App. 1990). On appeal, a jury's verdict is viewed in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party, and the evidences presented and every
reasonable inference fairly drawn from the evidence is accorded the same degree
of deference, See, e.g., Commercial Investment Corp. v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105,
110 (UTApp. 1997).
ISSUE: Was a jury verdict awarding no severance damages to Defendants for loss of
view justified and supported by the evidence, the applicable law and the Utah Supreme Court's
mandate in Ivers I. ?
a.

DetermiaativeLaw: Ivers v. UDOT, 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007); Utah

State Road Comm 'n v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §78B6-511(2); Article I, §22, CONSTLTUTEON OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
4

b.

Standard of Review: The appellate court reviews the district court's

ruling for correctness, granting no deference to its legal conclusions. Woodbury
Amsource, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 73 ?.3d 362, 364 (Utah 2003). See also
Kouris v. Utah Highway Patrol, 70 P.3d 72, 75 (Utah 2003); and Smith v. Smith,
793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990). On appeal, a jury's verdict is viewed in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party, and the evidences presented and every
reasonable inference fairly drawn from the evidence is accorded the same degree
of deference. See, e.g., Commercial Investment Corp. v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105,
110 (UT App. 1997).
8.

Factual Summary: A portion of Defendants' commercial real property was taken by

UDOT for an improvement that resulted in the elimination of fhe intersection at U.S. 89 and
Shepard Lane in Farmfngton, Utah. The property taken from Defendants was essential to
UDOT's project Appellants' remnant property, which is being used for an Arby's restaurant, is
located on the northwest corner of the intersection that was eliminated. The reconfiguration of
the intersection entailed elevating U.S. 89 going north and south over Shepard Lane, which
travels east and west Appellant's property is immediately west of Hie elevated U.S. 89. The
elevated U.S. 89 now blocks the viewfromAppellants' property to the east.
The issue of severance damages was first presented to the Utah Court of Appeals, which
ruled Defendants had no severance damages claim for loss of access or loss of view. Thereafter,
the Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari and ruled specifically that Defendants had a
protectable easement of viewfromtheir property. The Utah Supreme Court remanded the case to
the trial court for a factual determination of whether the property taken from Defendants was
5

essential to VDOTs project UDOT stipulated that its taking was essential to the project. This
left the amount of damages as the only issue for trial. However, UDOT then filed a motion in
limine, which the trial court construed as a motion to amend, asserting a theory that had never
been presented previously. Ultimately, the trial court agreed that pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN.
§78-34-11(2), UDOT could freely amend its complaint to modify its taking at any time. This
allowed UDOT to excise from its condemnation complaint its claim for taking of Defendants'
appurtenant rights. By allowing UDOT to take this position, the trial court's ruling foreclosed
Defendants' severance damages claim for loss of view.
The trial court's ruling was appealed and the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court
in its Ivers U decision in 2009. The case was then tried before a jury on April 13-15, 2010. The
non-unanimous jury awarded absolutely no severance damages for Defendants' loss of view,
despite the Utah Supreme Court's mandate that Defendants' could recover severance damages
for loss of view. The ruling in Ivers /proved to create confusion in the trial court and prevented
Defendants from receiving their constitutionally protectedrightsofjust compensation.
9.

Opposition to Assignment: Tins appeal is subject to transfer by the Utah Supreme

Court to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78A-3-102(4), However,
Defendants oppose such a transfer on the basis that the Utah Supreme Court is already familiar
with this case, having heard two previous appeals. Additionally, this matter involves important
constitutional law issues that should be reserved for decision by the Utah Supreme Court for
clarification. The Utah Supreme Court is also potentially reconsidering its ruling in Ivers Jin the
Admiral Beverage Corporations v, UDOT case currently pending before the court. Finally, hi the
interests of consistency and in having is prior rulings respected, the Utah Supreme Court should
6

retain this appeal,
10.

Related Appeals. Ivers v. UDOT, 128 P.3d 74 (Utah App. 2005); Ivers v. UDOT,

154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007), UDOT v. Ivers, 218 P.3d 583 (Utah 2009). Similar issues related to
the distinction between loss of view and loss of visibility are pending before the Utah Supreme
Court in. Admiral Beverage Corporation v. UDOT, Case No. 20081054-SC.
11.

Attachments: The following documents are attached hereto:
a.

The verdict and judgmentfromwhich this appeal is taken, dated May 11,
2010.

b.

Notice of Appeal date June 14,2010.

c.

Ruling and Order on Defendants' Motion in Limine and Motion to Strike
Portions
Portic of I Philip Cook's Appraisal Report dated April 12,2010.

DATED this A

day of My, 2010.

WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C.

XNALD J. WINDER
JOHN W.HOLT
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on t h e ^

day of July, 2010, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing Docketing Statement was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Randy Hunter
OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 5ft Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857

8

ATTACHMENT
"A"

RANDY S. HUNTER (#9084)
Assistant Attorney General
MARX L. SHURTLEFF (#4666)
Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
160 East 300 South, 5fh Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Telephone: (801)366-0353
randvhtmter@Ptah.gov
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DETRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF'
TRANSPORTATION,
JUDGMENT ON VERDICT

Plaints
VS.

JAMES IVERS; KATHER3KE G. HAVAS;
P and"F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant); and
ZIONS CREDIT CORPORATION,
Defendants,

Civil No. 020700665
Judge Michael Allphin
i

This matter came on fox trial on April 13,14 and 15,2010, before the Honorable Michael.
Allphin of this Court. Plaintiff was represented by Randy 3, Hunter, Assistant Attorney General,
and Defendants were represented by Donald Winder and John Holt A jury of eight persons was
regularly impaneled and sworn to try said action, "Witnesses on behalf of both parties were sworn
and testified. After hearing the evidence, arguments of counsel and the instructions of the Court,
the jury retired to consider their verdict, taking with them the exhibits which had been offered

and received and the mitten instructions of the Court. ThB jmy subsequently returned to the
Court and, through its foreman, said that theyfinda verdict for the Plaintiff and against the
Defendants as follows:
[We]findin favor of the Plaintiff and againstthe Defendants in
that the Defendants have failed to prove damages for diipirmation
of fair market value for loss of view and we decline to award the
Defendants a monetary sum,
TOTAL AWARD

$0,00

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law and by reason of the premise aforesaid, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AMD DEOREED that James Ivers and P and F Food Sendees,
Defendants herein* recoverfromthe State of Utah, no forfhsr monies; a stipulation and award of
$104950Q having been stipulated to and ordered on the 6th day of June, 2003, leaving a. balance of
$0.00 owed by the State of Utah by Defendants,
DATED this

,2010,
U

' BY THE COURT:

MICHAEL
District
Approved as to Form:

DWAUD WINDER
JOMHOLT
ArataW for Defendants
3ndgm£3E DB Verdict
Dayis Comity Civil Ko, C20700665
Page 2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that atrue and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT ON
VERDICT was mailed, postage prepaid, this j3/gf day of April, 2010, to:
Donald J. "Winder
WINDER & COUNSEL, PrC.
175 West 20D Booth, Suite 4000
P.O. Box 2568
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2658
John W.Holt
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C,
175 "West 200 South,' Suite 4000
P.O. Box 2668 '
SaltLakc City, Utah 84110-2668

/s/-StaseyEL Calvm
Secretary

Judgment or. "Verdict
DRVIS County Civil No. 020700665
Page-3

ATTACHMENT

Donald 7. Winder #3519
Join W.Holt #5720
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C.
175 West 200 South #4000
P.O. Box 2568
Salt Lake City, Utah. 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222
Attorneys for Defendants
IN TEE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOE. DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 020700665
VS.

Judge Michael G. Aflphrn

IVERS; ICATHERINE G. EAVAS,
P ami F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant);
Defendants.
Notice is hereby giyen that Defendants, hy and through counsel, hereby appeal to the
Utah Supreme Coral the jmy yerdict and final judgment entered by the trial court in this matter
onMayl7 5 2010,
I dav
DATED this?iM__
day of June, 2010,
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C.

DOKALD J, WINDER
JOHN W.HOLT
Attorneys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby cernfy thai on this .|_j_ day of June, 2010, I caused to he saved a trae and
correct copy of the foregoing Defendanf s Notice of Appeal to the following via U.S Mail,
postage prepaid:
Randy Hunter
Office of Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Fif& Floor
P.O.Box 140857
Salt Lake Ciiy, UT 84114-0857

ATTACHMENT
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IN THE SECOND D K T R I C T COURT,' DAVIS C O U N T Y
•STATE 0F..1EJTAH

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

RULING ANDORDER 'ON
.DEFENDANTS' MOTION 3K LIMINE'
AND MOTION TO STRIKE PORTION!
OF J, PHILIP COOK'S APPRAISAL
REPORT

Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES IVERS; KATHERME G. HAVAS; P
AND F FOOD SERVICES CTenant); and
ZIONS CREDIT CORPORATION,
Defendants.

Case No. 020700665
Judge Michael G. Alipidn

Tms matter is before lie Court on "Sue defendants' motion in limine and motion to strike
•portions of J. Philip-Cook's appraisal report The Coral lias reviewed the moving and responding
papers, as well as, their supporting documentation. Having considered all of foe arguments,
determined that a hearing is unnecessary for its ruling and order, being folly advised in the
premises, and for the reasons set forth herein, the Coral DENIES the defendants' motion.
RULING
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence sets forth the basis upon which expert testimony
may be admitted. See Utah R, Evid 702(a) ("{Tjf scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand-the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."), Pursuant to Rule 702:

"Scientific, technical, ..or other specialized knowledge may serve as the
basis for expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or other principles or
methods mdeiiying;:&^^
meet a threshold showing that they (i)
are reliable (H) are-'based upon .sufficient facts or data, and (id) hare been
reliably app!is3'to'fbe facts nf the "base.*9
Utah R. Evid 702(b). Moreover, "#>* "%eshold showing >.. is salisfied if ^principles or
methods on wkiclrsT&h knowledge is based, including the sufficiency of facets or data snd ifoe
manner of t£eir application to the^facts of the case, are generally accepted byfee-Televmtexpert
community." Utah B., Bvid. 702(b)* -!Whe?i detaining whgthei to allow experttestimony^ the
trial court must consider if there is. a sufficient foundation for the expert's opinion. The trial conr
is allowed considerable latitude of discretion in the admissibility of expert testimony, and in the
absence of a clear showing of abuse, [appellate courts] will not reverse." Young v, Fire Ins.
Exck> 20O8 UT App 114, f21,182 P3d 911 (Internal quotations omitted); see also Lamb v.
Bangart, 525 P 2d 602,607-08 (Utah 1974)
Bfere, the defendants have .argued that portions of J. Philip Cook's appraisal report should
be stricken as nnrehable and lacking adequate foundation, Specifically, the defendants argue that
Mr. Cook's appraisal report relies upon inadmissible hearsay of lay persons, which is irrelevant
and not of the type that an appraiser reasonably relies upon when forming an expert opinion,
Additionally, the defendants assert that Mr Cook's appraisal report fails to disclose the
underlying methodology that he used to form his expert opinion.
"With regard to an expert's reliance upon statements of lay witnesses, Rule 703 of the
Utah Pules of Evidence states:
"The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the
expert at or before the hearing If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particulai field m forming opinions oi inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence "
2

UtahB, Bvid 703 J?urfherrihe Utah Supreme Court has -addressed the expanding scope- of Rule
703, holding thai
cc

Theiraditioiml rule has limited aa expert's opinion testimony to personal
experience and observation. . More recently, [Rule] 703 has broadened
the biisirfor an expert's testimony bytepsbifymg .thai facts or data used m
forming an opinion or inference need not be admissible if of the type,
reasonably relied on -by experts h r f e witness' field of expertise.
[Accordingly,] once the expert is qualified by the court, the witness may
base Ms opinion on reports, writings-or: observations not in evidence which
were made or complied by others, so long as they are of a type reasonably
reHed.upon.hy experts in thai particular field. The opposing party may
challenge the 'suitability or reliability of such materials on crossexamination, but such challenge goes ta the weight to be given the.
Patey v. Lamhart, 1999 UT 31,130, 977 P.2d 1193 (quoting State v. Clayton,* 646 ?2d 723,72526 (Utah 1982)) (Emphasis added).
la the instant matter, Mr. Cook's appraisal report indicates that he hiterviewed several
marketparticipants, i e . certain managers of Tarious neighboring businesses and similar fast food
restaurants, regarding me enecxs mac a loss of view would have on their businesses. See J. Philip
Cook Appraisal Report, pg. 51-54. Mr. Cook then incorporated the information he obtained from
these market participant interviews in oanjuaction with data research and case studies to
establish his expert opinion on the value of the loss of view from the defendants9 property, See
Id, at pg. 54-55. Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Cook's market participant interviews were
not the sole basis for his expert opinion Further, the use of market participant interviews by real
estate appraisers to aid in the formation of their opinion as to a property's value is an acceptable
method in the field of real estate appraisal Cf Appraisal Institute, Tlie Appraisal of Heal Estate,
pg 272 (13 th ed. 2008) (discussing the use of market participant interviews for the appraisal of

3

•special-purpose buildings'); see-ako AppraisaitotLmt^
[12H<'* ecL2Wl iftiisrassingTaw^^

pg: 2-7-1
ot market'detaiition and -

..•Giv.snf.float.ieaI 'estate ant)raisersTi5aaiifliketnartiorD*aiil interviews .when defas^rime
property vafa,es,..and-that the scope/of'Rate 703 'is .'expanding to permit e:xpe0/testhnon}t based;,,
upon observations^m'evidenckwMc&'Were madefeyothers, and becanse&e subject,
interviews ifrfofrins^^

Coot's expert opiniGm,4h§ Corat«Sndi

thatMr. uooiC;.s appraisal reponnspropsrunasricuies /.uz ana /u.3 oitne uta&.Knies ot
Evidence. Moreover/ Mr. Cook's appraisal report discusses Ms qualifications tp provide, gn
sxpert opinion in this matter, which the defendants havB not challenged, and addresses the data,
analysis and basis for formation of an opinion as to the value of the subject property's "before
condition" and "after condition." See generally, J. Philip Cook Appraisal Report Mr. Coot also
niffidsnfly identifies the market participants that were interviewed for his appraisal report, why
hese market participants were chosen for interview, and the information that was obtained.from
he interviews and how this information was implemented into the formation of his expert
jpmion. See generally Id. The Court, therefore, finds that sufficient foundation exists for the
expert opinion rendered in Mr. Cook's appraisal report In this matter, the defendants-' challenge
o Mr. Cook's appraisal report are more appropriately the subject of cross-examination and ebutial expert opinion, rather than the instant motion in limine and motion to strike. Cf,

The Court notes that while its specific citation to The Appraisal of IRsal Estate Thirteenth Edition discusses fee use
if market participant interviews in the appraisal of "special-purpose*' buildings, the concept of using such interviews
o aid in the determination of property values is, nevertheless, sufficiently analogous to the issues presented in the
ostant matter to dra'w an inference that market participant raterviews are a method reasonably relied npon by experts
cifhe field of real estate appraisal,
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•MMLING .CERTEEICA-CE..
I certiiyAatl.smt^i£Bmaiimdfl3:e,IJ.$. Postal Service, a true .and correct cqp5c.-pfvftje
foregoing RULING' AND ORDER ON DEPENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE AND
•MOTION TO SIRngB.PQR2g0N5- OF J,-?HTT ,"PP; GQQEg AJPPRAJSAL REPORT
postage pi&paid, to &e Allowing on&is dat&r • .^•j frqp
Donald J. Winde
Jehu W. Bolt
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C,
175 West 200 South, Suite-4000.'.
P.O. Box 2668
Salt Laie City, Utah 84110-2668
iholt(3foyiDfl fvrfrrm .r-nm

Randy S. Haste
[JTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFHCB
160 East'300 Soufh, 5 a floor
P.O.Box 140857
3altLake City, Utah B4114-0857
•aadyb.mitsr@utali. gov
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WINDER & COUNSEL PC
BUSINESS AND TRIAL ATTORNEYS
Suite 4000
175 West 200 South
PO Box 2668
SaltLake Cfey, Utah. 84110-2668
801322-2222/phone
801322-2282/ibc
www".wiiiderfiniLcom

Donald J. Winder
John W.Holt
IinetteB.Hutton,lLN.
Jerald V.Hale*
Lance P. Sorenson**
Michelle Winder McDonald****
Of Counsel
Robert K. Rotifedex, MJD.
*Also admitted in Arizona
**Also admitted in California
^Admitted in California only

Pat EL Bartholomew, Cleric of the Court
Utah Supreme Court
Scott M. Matheson Courthouse
450 South State Street
P.O. Box 140210
Salt Ldce City, UT 84114
Re:

Utah Department of Transportation v. Ivers, et al ("Arby's)
Case No. 20100511

Dear Ms. Bartholomew:
Our lawfirmrepresents Arby's in the above-reference condemnation case. Randy Hunter of the
Office of the Attorney Genera! represents UDOT.
This letter is presented in response to the Order entered by the Utah Supreme Court on June 29,
2010. For the reasons set forth herein and in the Docketing Statement Arby's previously filed,
this appeal should be retained by the Utah Supreme Court.
This is the latest appeal of a case with which the Utah Supreme Court is already well familiar.
The Utah Supreme Court previously granted Arby's petition for writ of certiorari following a
ruling by the Utah Court of Appeal precluding Arby's from seeking recovery for severance
damages. The Utah Supreme Court, upon certiorari, held there was a compensable loss for loss
of view and Arby's could pursue that claim for severance damages at trial. Ivers v. Utah Dept of
Tramp.9154 P3d 802 (Utah 2007). The case was remanded to the trial court for a determination
of whether the taking of Arby's property was essential to the construction project that causes the
loss of view. If it was found the talcing was essential to the project, the Utah Supreme Court
ruled Arby's would be awarded appropriate damages for its lost view.
Following remand, UDOT stipulated the talcing was essential to its project, leaving the amount of
severance damages as the only issue for trial. However, UDOT then filed a motion in limine
seeking to preclude Arby's severance damages claim on a basis never before raised in the long
history of this case. UDOT claimed that access deeds executed by Arby's predecessors in
interest could be interpreted to mean that any and all appurtenant rights, including the right of
view, had been relinquished years before Arby's acquired its interest in the property, in short,
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UDOT argued Arby's held no appurtenant rights that could be damaged by the subject
construction project. The trial court construed UDOT's motion in limine as an untimely motion
for leave to amend its pleadings. However, while the trial court was troubled by UDOT's
request and its use of "shifting theories", it ultimately determined that pursuant to UTAH CODE
ANN. §78B-6-511(2), UDOT had an unfettered right in condemnation cases ro amend its
pleadings at any time after the date of the service of summons, Based upon that ruling, Arby's
was once again been precluded from recovering its severance damages, which damages were
recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in Ivers L Arby's appealed the trial court's ruling. The
Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court. See UDOT v. Ivers, 218 P.3d 583 (Utah 2009)
(Ivers H) and required the case be tried pursuant to the mandate of Ivers Z,
Following Ivers II, the issue of severance damages wasfinallytried before a jury in a three-day
trial in April 2010. The parties and the trial court found it a challenge to instruct the jury and
conduct the trial based upon the holding of Ivers I with respect to the scope of severance
damages, Arby's claims that in attempting to abide by Ivers I9 the jury was confused by
inconsistent, contradictory and inconsistent instructions. The jury was asked to make
distinctions between view and visibility related to severance damages that were impossible to
make. Despite the fact Arby's had suffered a loss of view, and some damage would have to be
associated with that loss. The non-unanimous jury awarded no damages to Arby's, The issue of
severance damages in a case like the present case remains less than clear, despite the Ivers I
ruling.
This matter involves important constitutional law issues that should be reserved for decision by
the Utah Supreme Court for clarification. The Supreme Court has previously heard two appeals
in this case. The present appeal concerns issues that occurred at trial related to attempts to
follow the Court's prior rulings. The Utah Supreme Court is also potentially reconsidering its
ruling in Ivers I in Admiral Beverage Corporation v. UDOT, Case No. 20081Q54-sc5 which is
currently pending before this Court Finally, in the interests of consistency and in having is prior
rulings respected, the Utah Supreme Court should retain this appeal,
Thank: you for your kind attention to this matter.
Very truly yours^
JdtoW.Eolt
COM

P^andy Hunter

